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The debate on Indian entrepreneurship largely revolves around Weber’s Protestant ethic 
thesis, its applicability to non-western countries and his comparative study of the sub­
continent’s religions. However, India historically possessed a long indigenous 
entrepreneurial tradition which was represented by a number of business communities. 
The major hypothesis of this dissertation is that the socio-cultural milieu and practices of 
certain traditional business communities generates entrepreneurial behaviour, and this 
behaviour is compatible with contemporary occidental capitalism. This involves an 
analysis of the role of entrepreneurship and business communities in the Indian economy; 
specifically, a Jain community in the lapidary industry of Jaipur: The nature of business 
networks - bargaining, partnerships, credit, trust and the collection of information - and 
the identity of the family with the business enterprise, concluding with a critique of 
dichotomous models of the economy. The lapidary industry of the city is closely 
identified with the Jain community, but the latter is subject to religious schisms which 
are cross-cut by caste divisions. An important tenet of Jainism is philanthropy which 
functions as a form of competitive gift-giving, social prestige, creditworthiness and the 
legitimizing of ‘black money’. The Jain middle class patterns of consumption engender 
the creation and reproduction of social differentiation, particularly ostentatious weddings 
as supra-local vehicles for potential regional, national and international recognition. In 
conclusion, the Jain socio-cultural milieu and its commercial practices form an embedded 
economy. The religion/business nexus posits a conflation of prestigious religious and 
secular expenditure. Jain business skills lie in the minimising of economic uncertainties, 
but these are rationalizing mechanisms of an entrepreneurial process which is ultimately
2
speculative and unpredictable. Entrepreneurial judgements are governed not only by 
objective information but also by subjective cultural beliefs, and certain cultural matrices 
appear to give greater encouragement to entrepreneurship than others.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
i/ Jainism. Jains and Entrepreneurship
Jainism, like Buddhism, is usually depicted in the West as a heterodox rebellion against 
Vedic and brahmanical ritualism but, with some justification, Jains claim that both their 
belief system and Buddhism belong to an older Sramanic (‘striving’) tradition that 
predates what has come to be described as ‘Hinduism’. Although Buddhism’s antipathy 
to Vedism is unequivocal and its origins can be accurately dated, arguably Jainism is an 
incarnation of Eurasia’s oldest extant religious tradition. The exemplary luminary for 
Jains is Mahavira (‘Great Hero’ - 599-527 B.C.),1 an older contemporary of the Buddha, 
who is often described by non-Jains as the ‘founder’ of Jainism. However, Mahavira is 
for Jains the last of the twenty-four Tirthankaras or Jinas of our era, and the inheritor 
of the religious teaching of Parsva, the twenty-third Tirthankara? The Sramanic tradition 
emphasized renunciation and extreme austerities as the only means of salvation or moksa 
(liberation) from samsara, the endless cycle of transmigration.
lPThis is a Svetambar Jain dating, Digambar Jains’ claim that he died in 510 B.C. see, 
Dundas (1992:21).
2The Jain cosmological cycle has twelve yugas (ages) each of which produces 24 
Tirthankaras, the ‘fordmakers* who cross the ocean of suffering to the other side of 
existence; Jina is a spiritual victor from which ‘Jain’ etymologically derives. Of the 24 
Tirthankaras, there is historical evidence for only Parsva (c. 850 B.C.) and Mahavira; 
see, Jaini (1979:10-21).
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During a famine in the forth century B.C., a number of Jain ascetics migrated from the 
faith’s heartland in present day Bihar to southern India, and this geographical shift by 
part of a once unified religious community precipitated the later division of mendicants 
into two distinct traditions, the Digambars and the Svetambars. The major point of 
contention between the Digambars (‘sky clad’) and Svetambars (‘white [i.e. cotton] clad’) 
largely revolves around whether ascetics should wear any form of clothing. The migration 
to southern India formed the nucleus of the Digambar community that were and are 
largely agriculturalists and concentrated in the Deccan, the modem states of Maharashtra 
and Karnataka. The Svetambar’s are mainly concentrated in Gujarat and Rajasthan where 
they are for the most part involved in commerce, although there are members of both 
sects scattered across India; for example, Calcutta has an important Jain mercantile 
community, and Jaipur in Rajasthan a large Digambar population.
Both major sects are sub-divided into a number of sub-sects - sanghas (religious 
communities) or gacchas (sects) - which form the major loci of religious affiliation. Some 
sects are mandir-margis (temple-goers) or murti-pujaks (‘image-worshippers’) whereas 
others eschew all forms of ‘idolatry’; Jainism does not require a formal temple priesthood 
although these have evolved, and quasi-ascetic institutions have also developed in both 
major divisions of the faith. Jains are also divided into a number of jatis (‘castes’) which 
are either Digambar or Svetambar, although caste designations may be shared with 
Hindus.
Within each sub-sect, the major division is between the minority of ascetics and the 
majority of the laity. The ascetics, having formally renounced all worldly concerns, are
totally dependent on the laity for all their material concerns. With the exception of the 
monsoon season, the ascetics continually wander the region where their followers are 
known to reside allowing the latter to offer alms. The ascetics are primarily exemplary 
upholders of the Jain faith, embodiments of the path of renunciation, sermonizing on the 
faith’s values and morality centred on ahimsa (non-violence) and offering spiritual advice 
to the laity. Ascetics are of course drawn from the ranks of the Jain laity, but the 
infrastructural support for the ascetics presupposes a large and generous congregation that 
will not only maintain the ascetic order but also promote and subsidize Jain religious 
institutions.
The major mechanism for this support is through the pan-Indian practice of religious 
gifting, dana. Besides the gifts of mainly food and clothing to ascetics, the Jain laity - 
or rather its wealthiest individuals - donate lavishly to the construction and renovation of 
temples, temple images and other religious institutions; they also underwrite the expenses 
of public religious events. The subsidy is often considerable as these events are a 
citywide or even a regional phenomena, perhaps involving upto several hundred thousand 
Jains. And an important ingredient of all major Jain rituals is institutionalized competitive 
gift-giving in the form of auctions for the honour of donating to the highest bidder. This 
not only generates additional funds for Jain organizations, but also provides an arena for 
affluent individuals to monopolize these events, to openly display their wealth and 
creditworthiness, which in turn engenders status.
Thus such events provide a nexus between religious observance and wealth creation. 
Particularly in northern India, the Jains have historically been associated with commerce,
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one of a number of business communities who have been designated Vaisya or Baniya in 
the pan-India vama scheme. The Jains have been involved in commerce since antiquity, 
and they have provided contemporary India with some of its most powerful corporations 
and industrialists besides a plethora of smaller firms. But behind the individual business 
lies a sub-structure of Jain sanskar, a cultural tradition which embraces religious beliefs 
and practices, social observances, and importantly entreprepreneurship. And this 
conjunction is the primary theme of this dissertation.
Aside from servicing the ascetics, the role of the Jain layman is only to partially to 
imitate the austerities of the mendicants, and this can be undertaken by formally adhering 
to the five anuvrats (‘lesser vows’) which mirror the mahavrats (‘great vows’) of the 
ascetics. The principle appellation of the layman is sravaka (listener) and by listening to 
the ascetics’ preaching he reproduces the original samavasarana (assembly) of the 
Tirthankaras. But from his survey of Jain medieval literature, Williams has argued that 
by this period an informal non-canonical dana-vrata (vow of charity) became the 
layman’s major expression of his faith (Williams 1963:149). However, rarely do Jain 
laymen undertake austerities and the five vows but largely concern themselves with 
traditional precepts of vegetarianism, ritual, offering dana, pious participation in religious 
events and affairs of the sangha. ‘[Contrary] to ascetic ideology, the Jain lay person does 
not gain identity solely through interaction with ascetics and a satisfactory and fully 
Jain religious life may be constructed around events and practices in which ascetics play 
a minimal or non-existent part’ (Dundas 1992:168).
Jains have tended to hold occupations, notably as traders, that are nominally non-violent
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in intention if not always in practice: For example, the earliest textile mills in 
Ahmedabad were owned by Jains, with the potential for destruction of countless insects 
and micro-organisms as the yam passed through the looms, ‘Economics proved stronger 
than principles here* (Gillion 1968:86). As Dundas has noted, Jain industrialists do not 
speculate on the infringement to the core belief of their faith in their enterprises and 
manufacturing processes. Of the rural Digambars of the Deccan, these mainly 
agriculturalists - theoretically, a proscribed occupation - are no longer stigmatized for the 
violence they cause to organisms in the earth (Dundas 1992:165). And Jains, at least in 
Jaipur, are keen supporters of the Bharatiya Janata Party (B.J.P.), which in the late 
1980’s and early 1990’s has been responsible either directly and indirectly for a 
disproportionate level of communal violence in northern India.3
Pace Weber, the obvious question pertinent to the role of Jains as successful 
entrepreneurs is whether they possess some equivalent form of the Protestant ethic, 
religious principles that foster capitalism. According to Weber, India failed to develop 
its own form of modem rational capitalism, and India’s religions may have been directly 
and indirectly responsible for the lack of indigenous economic development. While 
acknowledging the Indian artisans’ industriousness and the general acquisitiveness of most 
Indians, in isolation they could not have initiated modem capitalism (Weber 1958:113). 
The main impediment was the ‘spirit’ of the religious culture, the combination of the
3It is worth considering whether this ethical relativism can be indirectly attributed to 
the epistemological relativism of the Jain concept of anekanta (‘many-pointed’), whereby 
the model of reality simultaneously involves two apparent contradictions: permanence and 
change, and ontological judgements are predicated by syadvada (‘the doctrine of may 
be’). At this level of abstraction, Dundas argues, ‘manysidedness could ultimately be 
regarded as operating in a moral vacuum* (Dundas 1992:199).
caste order and the doctrine of karma (Weber 1958:112,131)- All Asian soteriologies and 
philosophies were otherworldly paths to salvation, and although Hindus have been 
economically active they possessed no ‘rational, inner-worldly ethic of behaviour’ - such 
as the Protestants* possessed - that manifests itself as ‘economic striving’ (Weber 
1958:330,337). And although industrialization had been introduced by the British, with 
their departure India would revert to the Middle Ages (Weber 1958:325).
Of the Jains, Weber argues that they shared many of the basic suppositions of the 
Hindus, they were partly integrated into the caste system and also shared the karma 
doctrine. He notes that they shared many of the ethical and commercial characteristics 
of the Protestants, but their behaviour was dominated by ‘ascetic rectitude’ - as opposed 
to an ‘active asceticism’ - and ritualism, and it was these that led to their being confined 
to ‘commercial capitalism* rather than developing ‘industrial capitalism’ (Weber 
1958:193-204).
Buss has argued that critiques of Weber’s comparative sociology of Asia are of three 
kinds: Firstly, those concerned with the ‘Protestant ethic thesis’, that is whatever readers’ 
perceive to be the hypothesis - vis-a-vis Asia - and it must either be refuted or they must 
accept Asian ‘underdevelopment and stagnation for many years to come’. Secondly, 
‘Many facts and details which have been made available by modem research, obviously 
were unknown in Weber’s time and, as far as these new findings are concerned, Weber 
must be corrected*. Thirdly, the nature of the comparative endeavour: following Dumont 
for example, whether the study of India tells us anything about the Occident (Buss 1985:4- 
5). I hope to have modestly contributed to the second critique.
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The subtleties, breadth, and the seemingly contradictory scholarship, not to mention the 
translations, of Weber’s work have bequeathed a problematic legacy to his interpreters. 
Besides the three critiques identified by Buss, Singer has identified three phases of 
analyses of Weber’s Protestant ethic thesis: Firstly, with regard to comparative study of 
Asia's religions, the thesis was applied negatively: Asia’s religions lacked certain crucial 
elements - an equivalent ethic, secularization, rationality - and these explained economic 
backwardness. Secondly, when scholars did find equivalents of the Protestant ethic - some 
indigenous, some imported - their presence would arguably initiate industrial 
development. And thirdly, following Bellah (1968), that analogies to the Protestant Ethic 
must be sought ‘in the transformations of the basic structure of society and in its 
underlying value system’, which was the nature of Weber's endeavour in the European 
case (Singer 1966:497). Almost twenty years later, Singer was arguing for a ‘fourth 
phase’, ‘to study how the cultural metabolism of tradition and innovation generates 
persistence and change in diverse societies.
It will be sufficient to solve the riddle of why Indians my be becoming more modem 
without becoming less traditional....It is already apparent....that the concept of self- 
identity is a more fruitful research tool than the concept of "spirit" for exploring the 
cultural and social psychology of individuals, nations and civilizations’ (Singer 1985:40).
Contrary to Kantowsky’s (1982) claim that Weber never addressed himself to the 
industrializing of underdeveloped countries, Singer argues that Weber’s concern with the 
long-term processes of religious rationalization and disenchantment made an important 
contribution to the ‘theory of modernization’, whose implications are global (Singer 
1985:40-41). He cites Shils’ belief that Afro-Asian societies will be susceptible to 
wholesale rationalization, but there are limits to this process: the complexities and
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ignorance of the task; the resistance and irrationality of rulers, peasants and workers; the 
scarcity of resources and trained personnel; loyalties to family, community, tribe and 
region. These limits engender conflicts among varying interests, the result is compromise. 
For example, ‘In India, the battle of the castes and regions over the allocation of 
appointments, opportunities to obtain the educational qualification for appointments, and 
the allocation of federal funds to regions is sustained, indeed, would be impossible 
without the prior definition of the contending collectivities by traditions of belief about 
the caste system and the theology from which it is derived, attachments to linguistic 
traditions and the regional communities thereby formed’ (Shils 1983:301).
It should be noted, however, that what Shils fails to mention are that ‘traditions of belief 
about the caste system’ are rather comparatively recent re-inventions of caste identity. 
With the advent of competing caste blocs, usually in the form of caste associations, caste 
consciousness has become an important and pervasive factor in the political process, 
especially in elections to legislative assemblies, to administrative bodies, and in the 
distribution of offices in government-run institutions (Singh 1988:166-69).
Weber’s comments on the Jains will be further explored in the conclusion to the 
dissertation, but their commercial acumen - and that of Vaisnavite Hindu merchants - is 
predicated on their ability to utilize familial, caste, religious and mercantile 
infrastructures as sources of capital, information, partnerships and marketing. These 
cross-cutting and flexible strands combining religious, social and commercial factors 
provide the varying resource networks which facilitate entrepreneurship.
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A major preoccupation of Jain Baniyas was with their status as reputable businessmen 
which historically has been a byword for Jain integrity, discretion and frugality; and 
reputation (abru) was an essential prerequisite of creditworthiness. Status was grounded 
not only on commercial and social criteria but also, rather than asceticism, on a 
reputation for religious piety; to a large extent, piety and religious philanthropy were 
perceived as generating success in business; and ‘there was general acknowledgement that 
commerce and Jainism alike would only flourish if money was used for religious 
purposes and be thus transformed into social and spiritual credit’ (Dundas 1992:170).
Thus piety and philanthropy in religion, probity and a certain caution in business, an 
abstemious lifestyle, strict vegetarianism, sobriety, and orthodoxy in marital alliances, 
have characterized the Jain business community as ‘conservative’. Dundas has argued that 
these features of Jain lay behaviour remained intact until comparatively recently (Dundas 
1992:171), the arrival of the pax Britannica and later Independence brought a huge 
increase in potential and actual trade which has been exploited by India’s business 
communities, of which the Jains have been one of the most prominent. But, as has 
already been noted, the Jains are not an undifferentiated community and a large section 
are not involved in commerce at all. A number of those involved in trade, however, 
particularly in lucrative external markets, have experienced a relative quantum leap in 
affluence that was earlier only possible for a few major seths (business magnates). With 
prosperity and western contacts have come some changes in business practices, lifestyle 
and the appropriation of consumer goods as new markers of status for the nouveaux 
riche. Nonetheless, a variable adherence to an underlying sanskar remains but is subject, 
as arguably it always was, to negotiation and the strategies of individuals rather than
being simply replicated as an ideology.
ii/ Plan of the Dissertation
Chapter 2 begins with an introductory historical outline of Indian entrepreneurship from 
the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries, corresponding to the imperial impact and the 
post-independent period. But India possessed a considerable indigenous mercantile 
tradition that stretches back to antiquity, and this heritage was embodied in a number of 
business communities or castes which were geographically distributed around the sub­
continent. This is followed by a review of some of the major theories of entrepreneurship 
- Cantillion, Say, Knight, Weber, Hagen, McClelland, Schumpeter and Barth - and their 
particular relevance to Indian entrepreneurship. Of course, this debate is dominated by 
Weber’s essay on Indian religions, particularly his reference to two sects associated with 
the Baniyas, Vallabhacarya Vaisnavism and Jainism. These theories will be measured 
against the empirical studies of Indian entrepreneurship by Bema, Hazlehurst, Fox, 
Owens and Nandy, and Cottam. The chapter concludes with a survey of the largely 
theoretical literature on caste and class in an urban environment.
Continuing the historical account of the business communities, Chapter 3 begins with the 
economic practices of north Indian Baniyas during the eighteenth century, particularly 
their expertise in trading and financial services, and their relations with the powerholders 
of the region. The relocation of the Rajput state of Amber to the purpose-built city of 
Jaipur provides the setting for the political turmoil that surrounded the fledging state in 
the middle decades of the eighteenth century. But the depredations of the region
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fortuitously provided Jaipur with an almost immediate commercial advantage over its 
mercantile rivals. The unique town planning with its allocation of trading facilities at the 
heart of the city provided an opportunity and a haven for both indigenous and migrant 
merchants to establish themselves. As the new state of Jaipur was consolidated, the local 
Baniyas expanded their banking and moneylending activities over the state and regional 
economy.
The role of the British raj in the political economy of Jaipur state was, firstly, largely 
concerned with pacification and the extraction of revenue; later, with an abortive attempt 
to reform the land revenue system, and to successfully open the state to trade with British 
India. But by the end of the nineteenth century with the city's increase in population and 
expansion of the state administration, and due to the disproportionate importation of 
foreign goods, Jaipur had become only a marginal manufacturing centre. Local commerce 
became focused on financial services and on the major entrepots of British India. The one 
counter-trend was the almost surreptitious growth of jewellery and lapidary 
manufacturing, which had been a minor industry of the city since its inception. An 
attempt to trace the industry’s growth, and the role of Jains in the city and the industry, 
will conclude the chapter.
Chapter 4 begins with the macro-economic background to the lapidary industry in India 
and Jaipur during 1989/90 with its emphasis on exports. This is followed by an 
examination of the nature of the relations between the Jain firms and their largely Muslim 
artisans. But due to Hindu-Muslim communal violence in Jaipur, there was a discernible 
shift in employment patterns among the larger firms from the traditional sub-contracting
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of Muslim craftsmen to the direct employment of Hindu workers.
The traditional Indian 'jajmani system’ is seen in the ‘substantivist’ literature as a series 
embedded transactional relationships inimical to the atomized impersonal exchanges of 
‘market* societies. However, the evidence from peasant/bazaar environments in many 
parts of world and the lapidary market in Jaipur is that durable personalized embedded 
partnerships engender commercial information, predictability, lessen risk and generate 
trust. The linkages between the various aspects of the gem trade - exporting, 
manufacturing, etc. - are facilitated by brokers, who are basically middlemen in a large 
highly-organized market where margins are relatively small. The commercial modes and 
strategies of information collection, bargaining and negotiation are compared to those 
described in the economic anthropological literature. The rather secretive area of credit 
and reliability of account books as reflecting the true worth of the firm are also 
examined. The gem firms of Jaipur are usually synonymous with the family, business 
families rather than family businesses; and the family is particularly important in the 
training of sons in the business, although there was an extra-familial system of 
apprenticeship which is now in decline.
The dyadic personalized clientalism of the market place can be extended by the 
businessman into the workings of the Indian bureaucracy. Relations with government 
officials are cultivated to manipulate the government bureaucracy to ensure both the 
successful passage of paperwork, and to negotiate underestimated tax bills. These and 
other strategies involving ‘black money’ such as smuggling and underinvoicing are 
considered corrupt but necessary business practises. The chapter concludes with a
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discussion of the applicability of dual sector models to the lapidary economy of Jaipur.
From economic behaviour, Chapter 5 shifts to the study of the Svetambar Jain community 
which dominates the lapidary industry in Jaipur. Without addressing the problematics 
inherent in the concept ‘community’, the term is a relevant appellation and is widely used 
by the Jains themselves. But its use is contextual and individual and embraces religious, 
caste and occupational affiliations, elements of which may be shared with non-Jains. The 
religious element of the community is primarily divided into its ascetic and lay 
modalities; the secondary division is into a number of sects and sub-sects, among the 
Svetambar Jains of Jaipur two ‘idolatrous* and two ‘non-idolatrous* sects predominate. 
Cross-cutting these religious affiliations are a number of jatis which can be correlated 
with the primary sectarian division. The major Svetambar religious institutions - temples, 
meeting halls, etc. - are divided between religious and caste organizations, and largely 
situated around the traditional jewellers’ neighbourhood. The nature of caste for Jains is 
not unproblematic, any form of hierarchical ranking in an idiom of purity is rejected but 
caste has been accommodated as a basis for social organization. Co-incidental with the 
relationship of Jainism to caste is the question of occupation; with its proscriptions on any 
activity that involves overt violence, Jainism has historically seen the rather sedentary 
profession of the merchant as the most preferred occupation.
The Jains practice patrilocality with often the extended family sharing one residency, but 
in-marrying wives who are natives of the city retain strong ties with their natal home. 
Traditionally, marriage was intra-caste if not always intra-sectarian - Jains may even 
marry Hindus of the same caste. However, there a growing number of inter-caste and
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even inter-varna arranged ‘love marriages', alliances that have a wider class character. 
Marriages with Hindus of the same caste have traditionally been considered ‘orthodox', 
and this in part reflects the status of Jains in a wider Hindu world. This status is most 
accentuated during participation in Hindu festivals, notably Diwali; nonetheless, 
paralleling the shared celebration of the new year is an important and specifically Jain 
ritual. Thus for Jains, Diwali signifies both their symbiosis to a Hindu social world and 
their ritual separateness. This leads to the conclusion that Svetambar Jains do form a 
definable community in Jaipur, but this identity intersects and can merge with potentially 
separate, sectarian, caste, occupational and class identities.
Continuing the community theme, Chapter 6 analyses some of the Svetambar Jain laity’s 
ritual gifts and infrastructural subsidy to Jain ascetics and institutions. Firstly, the nature 
and scriptural prescriptions for Jain gift-giving, interpreting the vow of limiting one’s 
possessions, and other forms of meritorious donating. The most common forms of 
donations and the most meritorious are gifts to Jain images and ascetics, and the former 
is comparable to similar Buddhist rather than Hindu practices. Interaction with ascetics 
is particularly prevalent during the monsoon season when the mendicants must stop their 
wanderings; this is a period of intense communion between the laity and ascetics, of 
fasting and ritual confession, which culminates in a re-enactment of Mahavira's birth. An 
important feature of the re-enactment is a symbolic auction of the fourteen dreams of 
Mahavira’s mother that prefigured his birth.
A major ritual event is the consecration and installation of new Jain images, and the scale 
of the occasion involves participation from the entire region. This and other major rituals
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usually incoiporate auctions for the privilege of making donations to the images; but 
public religious events such as fasts and pilgrimages are sponsored collectively and 
individually, often at considerable expense, by affluent Jains. However, an examination 
of the yearly accounts of one Jain sangha reveals their inadequacies in respect of such 
payments which probably involves black money. Sthanakvasi-inspired philanthropy in 
Jaipur, in lieu of any temples and thus less religious infrastructure, can be characterized 
as * secular* charity and is largely targeted at non-Jains, although it possesses a religious 
dimension for the donors.
Such activities, particularly gifts to Urthankara images and ascetics, are considered 
highly meritorious and engender beneficial karma. However, the Tirthankaras, like the 
Buddha, being exemplary human beings who have achieved liberation stand at the apex 
of the Jain cosmos, above deities and mere humankind, and as such cannot interfere in 
the world. But the austere example of these enlightened beings is only available to the 
rarest of mortals, there is little emotional consolation for the mass of the laity in their 
hope of rewards or salvation. Thus over the centuries a number of cults have arisen 
around tutelary deities and Jain divines who are perceived as having the power to 
intercede in their devotees* worldly affairs. In Jaipur, this devotionalism centres around 
the cult of the historical *Dada* and cuts across Jain sectarian boundaries. And the cult 
is intimately connected with commercial success. Nevertheless theoretically, such cults 
contradict the absolutist aetiology of the doctrine of karma; but in practice, the 
incompatibility is successfully resolved if the two belief systems are kept distinct and 
separate.
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Gifting to images and ascetics is open to all Jains, but the subsidy of major religious 
events and institutions has become the prerogative of the most affluent. Wealth has had 
a thoroughgoing impact on ritual practices to the point where a handful of competing 
families monopolize major religious events to the exclusion of the mass of the laity. And 
it is generally perceived that this expenditure is financed by black money.
The theme of ostentation is pursued in Chapter 7 which examines the lifestyles and 
conspicuous consumption of Jaipur’s Svetambar Jain gem merchants. Historically, in 
India’s cities, an extant caste system has been paralleled by an incipient class structure 
resulting in the formation of an urban bourgeoisie that tends to be comprised of members 
of the twice-born castes. Following Bourdieu, as a form of ‘cultural capital’, one of the 
markers and prerequisites of class status is an emphasis on the acquisition of higher 
educational qualifications. In Jaipur, the majority of Svetambar Jains mercantile families 
have endorsed costly English-medium secondary and higher education as an essential for 
their children’s future. Education can be viewed as an ‘invisible’ commodity, more 
tangible consumer durables were displayed in their homes and lifestyles. Not only 
purpose-built or refurbished homes, but an important ingredient in this lifestyle were 
much-coveted imported goods which are distinguished as more sophisticated and superior 
to their Indian-made equivalents. But a number of gem merchants eschew this lifestyle 
and we can distinguish two patterns of consumption: a minority abstemious group of non- 
consumers of western goods and the majority who, to some degree, have embraced 
consumerism.
Ostentatious displays of wealth were most prevalent at weddings of the most affluent
23
families. Historically, Svetambar Jain weddings were community affairs involving the 
whole caste which helped compensate for the often strict sumptuary rules that 
accompanied marriage. But the sumptuary restrictions have been jettisoned, and the 
protracted traditional rituals have been conflated into usually a weekend. The wedding 
revolves around the timing of the marriage ritual which are invariably held in one of the 
city’s hotels. This is preceded by mayra, a ritual presentation of gifts to the bride’s 
mother by her brothers to offset the cost of wedding. This ritual and the ostentatious 
display of the bride’s trousseau plus dowry, the chosen hotel, the number and status of 
the guests have become important markers in gauging the relative wealth and 
creditworthiness of the Jain gem merchants. The conspicuous expenditure at weddings 
can be seen as form of ‘potlatch*, a competitive system of status ranking among families 
searching for commercial and prestigious advantages.
Finally, the conspicuous lifestyle of the majority of the Svetambar Jains blends into 
Jaipur’s affluent middle classes of which they are an important constituent. As ‘upper 
caste, middle class’ not only sect and caste but considerations of education, occupation 
and income were increasingly important, and this is reflected in the choice of marriage 
partners.
iii/ Methodology
The period of fieldwork was of 15 months duration, from January 1990 to March 1991 
almost exclusively in Jaipur and its environs. The objective of the fieldwork was to 
collect data on entrepreneurship in an Indian city. Having visited Jaipur several times and
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noted its considerable commercial activity, it seemed an ideal environment to observe the 
processes of entrepreneurship. Also, I had contacts in the city and several of these were 
involved in the gem trade. The possibility of studying the lapidary industry had therefore 
presented itself even before I arrived in India. Although none of these contacts were 
Jains, it soon became apparent after only a few days into my researches that the industry 
was dominated by Jain traders. If the industry was to be the object of research, and I was 
not yet sure that it would, it seemed obvious to concentrate on an identifiable group who 
were most associated with it. On initially presenting myself to one major Jain jewellers 
in the city, one of the few who was involved in retailing and thus easier to identify and 
approach, I was directed to the offices of Jain charity where I encountered several gem 
traders. From this second encounter, I was introduced to an ever-increasing number of 
Jain traders, their households and families mainly concentrated around Jauhri (jeweller) 
Bazaar.
Besides the household, a large amount of time was also spent in the various Jain religious 
establishments both in and outside the city. Also, for what seemed an inordinate amount 
of time, attending a large number of weddings became an important source of data 
collection. Thus the conjunction of these elements, basically the business/religious nexus, 
presented itself as the theme for the research and the dissertation.
Although I had contact with Digambar Jains and non-Jains, all my core informants were 
Svetambar Jains of the Srimal and Oswal jatis as these two castes dominated the lapidary 
industry in Jaipur. The choice of forty households/businesses from these castes seemed 
the maximal manageable number of core informants. That these core informants were
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only affiliated to two Jain sects - the Kharataragaccha and Sthanakvasi - seemed at the 
time fortuitous, but in retrospect may reflect the sectarian orientation of my initial 
informants. The time spent with these core informants was very uneven; perhaps half this 
number I encountered almost every week or even every working day, the remainder more 
infrequently. As a rule, the more affluent and prestigious the merchant, the more 
inaccessible both he and his business premises. If he was not buttonholed at a public 
event, visits and interviews had to be made by appointment which without the right 
introduction, in the form of an appropriate - i.e. known - intermediary interceding on my 
behalf, access could be difficult to obtain. But generally, a shodakwala (researcher) from 
the London School of Economics doing a socio-economic study of the ‘Jain jewellers of 
Jaipur* was more than welcome. With the exception of proffering hard personal economic 
data (see below), the majority of my informants were more than accommodating and keen 
for an ‘academic* to be studying their milieu. A number went to great lengths in 
organizing access to the lakhpatis (‘millionaires*), introductions to other families and 
invitations to their social and religious events. But unsurprisingly, a few did express the 
wish that I would study Jainism per se, i.e. the religion, as that was something ‘very 
worthwhile*.
The most singular difficulty was collecting economic information at all, and then 
wondering how accurate it was particularly where it concerned enumeration. Indian 
businessmen of whatever hue are notoriously difficult to elicit information from: ‘When 
it comes to statements about their wealth, business capital, turnover, and so forth - which 
they never correctly told anyone, so they said - it was impossible to get figures with any 
assurance of accuracy’ (Fox 1969:147). For example, I observed what I hope was a
cross-section of forty Svetambar Jain lapidary family businesses in Jaipur. I say I hope 
it was a cross-section, as there were the super-rich at one end of a continuum and I’m 
not quite sure what at the other as nobody was exactly in penury. But the majority were 
scattered somewhere in between. How does one know? By a combination of emic and etic 
responses, experience, intuition: I had opinions from other informants, Jain and non-Jain, 
outside the forty families, and all were often trenchant in their pronouncements of others 
in the industry. As a consequence, a great amount of the information I collected was 
probably as much anecdote and gossip as ‘fact’, but no less interesting for that. There 
were no serious discrepancies between their opinions and mine when it came to, say, a 
league table of wealth.
Among the forty family businesses, annual turnover was between ‘Rs. 5 crores’ to ‘Rs. 
3 lakhs' ,4 the average annual income was 15% of total sales revenue. I was continually 
warned, even by those concerned, that almost nobody would tell the truth when it came 
to such figures, and that the very rich would underestimate their income and the least rich 
would overestimate theirs - as ‘this is what they do' under such circumstances. However, 
besides the above doubtful indicators, there were more tangible ones such as the state of 
their residence, not just the size but how many ‘gadgets' they possess, how many children 
were undertaking English-medium secondary and tertiary education and, perhaps most 
indicative of all, how much their daughter's marriage may have cost. The latter with its 
attendant gifts was always a popular topic of gossip plus a source for ranking families in 
terms of affluence and status.
4£1 = Rs.35 (1990), 1 crore = 10,000,000, 1 lakh = 100,000.
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Typically, a day was spent at one or more of the household premises of the gem 
merchants and, for the reasons outlined above, this was unlikely to be one of the most 
prestigious firms which are larger than the norm. In his ‘office*, the trader would sit 
either at his desk or on his gaddi (seat) as other traders and brokers came with examples 
or consignments of gemstones to sell, or enquiring about stones for sale. A greater part 
of the day was spent poring over the ubiquitous white packets, examining, separating, 
weighing, and so on, varying quantities of gemstones. Although bargaining was minimal, 
this was the transactional focus of the entrepreneurial process; and as many traders have 
overseas customers my presence was rarely queried, thus observation of their behaviour 
and interaction was never problematic. After several weeks, and my attendance at a 
number of households became more commonplace, I could ‘participate’ to a degree in the 
above processes attempting to judge - and not very successfully - the quality and value 
of the stones. (Several informants said they could teach me the business, but that it would 
take five years!) At this stage, after about six months, I still felt it was imprudent to even 
elicit any hard economic data, as I had not been in Jaipur long enough to delve into 
matters of a confidential nature.
Simultaneously, I now had access to the non-commercial areas of several households 
although, with the occasional exception, I had very little contact with their womenfolk. 
And I was able to participate in their familial and religious functions which might take 
place within the home or outside. This access facilitated the collection of largely non­
commercial data, and I was particularly interested in observing the household in respect 
of consumer durables, especially non-indigenous goods; and, with the expansion of the 
lapidary industry, whether the choice of marriage partners had changed from the
normative pattern.
It was only after one year that I felt in a position to try and gather any hard economic 
data, and this was less in the form of a questionnaire than an open-ended series of 
questions depending on whether I was getting anywhere or not. The responses were 
variable, a few informants insisted on giving me 'official* and 'unofficial* estimates of 
turnover; another, from one of the most important family businesses who have a relative 
living in New York to deal exclusively with Tiffanys, told me bluntly that ‘We don’t give 
that information to anybody. If you want to write something in your little book, p u t " 1 
crore"* - needless to say, this was a risible underestimate. In an effort to gauge an 
informant’s income and perhaps to illustrate the folly of asking such questions, one 
potential follow-up question was on household expenditure per month: in one example, 
an informant said his annual income was ‘Rs.50,000’ but his monthly expenditure was 
'Rs. 10,000*.... Thus I abandoned this line of questioning, unable to summon up the 
nerve to say that it did not add up. As Fox noted, it is impossible to gather this 
information with any sort of accuracy, and the reasons for this circumspection are 
palpably obvious: The understating or non-recording of a large number of transactions 
to circumvent revenue collection, and therefore the unquantifiable amount of black money 
that circulates within the industry.
But my informants were much more open and would talk freely about the nature, if not 
the amounts involved, of the ‘black economy*, the scams and ruses of underinvoicing, 
smuggling, negotiating tax bills, and their cultivation of the appropriate bureaucrats. I put 
this openness down to the fact that it was so commonplace, widespread and felt to be a
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commercial necessity. This is not to imply that the lapidary business is unethical, but 
rather the traders’ argued that an exception had to made in respect of the government if 
they were to remain successful and profitable. The government - i.e. the state - was 
regarded with contempt, construed or misconstrued as pro-state sector industries, 
monopolistic, ‘socialist’ and inimical to private enterprise. The state with its plethora of 
regulations, permits and corruption was seen as a straightjacket stifling business potential, 
a situation that - if elected - the B.J.P. would eventually reverse. However, although their 
political opinions were sincere, I suspect this interpretation may have simply been a post 
hoc rationalization of illegality.
Another objective of the research was diachronic, to endeavour to delineate the historical
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growth of the lapidary industry from the city’s inception in the eighteenth century. But 
due to lapses or selective memory, and the lack or inaccessibility to family records, I was 
unable to construct the local business history I had envisaged. Many informants’ claimed 
that the old family records were destroyed at Independence when Jaipur was incorporated 
into the new Indian revenue structure, as they paid no taxes hitherto and were loath to 
retain a potential source of assessment. This claim I was never able to confirm, but it 
sounds unlikely and was probably concerned with the fact that Jains were particularly 
reluctant to divulge any commercial information (see, Bayly 1983:380). Thus I was 
restricted to the rather fragmentary records of mainly British provenance that were 
housed in the Jaipur City Palace and the Indian Office Libraries. But, nevertheless, I 
have aimed to construct the economic and historical matrix out of which the lapidary 
industry evolved.
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CHAPTER 2: INDIAN ENTREPRENEURSHIP. COMMUNITIES AND CASTE
Bayly opens one of his works with the words, ‘Since the Middle Ages European 
travellers have been fascinated by the bustle and colour of the oriental bazaar* (Bayly 
1983:vii). The travel writers palette of cliches is often pushed to extremes in such an 
environment, but for the social scientist the ‘rich pattern of commercial life’ is 
problematic: Amid the plethora of detail how are we to identify social entities and 
relationships? One salient strand, however, that has been successfully identified is 
entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship has been interpreted in several ways, for example, 
in terms of innovative activities, personality characteristics, and ethical values. A number 
of social scientists have argued that entrepreneurship is a key variable which links the 
socio-cultural milieu with the rate of economic development. The characteristics of the 
small enterprise dovetail well with the socio-economic objectives of a developing country 
such as India. Generally, they are labour intensive, employment generating, capital 
saving, and capable of operating on an individual, unregulated basis.
But Indian entrepreneurship is hardly a recent phenomenon, a tradition of commercial 
enterprise stretches back to antiquity. Although India and the West have had different if 
overlapping economic histories, I believe there is no fundamental difference between the 
natures of western capitalism and Indian commerce. Both possess a social and economic 
system in which individuals are free to own the means of production and to maximise 
profits, and where resource allocation is determined by the price system. However, a 
confusion has arisen through the use of an assortment of terms to describe the Indian 
entrepreneur - i.e. businessman, merchant, trader, Baniya, etc. - but rather than reduce
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these to one label, such as 'entrepreneur’, I will interpret them as interchangeable terms 
of a single ‘occupational category* (Gould 1970:53).
Besides an introductory brief outline of modem Indian entrepreneurship and the business 
communities, this chapter will examine theories of entrepreneurship in an Indian context; 
secondly, a review of the ethnographic literature on Indian entrepreneurship; and finally, 
caste and class in an urban setting.
i/ Historical Outline of Indian Entrepreneurship from the Eighteenth Century
This outline begins in the eighteenth century, and the choice of this period as a starting 
point corresponds with the early years of the considerable British impact on the sub­
continent. Anecdotaly, in the mid-eighteenth century, India was as urbanized as Britain, 
France and Italy, and there were a number of important trading centres around the Gulf 
of Cambay on the west coast, in the Indus Valley in the northwest, along the river 
Ganges and its delta in Bengal, and in southern India’s coastal regions (Gadgil 1959:8,11- 
16).1 By the eighteenth century, Indian traders in these areas had established considerable 
commercial contact with the chartered European companies such as the English East India 
Company. Besides trading, Indian merchants historically also acted as financiers: 
changing money, providing bills of exchange, acting as revenue collectors for the 
princely states, providing financial credit to royal courts, individuals and Europeans 
(Gadgil 1959:32-34).
*1 use the term ‘India’ as an equivalent to an undivided pre-independent sub-continent.
Although the British established trading stations in India at the beginning of the sixteenth 
century, it was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that manufacturing expanded 
through the development of the railways and an enlarged market. Around 1850, Indian 
entrepreneurs’ entered large-scale manufacturing, especially the textile industry in western 
India, and were largely responsible ‘for the introduction of the modem factory system in 
India’ (Medhora 1965:558). Simultaneously, in Bengal, export-orientated industries such 
as jute, tea and coal were established and financed mainly from British sources (Medhora 
1965:568). But the introduction of machine-made goods signalled the demise of a large 
section of India’s traditional handicraft industry. Arguably, the most important Indian 
ingredient to its embryonic industrialization in the nineteenth century was finance. ‘The 
availability of capital may be regarded not only as an operative factor in the development 
of a modem textile industry....but as one of its causes also: the financiers were looking 
for profitable avenues of investment* (Gillion 1968:79).
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Indian entrepreneurs’ - personified by the 
Parsi, J. N. Tata - began to make inroads into heavy industry: steel, engineering, 
electrical power and shipping (Lamb 1955:105). After the First World War, the colonial 
government further relaxed its policy on the establishment of indigenous industries, and 
the main developments were in sugar and cement manufacturing; and the 1930’s and 
1940’s, ‘not only showed a more diversified growth of industry in India, but the 
increasing role of Indian entrepreneurship in setting the pace of this growth* (Medhora 
1965:573). The Indian entrepreneur could emerge in the textile, and later in the steel and 
cement industries, because British industrialists’ did not participate in them - the latter 
confined themselves to plantations of tea, jute, indigo, etc. The growth of large units in
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India was not a gradual evolution from smaller units, rather they emerged as fully-fledged 
large enterprises (K. L. Sharma 1982:222).
But the inter-war years were marked by the freedom movement under the leadership of 
the Congress Party, and the regeneration of the Indian economy in the form of industrial 
development became one of the major planks of nationalist ideology. Impressed by what 
he had seen in Soviet Union, the Congress leader Nehru saw a planned ‘command’ 
economy as the means of not only achieving that regeneration but as a policy of social 
justice for removing ancient social inequalities and alleviating poverty. The irony was that 
India’s entrepreneurs’ financed the freedom struggle and helped prepare the national plan, 
in 1944, and had ‘no objection to the central role of the state in the process of 
industrialization* (Dhar 1988:4).
After Independence, in 1947, India embarked on creating a ‘mixed economy’ by asserting 
that it was the government’s direct responsibility to establish new industrial enterprises. 
The socialist bias of the new government was compounded by a policy that displaced the 
pre-eminence of private enterprise in industrial development; the latter was to be subject 
to regulation and control, and its expansion subject to central government licensing 
(Harriss 1989b:72). In the 1950’s and 1960*s the Indian government was the major 
entrepreneur accounting for half the total industrial investment in infrastructural facilities, 
industrial estates, heavy capital-intensive industries such as iron and steel and 
agricultural-based products. In the agricultural sector the government sought to establish 
co-operative enterprises and largely exclude private enterprise. But as Medhora has 
argued, the arrival of the ‘permit-license raj* with guaranteed investment from
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nationalized banks and financial institutions, combined with import controls, has tended 
to restrict competition and favour private entrepreneurship. With assured markets and a 
sympathetic government, the number and diversity of licensed ‘small-scale’ enterprises 
has grown substantially (Medhora 1965:575).
And, as the Rudolphs have shown, the private sector has consistently out-performed 
public sector enterprises, the reasons for the latter*s low profitability are varied and 
disputed.2 There is a perception that the public sector is a ‘problem rather a solution’ in 
realizing national goals and socialist objectives. Its role is exacerbated by the 
government’s tendency, for political rather than economic reasons, to rescue ailing 
private sector enterprises by taking over ‘sick’ industries. One the other hand, as a result 
of earlier post-independent policies, the Rudolphs’ argue that private enterprise is 
‘dependent capitalism’: ‘it relies on the patronage and protection’ of the state, ‘is 
protected from the rigors [sic] of competition by government-licensed production and by 
protectionist trade policies that continue from the import substitution development 
strategy’. While acknowledging that the promotion of the Gandhian-inspired small-scale 
sector enhances employment, economic development, and has accelerated the propensities 
of India’s entrepreneurs, they argue that this policy has resulted in ‘involution’ - ‘an 
increase in the number of firms and a decrease in their average size’. And because of 
lower production costs many large firms have invested in the less regulated small-scale 
sector (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987:25-35). Following Geertz (1963a) study of Javanese 
agriculture, they employ involution as a metaphor for productive retardation, the 
multiplication and replication of ineffectual enterprises that ‘not only weakens each
2For a review of the varying explanations see, Rudolph and Rudolph (1987:34-35).
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successive unit but also weakens all units collectively and thus the activity as a whole’ - 
‘more becomes less*. ‘Involution is thus a regressive, debilitating process that results in 
decreasing effectiveness or entropy, the reverse of evolution’ (Rudolph and Rudolph 
1987:257).
But Saberwal has argued that Indian industrialization was ‘of a very shadowy sort’. 
Contrary to writers who laud the ‘modernity of tradition*,3 early industrialization in India 
was ‘fragmentary’ and notable for its narrow range, mainly textiles concentrated in 
Bombay, Ahmedabad, Calcutta and its Bengali hinterland. There was nothing comparable 
to the wholesale industrialization that was experienced by nineteenth century Britain, and 
key ingredients such as an indigenous iron and steel industry were absent during much 
of the colonial period. Both the pace and pressure to industrialize were spasmodic and 
its partiality was dictated by the requirements of the colonial regime; for example, the 
materials for a colonially-sponsored Indian railway network were provided by British 
industry. ‘The colonial state was a decelerator, not an accelerator of industrialization in 
India* (Saberwal 1977b:9).4 And he sees little improvement in the post-colonial period 
but for different reasons. Due to the great inequalities in income, there is a small 
aggregate demand for products with a technological provenance, which are never 
consumed by the bulk of the population, and without the expanding economies of scale 
the industrializing process loses impetus. ‘Into this leisurely industrialism, the pre- 
industrial institutions can settle relatively easily, and if that bespeaks of the "modernity 
of tradition", this modernity can only be of a very shadowy sort’ (Saberwal 1977b: 10).
3For example, Gillion (1968), Spodek (1969) and Singer (1972).
4For an economic historian’s view of this position see, Morris (1968:12-13).
ii/ India’s Business Communities
For Hindus, the ideology of the vama (‘kind7‘colour’) system was divinely ordained and 
structured around the theoretically rigid division of society into an ascribed fourfold 
schema: In the Rig Veda (c.1500 B.C.), the primal man, Purusa, was dismembered by 
the gods and his mouth, arms, thighs and feet became, respectively, the Brahmans 
(priests), the Ksatriyas (rulers and warriors), the Vaisyas (merchants), and the Sudras 
(artisans, peasants and labourers) (O’Flaherty 1981:30-31); beneath these were 
incorporated the Dasas (‘blacks’/slaves/ indigents/tribals).5 The first three vamas are 
‘twice-born* castes, its members undergo an initiation - the upnayan - indicating a 
second or spiritual birth. In this brahminical pan-Indian interdependent arrangement, the 
Brahman, at the apex of the hierarchy, has the purest moral substance or quality and his 
purity is dependent on the avoidance of polluting bodily substances, such as faeces and 
menstrual blood. The Ksatriya are the potentates and defenders of the society, the Vaisyas 
were originally farmers, later merchants, and the Sudras are the servants. The latter, with 
the Dasas, are also the ritual recipients via their impure vocations - such as contact with 
dead animals or washing soiled clothing - of the impurities of the other three vamas; 
consequently, intimate contact with these low castes can defile the higher castes. But as 
Harriss has argued, ‘Although the social hierarchy is defined by differences in purity, it 
clearly depends upon the possible exercise of power: the power to devolve impurity 
downwards* (Harriss 1989a: 129).
*Today this group is better known as ‘outcastes’, ‘Schedule Castes*, ‘untouchables*, 
Harijans (Mahatma Gandhi’s ‘children of God*) and Dalits (downtrodden).
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More specific than the vamas are the jatis (genus/species) which at the local level are 
discrete social divisions by which individuals identify one another, and may constitute a 
purely local or a regional phenomena. The ja ti ‘divided Indian society into a large 
number of small, endogamous groups with clearly-defined and well-recognized 
boundaries....[and] were the most conspicuous morphological features of the small 
communities, both urban and rural, in which the overwhelming majority of Indians lived’ 
(Beteille 1983:59). The division of the traditional community into jatis was reflected in 
the spatial organization of the village whereby the different castes occupied discrete areas, 
with the untouchable castes residing outside the core settlement. In the traditional Indian 
city, Hazlehurst has argued that there were three dimensions of urban space: the 
‘economic*, the ‘ritually pure’ and ‘ritually polluting*. In a north Indian town, caste-based 
occupational distinctions were sustained by the economic urban space; similarly, ritually 
pure residential space was occupied by the highest castes and acknowledged by non­
residents, ritually polluting space was occupied by the lowest castes and avoided by the 
highest castes (Hazlehurst 1970:186-95). Distance was maintained by reference to a 
hierarchical order reinforced by religio-legal precepts notably the Dharmasastras and the 
Manusmriti. Each ja ti claimed a broader allegiance to one of the four vamas, but the 
system was not immutable and fixed; in the middle strata of the hierarchy, caste ranking 
could be ambiguous and flexible.
The major mechanisms for regulating distance between castes was through commensality, 
connubium and the division of labour. Proscriptions on commensality were highly 
elaborated, not only in respect of which castes might eat together, but in the form of
which castes might accept food from another and how it was prepared. The most 
important means of maintaining caste identity was endogamous intra-caste marriage, and 
is arguably the major reason for its persistence to this day. There was also a close 
association between caste and occupation whereby certain castes were restricted to 
particular occupations: usually, non-manual occupations were the preserve of the higher 
castes and the artisanal and menial tasks allocated to the lowest; however, agriculture was 
undertaken by a wide spectrum of castes.
India’s traders and financiers were traditionally Vaisyas and in northern India were 
usually known as Baniyas, a rubric for a small number of heterogeneous castes involved 
in commerce. In northern India, Agarwals, Oswals, Maheswaris, Khatris, Lohanas, 
Muslim Bohras and Parsis were the major trader communities; in the south, Chettis and 
Komatis. These are both trading communities and trading castes, their occupation and 
caste are certainly related but they may not be identical. The majority of members of the 
traditional trading castes remained in commercial occupations, but other groups without 
this provenance also adopted trade. The Parsis, the relatively small group of Zoroastrians 
originally from Persia and outside the caste structure, are an example of a community 
who were initially artisans but became one of India’s most important mercantile 
communities. Essentially, Baniyas or Vaniyas were a group of Hindu and Jain jatis or 
endogamous sub-castes who are designated Vaisya - all of which have trade as then- 
traditional occupation. Other epithets for a Baniya were mahajan (‘great man’), seth 
(banker), often with the prefix nagar i.e. town, modi (grocer or, historically, a Parsi 
army supplier), sahu, sahukar or sowkar (banker) and saraf or shroff (bullion merchant), 
etc. For large parts of Hindi-speaking northern India, these terms were often
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indeterminate and difficult to define as their roles often overlapped.
According to Gadgil, despite the fact that Muslims dominated northwestern India (Panjab 
and Sind), the Khatris and Lohanas controlled trade and finance both in the towns and 
in rural areas and played an important role in Central Asian trade. The Khatris - both 
Hindu and Sikh converts - later migrated southwestward to Gujarat and Bombay, the 
Lohanas to the centre and east of the sub-continent. In the Ganges valley of central 
northern India (Uttar Pradesh and Bihar), by 1750 the main trading communities were 
emigrant Baniyas from Rajasthan - mainly Agarwals and Oswals; they later migrated to 
eastern and central India. Gujarat and Saurashtha (the Kathiawar peninsula) on the west 
coast had a highly developed Baniya community, both Hindu and Jain, which had been 
involved in foreign trade for several centuries. Besides the Oswals and Maheswaris, who 
had earlier migrated from Rajasthan, there were important Muslim trading communities - 
the Bohras, Khojas and Memons - all converts from Hindu castes, and the Parsis who 
had arrived in India during the seventh century A.D. With the arrival of British and the 
decline of Gujarati ports such as Surat, many of these communities migrated to nearby 
Bombay. The Komitis of Andhra Pradesh and Chettis of Tamil Nadu were the most 
important trading communities in southern India, the exception was in Kerala where trade 
was dominated by Muslims, originally of Arab descent, Syrian Christians and Jews. The 
Deccan (Maharashtra) was considered by Gadgil as ‘commercially retarded’ and, until 
the arrival of the Rajasthani Baniyas, trade and finance was undertaken by various 
Brahman castes which reflects the paucity of trading communities in the local caste 
structure. In Calcutta and Bengal, there was a traditional trading community - the 
Subama baniks - but they were eclipsed by a considerable British presence dating from
the end of the seventeenth century. And the British occupancy led to the anomalous 
nature of Bengali entrepreneurship: trade traditionally had a low status, and this combined 
with their exclusion as potential competitors by the colonial power only allowed educated 
Brahman and Kayasthas to act as agents and employees of British business.6 (Gadgil 
1959:16-21).
The indigenous entrepreneurial role in Bengal was from the end of the nineteenth century 
filled by another migration of Rajasthani Baniyas - the Marwaris. This was another 
designation for an important group of Baniyas originally from the desert regions of 
Rajasthan.7 It was wealth accumulated through usury in their Rajasthani homeland that 
provided the capital base for their expansion into other regions of India (G. D. Sharma 
1984:188-89). The Sheikawati Marwaris, from the northern part of the Jaipur princely 
state in Rajasthan,8 were well-established merchants long before the British arrived on 
the sub-continent; and as the British dominion spread over India, the Marwari bankers 
and traders spread with them, particularly to the port cities of British India, and more 
particularly Calcutta (Timberg 1978:41).
6Kayasthas are usually described as scribes or a writer caste, and in the vama 
hierarchy they hold an ambiguous status due to their originating from the intermixing of 
Brahmans and Sudras (Thapar 1979:137-8).
7Strictly speaking, a Marwari is from Marwar, the original name for Jodhpur, but 
anyone in commerce originally from areas around Bikaner, Sheikawat, or Jodhpur 
became conflated into the term. Generally, outside Rajasthan, Baniyas from anywhere in 
that region were and are still known as ‘Marwaris’, although within contemporary 
Rajasthan the appellation has a purely regional as opposed to an occupational connotation.
8Sheikawat was nominally part of Jaipur State, but its Marwaris’ involvement with 
the city of Jaipur was more political than economic. On the role of Sheikawat’s most 
illustrious sons, Jamnalal Bajaj and G. D. Birla, in Jaipur’s nationalist politics see, Stem 
1988:ch.6-7.
Where the Bengalis failed the Marwaris succeeded, firstly as intermediaries, suppliers, 
financiers and brokers. Once they had gained a foothold in the Bengali economy, their 
businesses expanded rapidly through hard work and commercial acumen, and their 
communal solidarity was essential in mobilizing capital for entrepreneurship. K.N. 
Sharma (1969) suggests that what is involved here is a ‘resource group’, and that the 
relations within it are primarily instrumental - in this case to economic success or perhaps 
more generally to ‘the businessman’s way of life’. Timberg sees the existence of such 
resource groups as being crucial to the evolution of Marwari entrepreneurship, especially 
after emigrating from Rajasthan. The Marwaris were noted for their institutionalised 
forms of mutual support, such as accommodation for migrants, credit facilities, and forms 
of commercial arbitration (Timberg 1978:29,37,211). And Timberg adds that the ‘genius 
of a trading community lies in its manipulation of credit* (Timberg 1978:29). The 
acquisition of capital resources has enabled the trading communities to play a dominant 
role in the industrial development of India. The Marwaris have become prominent 
throughout Indian commerce, owning an estimated 60% of industry’s assets (Timberg 
1978:11).
Although Baniyas were usually associated if not synonymous with heterodox devotional 
sects such as Vallabhacarya Vaisnavism, Nanakpanthi Sikhism and particularly Jainism, 
otherworldly values were no obstacle to economic activity. Despite a reputation for 
parsimony, temperance and religious philanthropy, conspicuous consumption was not 
unknown particularly in regard to dwellings and weddings, and where the outward display 
of wealth would not invite appropriation by the ruler. The latter conferred a reputation
for piety, which in turn generated high status associated with the term ‘abru’ which 
meant not only reputation and honour but implied economic creditworthiness (Haynes 
1987:342). Baniyas had a universal reputation for their business acumen if not always for 
their honesty. But their famed probity seems to have been the rule and, although the 
unscrupulous Baniya was not unknown, a sound reputation for ethical behaviour was 
indispensable for the merchant particularly in an economic world where a large amount 
of financial activity was undertaken on trust.
iii/ Theories of Entrepreneurship
The term ‘entrepreneur* was first defined by Cantillon in the mid-eighteenth century as 
one who buys products at a certain price and resells them at a uncertain price in the 
future; as acceptors of risk their rationale is to secure the maximum return on their 
investment (Cantillon 1930:258). This argument was developed by Say, whereby the 
functions of the entrepreneur were the application of acquired knowledge for the 
production of commodities for consumption. To be successful, Say argued that the 
entrepreneur must have the judgemental ability to assess future demand, to determine the 
appropriate quantities, timing, calculate production costs and selling prices, and possess 
administrative skills (Say 1964:330-31). Entrepreneurial activity was virtually 
synonymous with management and rather than innovators, Say saw their role as brokers 
between vendors and purchasers.
Entrepreneur was variously translated into English as ‘merchant’, ‘employer’ or 
‘adventurer*, and although the term was popularized by J. S. Mill in the mid-nineteenth
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century by the end of that century it had almost disappeared from the theoretical literature 
(Casson 1987:151). But the term was revived by Knight in the 1920’s who, applying 
Cantillion’s concept of risk, argued that entrepreneurs bear the responsibility and 
consequences of making decisions under conditions of uncertainty; and he made a 
distinction between risk and uncertainty. The control and decision-making lie with 
entrepreneurs and, although risk was potentially knowable and could be ‘laid o ff through 
institutional insurance, Knight argued that uncertainty defied definition as every 
commercial situation was unique and depended on the imponderables of the marketplace 
(Knight 1951:119-20).
In his emphasis on decision-making and risk-taking, Knight’s conception is probably most 
apposite to the position of the entrepreneur in developing economies. These economies 
are characterized by a lack of western ideas of ownership - i.e. as separate from control 
of an enterprise - and Tayloristic management, accounting techniques which are 
rudimentary or non-existent, and where ownership and management are more or less 
synonymous. And in the absence of fully-established capital markets, the entrepreneur’s 
credibility relies on economic personalism, the utilization of social relationships for 
economic ends to lessen risk and uncertainty.
Of the sociological literature on entrepreneurship no argument has been more seminal 
than Weber’s Protestant Ethic thesis, in which he claimed that the ‘this-worldly’ 
Calvinism had been instrumental in developing the beliefs - the ‘spirit’ - that, in turn, was 
a pre-condition for ‘modem* European capitalism. Religious beliefs, in his view,
influence conduct and outlook, and material advance may be countered by an 
unfavourable belief system. From his comparative studies of economics and religion in 
several societies, Weber had been impressed by the fact that modem capitalism seemed 
to be a Western phenomenon. In all ages and societies individuals had greedily sought 
profits and engaged in trade but, he believed, it was only in the West, and more 
specifically in Britain, that these universal traits were transformed into a rational 
economic order.
His interest in several of the great religious traditions was an attempt to determine how 
functional they were for economic development, and he was the first to relate a general 
theory of entrepreneurship to the specifics of Indian economic life. For Weber, India had 
been unable to develop a modem rational capitalism out of its own traditions. What they 
had was imported by the British colonial regime. Thus, his concern was with how the 
credos of the religions of India were responsible for the absence of indigenous capitalist 
development (Weber 1958:112).
The obstacle to indigenous modem capitalism lay, according to Weber, rather in the 
‘spirit* of Hinduism - a combination of the caste order and the doctrine of karma (Weber 
1958:131). For Weber, Hindus have often been active economically, but they have no 
metaphysical interpretation of life that makes it meaningful for them to engage rationally 
in changing the world. On the contrary, all ‘other-worldly* philosophies and soteriologies 
of Asia had one common presupposition: that only literary knowledge and mystical gnosis 
are the single absolute road to salvation ‘in the world beyond* (Weber 1958:330).
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However, Weber did recognise the existence of a large number of highly successful 
entrepreneurial groups which appear to challenge his assertions about the unsuitability of 
Hindus to entrepreneurship. These were the Gujarati and Rajasthani Baniyas many of 
which he noted adhered largely to the Vallabhacarya sect of Vaisnavism.
The Vaisnavite doctrine of salvation was in no way especially conducive to commercial 
morality or Puritan-style entrepreneurship. But the sect did have an extensive network of 
relations between groups and centres, which required considerable travelling from its 
devotees, both of which were factors congenial for traders. But the major explanation of 
the success of these traders is allegedly in another direction: For Weber, the 
Vallabhacarya sect attracted the Baniyas - ‘the Jews of India’ - because it is a ‘antiascetic, 
partly hedonistic, partially ceremonial cult’ (Weber 1958:316). Of this sect, Pocock has 
noted that: ‘More than any other sect in Gujerat [it] provided an arena in which the 
wealthy merchant classes could display their wealth and earn at once distinction and 
merit* (Pocock 1973:117).
An equally large number of Baniyas subscribed to Jainism, and Weber argued that ‘inner- 
worldly asceticism’ determined the success of the Jains. ‘The compulsory "saving" of 
asceticism familiar from the economic history of Puritanism worked also among them 
toward the use of accumulated possessions, as investment capital rather than as a fund 
for consumption or rent’ (Weber 1958:200). For the Jains, the prescription against all 
occupations which involved them in violence or the destruction of life (<ahimsa), barred 
them from all agricultural and industrial occupations and limited them to commerce. 
According to Weber, prohibitions on travel limited them to sedentary banking and
money lending, and their belief in commercial honesty gave them a high reputation.
He argued that the difference between the doctrines of these sects and those of normative 
Hinduism explains their adherents* economic success. In the case of the Jains, the 
presence of a quasi-Puritan ethic explained successful entrepreneurial activity; in that of 
the Vaisnavites, its absence was compensated for by certain social arrangements congenial 
to traders and trade.
Due to his thoroughgoing scholarship, Weber introduces material which undermines his 
main thesis. For example, while claiming that ‘industrial capitalism* could never derive 
from the caste system, he concedes that many traits of the traditional castes were 
conducive to trade and industry. These include extreme industriousness and property 
accumulation, and he observes an acceleration in the accumulation of wealth among low 
castes, and members of the merchant castes turning into ‘capitalist entrepreneurs*. But, 
predictably, ‘in spite of the adaptability of some of the castes we have no indication that 
by themselves they could have created the rational enterprise of modem capitalism* 
(Weber 1958:113).
But in Ahmedabad an old trading centre in Gujarat which suffered little British influence, 
the Jain and Hindu Baniyas initiated the establishment of cotton mills in the 1860*s. In 
this ‘Manchester of India*, the caste system did not hinder but rather helped the early 
industrialists. As industrialization in Ahmedabad expanded, the Baniya community 
‘adapted for the new conditions many of their pre-industrial institutions, notably the 
family firm and a modified guild system of organisation* - the latter being ‘predicated on
the existence of business and trade groups which were dominated by specific castes* 
(Spodek 1969:m-27). These features, Spodek claims, endowed Ahmedabad with its 
‘unique self-contained pattern*. And contrary to Weber’s assessment that the two separate 
‘ideologies’ operated differently, little difference has been noted in the economic 
behaviour of Jain and Vaisnavite Baniyas. Gillion clearly states that: ‘The ethic of the 
Jains was the ethic of all the Vaniyas, and indeed of many other Gujaratis’ (Gillion 
1968:87).9
Gillion shows that the industrialization of the city was achieved in a milieu that remained 
socially and politically conservative. Ahmedabad was nominally a Muslim city, founded 
in the early fifteenth century, first with its own dynasty, later a Mughal satrap until it was 
annexed by the East India Company, but with an overwhelmingly Hindu population. But 
the modem industrial city was not the creation of intruders, rather it was the product of 
an intrinsic business culture:
‘Ahmedabad’s wealth came from trade and industry,....its handicrafts were independent 
of the patronage of a single court; its merchants and financiers were wealthy and 
constituted a superior social stratum in the city, a largely hereditary plutocracy; and, if 
it did not enjoy urban autonomy on the European model, still the financial power and 
social position of its wealthy Vaniyas and the survival there, but not in most other parts 
of India, of certain old institutions of Indian society - the Nagarseths, or city head, and 
the mahajans, or guilds - ensured that the government of the city was responsive to their 
wishes....Ahmedabad’s story is of the survival and transformation of an important 
traditional centre of trade and industry into a modem industrial city, under the leadership 
of an indigenous financial and mercantile elite....The distinctive character of 
Ahmedabad’s industrialization [is] the carry-over of traditional patterns* (Gillion 1968:5- 
6).
Until comparatively recently, historians have argued that British imperialist policies
9See, also Tripathi (1971:m-60) and Timberg (1978:35-6).
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destroyed the Indian cotton industry in the nineteenth century because of its direct 
competition with Manchester’s products (Hobsbawn 1968:149). But by 1914, in spite of 
the slow growth of new industries in general, the cotton industry in India had already 
become ‘one of world’s largest’. It was essentially ‘Indian in origin, largely controlled 
by Indian investors, and increasingly administered by native [sic] managers and 
technicians’ (Morris 1984:572-3).
The main criticism of Weber revolves around the argument that there never was a single 
unified system of values in India; instead, the varied ethical systems of India were open 
to constant reinterpretation over the centuries. And the ethical values to which 
individuals* conform to may be very different from those given by their religious 
affiliation. Thus the dichotomy of ethics and commerce may be an empirical reality. The 
main exponent of this view is Singer, who claims that what is most problematical about 
Weber’s argument is the notion that there is some kind of official, orthodox Hinduism 
‘with a uniform and unchanging interpretation, in spite of the diversity of heterodox 
schools and sects* (Singer 1972:278). Singer shows how some Madrasi industrialists can 
adapt some aspects of Hinduism to modem industrial life. He believes these industrialists 
are able to separate economic rationality from family life and the traditional meaning 
system.10 And nowhere does he find his industrialists* shackled to their other­
worldliness. Rather, they are not unlike Weber’s ideal-type European capitalist. The 
Madrasi entrepreneur is ‘calculating and daring, temperate and prudent, shrewd and 
completely devoted to his business’ (Singer 1972:356).
10See, also Srinivas (1967:ch.4).
In formulating his study, Weber assumed that India and Europe had separate histories 
prior to the establishment of colonial rule, that ‘modem’ capitalism was introduced into 
India under colonialism. This position is no longer acceptable as the role of colonialism 
is no longer seen in such an undifferentiated manner. For Weber, the differences between 
modem European capitalism and Indian capitalism must be emphasised: the uniqueness 
of occidental rationality is opposed to an ideal-typical India lacking economic rationalism.
Weber also had a secondary aetiology for Indian entrepreneurs which emphasises their 
‘pariah’ aspect: ‘In our usage, "pariah people" denotes a distinctive hereditary social 
group lacking autonomous political organisation and characterised by prohibitions against 
commensality and intermarriage originally founded upon magical, tabooistic, and ritual 
injunctions.’ They also suffer from ‘political and social disprivilege and a far-reaching 
distinctiveness in economic function* (Weber 1963:108-9). Weber suggests that many of 
the leading mercantile communities in India originated as pariahs, and cites as evidence 
their present status in Bengal (Weber 1958:86). Hagen (1962) has also argued that the 
main source of entrepreneurship lies in the creativity of a disadvantaged minority group. 
Here, it is alleged that marginal groups are more likely to innovate because they are 
exempt from some of the sanctions against deviance; further avenues to social 
advancement other than the commercial are often closed to them. Marginal groups are 
especially likely to have developed among themselves enduring communal institutions 
which can be easily adapted to organising trading.11
"On the applicability of pariah hypothesis in an Indian context see Fox (1967) and 
Saberwal (1977a).
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But the description by Weber of a pariah people as a 'distinctive hereditary social group* 
with a 'distinctiveness in economic function’ was generally characteristic of all Indian 
castes and communities. As Timberg notes:
'It hardly differentiates entrepreneurial groups from the others. In this sense, India may 
be considered a continent of pariah peoples’ (Timberg 1978:31).
Bellah (1968) argues that the most serious flaw in the pariah/ marginalisation thesis is its
emphasis on the motivational element at the expense of historical and institutional factors.
In particular it would seem that a network of contacts adapted to commerce is a major
necessity for business success. From this network an entrepreneur can get capital,
intelligence, collaboration, etc., which he needs to be successful.
For McClelland, marginalised groups can be successful entrepreneurs because of the 
consciousness of their minority and superiority complexes. But unlike Hagen, McClelland 
related the genesis and performance of entrepreneurs to the need for ‘motivational 
achievement’ (‘n/ach’) which he conceived as a function of child rearing or socialization 
in a society. McClelland noted the correlation between certain types of psychological 
motivation, measurable by psychological testing, and business success. Programmes in 
south India that increased the n/ach level of the participants were also effective in 
increasing their new entrepreneurial initiation. That is, the difference between various 
groups put through a course to increase their n/ach and comparable control groups were 
held to be significant (McClelland 1961:225-8).
However, it is not clear whether their efforts are any different in effect from certain 
kinds of management education; Timberg adds that ‘McClelland may simply have 
produced a "placebo" industrialising ideology, albeit one like many placebos that may be
therapeutically useful’ (Timberg 1978:25). The point is that n/ach, being only an 
aptitude, cannot of itself make a person a successful entrepreneur in a highly competitive 
milieu. Eisenstadt (1963) has criticised McClelland’s thesis for neglecting social structural 
variables, which inhibit or encourage entrepreneurship, opportunity being an important 
variable in explaining how one becomes an entrepreneur. The criticisms of the 
pariah/marginality hypothesis are also applicable here, the emphasis of psychological at 
the expense of cultural and institutional factors.
For Schumpeter, the entrepreneur is the prime mover in economic development, and his 
function is to innovate, or ‘carry out new combinations’ - i.e. to bring together the 
various sources and factors of production. He goes on to distinguish five types of 
innovation: the introduction of new goods or an improvement in the quality of existing 
goods, the introduction of a new method of production, the opening of a new market, the 
capture of new sources of raw materials or half-manufactured goods, and the creation of 
a new type of industrial organisation - such as the formation of a monopoly. Schumpeter 
is also very clear as to what the entrepreneur is not: he is not an inventor, but someone 
who decides to allocate resources in the exploitation of an invention; neither is he a risk- 
bearer, risk-bearing is the function of the capitalist who lends funds to the entrepreneur 
(Schumpeter 1934:66). Innovations and capital, largely in the form of credit, are the 
elements of economic development in Schumpeter’s analysis. Essentially, Schumpeter’s 
entrepreneur has a managerial or decision-making role.
The main objection to Schumpeter is definitional, and centres on his claim that 
‘entrepreneurs’ exist only in developing countries - the developed world has ‘capitalists’.
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He pictures entrepreneurship as some sort of absolute virtue that either does or does not 
exist in a given area when it is palpably obvious that the characteristics we usually 
associate with commerce - initiative, investment, risk, etc., - are to be found to a greater 
or lesser degree all over the world and in all epochs. Also, when we consider the role 
of government, successful or otherwise, Schumpeter’s claim that entrepreneurs are the 
progenitors of economic development appears far too narrow.
Agarwal has pointed out other deficiencies: he sees Schumpeter’s criterion of innovation
as being difficult to apply, and this renders the definition useless when applying it to
empirical situations. ‘Innovation is not in strict polarity to derivation -the one shades into
the other by degrees’ (Agarwal 1975:13). In one sense, every entrepreneur in coping with
his enterprise must sometimes attempt things which are new to him. Furthermore:
‘The Schumpeterian enterprise has success built into his definition. He is the one who 
brings about new combinations. What about those who tried and failed? Were they not 
important to economic development, and should not the definition of the entrepreneur 
take them into account?* (Agarwal 1975:13).
Like Schumpeter but more modestly, Belshaw also de-emphasizes risk-taking in 
entrepreneurship and concentrates instead on the innovative management of resources in 
the pursuit of commercial expansion. Risks are reduced by eliminating competitors, 
control over resources and establishing lasting commercial relationships; the 
entrepreneurial function ‘is better thought of as a propensity to take advantage of 
opportunities with an orientation toward expansion’ (Belshaw 1965:116). Similarly, Barth 
has asserted that entrepreneurship is a role - and not necessarily an economic one - which 
is concerned with maximization and innovation.
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Barth’s approach is to analyze the connection between the entrepreneurs’ activities and 
the instrumential creation and mutability of their social organization.12 But unlike 
Belshaw, he emphasizes the importance of mobilizing and coordinating interpersonal 
relations, organizational innovations and stresses socio-economic initiatives. According 
to Barth,
‘[This approach] brings out those particular features of an environment to which any 
specific enterprise must be adapted, the tasks it implies, and the prospective limitations 
on its growth. For each new enterprise, the entrepreneur may be represented as choosing 
his niche or niches....The choice of niche is in a sense an initial choice which precedes 
the launching of the enterprise, though it may be modified and changed in the course of 
the enterprise’ (Barth 1963:9).
According to Casson, the entrepreneur has never been fully integrated into modem 
economic theory - there are few models which formally analyze entrepreneurial behaviour 
within a closed economic system. Indeed, he argues that by its very nature 
entrepreneurial behaviour cannot be predicted using deterministic i.e. ‘equilibrium’ 
models.
‘A common criticism of theories which place considerable weight on cultural 
characteristics and personality traits is that they are difficult to test. Indeed, it is often 
suggested that because the behaviour of individual entrepreneurs tends to be 
unpredictable, theories of entrepreneurship are untestable. It is, however, quite possible 
that while the behaviour of individual entrepreneurs cannot be predicted, the behaviour 
of entrepreneurs as a group is predictable’ (Casson 1987:152 - emphasis added).
It is not clear at first sight, whether there is any common thread which runs through the 
various theories of entrepreneurship. Casson attempts to identify a shared element by 
introducing the concept of ‘entrepreneurial judgement*. The entrepreneur is defined as
12On the distinction between social organization and social structure see, Firth 
(1951:35-36).
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someone who specialises in taking judgemental decisions about the allocation of scarce 
resources; but much of the information required for decision-making is not merely costly 
to obtain, but is not available by direct observation at all. Thus, decisions are governed 
not only by objective information but also by subjective beliefs. An individual’s beliefs 
originate with their culture and religion as well as with their direct experience of life, and 
‘some cultures appear to give greater encouragement to entrepreneurship than others’ 
(Casson 1987:152). Casson’s last point might be amended to read: certain groups or 
communities within the culture appear to give greater encouragement to entrepreneurship 
than others.
I would argue that in the Indian socio-economic milieu, the key ingredient of the 
entrepreneurs’ niche has been initiating, organizing and co-ordinating social relationships. 
Economic personalism, the utilization of social relationships to gain access to 
commodities, capital, markets, information and favours, are essential in some degree for 
the development and maintenance of the commercial enterprise. The manipulation of 
social resources for economic ends is a pre-requisite for reducing risk and uncertainty and 
achieving a level of commercial stability.
iv/ Empirical Studies of Indian Entrepreneurship
Surprisingly, there has been a dearth of ethnographic research on Indian entrepreneurship. 
The major studies are Bema’s examination of the light engineering industry in what was 
Madras state (Tamil Nadu); Hazlehurst’s investigation into the social organisation of 
small businessmen and financiers in a Panjabi city; Fox’s monograph which is concerned
51
largely with a Baniya community in U.P.; Owens’ and Nandy’s study of former 
cultivators in Calcutta; and Cottam’s study of small town Marwaris and their links with 
both large cities and villages.
Bema’s 1957 study was confined to the light-engineering industry in Madras and 
Coimbatore, and more particularly to manufacturing enterprises with between 50 and 250 
people. He focused on the occupational and socio-economic background of the 
entrepreneurs, the origin and growth of their firms, the operational problems of the 
entrepreneurs, and the mobility of the entrepreneurs. Following Schumpeter, Bema 
defined the entrepreneur as ‘the person (or the group of persons) responsible for the 
existence of a new industrial enterprise*. (Bema 1960:2). However, he also included 
routine firm management as a part of the entrepreneurial function.
From his sample, Bema discovered that traditional occupations and caste had very little 
impact in determining entry into entrepreneurial endeavours. The 52 entrepreneurs were 
members of ten different caste communities, although 41 of the 52 were from the three 
twice-born vamas - 12 Brahman, 21 Naidu (landowners), 8 Chettiar (Bema 1960:43). 
Only four of the entrepreneurs were in direct line with the traditional caste-assigned 
family occupation. This break with the traditional family occupation indicated to Bema 
that in explaining entrepreneurial activity ‘sociological factors, such as caste, attachment 
to traditional activities, and approval or disapproval of the social group to which a 
potential entrepreneur belonged were less important than economic factors such as access 
to capital and possession of business experience and technical knowledge’ (Bema 
1960:213).
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This claim has been contested by Hoselitz, who argued, that if Bema’s sample is 
characteristic of Tamil industrial entrepreneurs as a whole, then the social structure of 
the state must be undergoing a profound change. One important indication of this change, 
Hoselitz continues, would be the decline in occupational choices assigned by caste, and 
sociological explanations are needed to evaluate these departures from traditional 
occupations.13 Hoselitz argues that Brahmans, for example, have been more inclined to 
become entrepreneurs than previously for a number of reasons: reverse discrimination in 
universities and government as a reaction against their previously favoured social 
position, the decline in the availability of caste-based occupations, an increase in status 
of business occupations resulting from socio-political emphasis on the need for economic 
growth, and the wealth and influence available for investment in new enterprises. In 
short, with socio-economic change and the increased emphasis by the government on 
economic development, entrepreneurship became increasingly attractive for Brahmans as 
a result of the erosion of their position (Hoselitz 1963:36-39).
In a study of entrepreneurs in a Panjabi city, Hazlehurst attempts to analyze the effects 
of caste, class, kinship and community on the social context in which entrepreneurial 
activity is undertaken.
Following the India/Pakistan partition of 1947, the number of Baniyas in the city 
increased substantially due to the fact that a disproportionate number of refugees from 
Pakistan were traders. A large majority of the displaced merchants were Khatris or
13See, also Gould (1970).
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Aroras. But many of the subcaste distinctions among these groups have been obscured 
by their adherence to reform movements such as the Arya Samaj, their high degree of 
occupational and spatial mobility leading to the demise of old marriage networks, and the 
difficulty of assessing the validity of claims to status by refugees. Thus, Hazlehurst 
argues, it is more accurate to think of the immigrant Khatris and Aroras as members of 
‘occupational groups’ rather than as members of endogamous caste groups with well- 
defined caste rituals and behaviour (Hazlehurst 1966:40-5).
The dominant economic position of the ‘local’ Baniyas, the Agarwals, already weakened 
by the departure of Muslim tenants and debtors, and legislation enforcing a ceiling on the 
size of land holdings of a joint family, was further undermined by the arrival of the 
refugee traders. After partition, the Agarwals allied themselves with a lower trading 
caste, the Suds, to monopolise the timber business of the city, in opposition to the 
refugees, and to uphold the social status and economic power of the two local commercial 
castes (Hazlehurst 1966:45-54).
Hazlehurst makes a clear distinction between cultural and structural dimensions of caste. 
Entrepreneurs* ‘participate in numerous cross-cutting social relationships and pursue 
diverse economic interests while still maintaining the cultural boundaries of caste’ 
(Hazlehurst 1968:295). In some cases, the ritual ranking of a caste may be relatively 
rigid, whereas its socio-economic ranking may be more flexible. Indeed, it is possible 
that individuals and subgroups within the caste may be relatively mobile in socio­
economic status and power. Moreover, structural changes - such as an influx of refugees 
- may lead to a realignment of castes; new inter-caste co-operation can result in changes
in the social status and the economic power of groups, and the status of caste and 
occupational groups is frequently a local matter. ‘Although the Suds and [Agarwal] 
Baniyas do not intermarry in Ram Nagar, they are inextricably related to one another in 
economic matters and in the legitimisation of social status within the city* (Hazlehurst 
1966:54). Caste ranking - especially socio-economic ranking - is not completely ascribed 
but is based in part upon the power and achievement of the group.
Auspicious marriages for children in Indian business families are generally considered 
important for both social and economic reasons. In most parts of north Indian Hindu 
society, marriage arrangements are based on clan exogamy and caste endogamy. In Ram 
Nagar, an individual’s status depends upon the maintenance of endogamy within the caste 
or subgroup, but for the Baniya family more may be required of the marriage than mere 
caste endogamy.
An important aspect of Hazlehurst’s study shows how the Agarwal marriage ceremony 
has economic as well as ritual significance. Business saving is often used for marriage 
expenditure, which are calculated to lead to the businessman’s advantage. Access to credit 
and avenues for mobility are dependent upon the complex network of relationships arising 
from marriage. Marriage ceremonies and the display of dowry payments serve as public 
statements to the local community - especially local creditors -of one’s financial worth. 
Non-kinsmen who have economic relations with the family are concerned with the 
integrity of the family’s lineage and its marriage network. A major offence, such as the 
marriage of a daughter into a lower caste, can result in the family being outcaste from 
the Baniyas leading to a prohibition on economic relationships, business partnerships, and
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marriage partnerships in the community. On the other hand, the respect and prestige 
deriving from an auspicious marriage may be important in improving the status of the 
family and setting the course for future business transactions (Hazlehurst 1966:45-6,109- 
18).
Like Hazlehurst, Fox has studied a market town in northern India, Tezibazar U.P. (like 
Ram Nagar, a pseudonym). Formerly, business revolved around the production and 
distribution of such staples as sugar and ghee; now the business of the town is largely 
retail, supplying consumer goods to the greatly increased population of the surrounding 
villages. While before businessmen merely accommodated the rural people by buying 
their surpluses and lending them money, now businessmen are dependent for their 
survival upon their rural customers. In these small joint-family subsistence level 
businesses that have mushroomed in the last thirty years, profits are low and competition 
is fierce. Success depends upon the granting of credit, the adulteration of products, and 
profiteering in times of shortages (Fox 1969:161-7).
The Baniya business ethic has interwoven itself with both the town’s historical lack of 
cohesion and recent socio-economic changes such as the introduction of democratic 
institutions. Fox argues that there is no effective inter-caste jajmani system nor any 
ranking of castes - neither ideologically agreed or through commensal prohibitions (Fox 
1969:88-97). In this almost Hobbesian world, Fox characterises the relationship between 
the thirteen Baniya castes as one of ‘mutual repulsion*. Through an analysis of the Umar 
Baniya caste, he also illustrates how intra-caste controls have declined and that regional 
caste associations - although they have penetrated the town and integrated the Umar with
a regional caste structure - have not taken on these responsibilities (Fox 1969:248-50). 
There are few voluntary associations, no guilds, no neighbourhood organisations, and no 
caste residential areas.
Fox traces a web of political machinations from the divisions in the community, how 
local interests divide themselves between the Congress and the Hindu nationalist Jan 
Sangh parties,14 and how inter-lineage, inter-caste and inter-communal (Hindu vs. 
Muslim) relations are projected into the local political arena.
Of the Baniya business ethic or ‘business style* in Tezibazar, Fox claims there is a 
willingness to accept a smaller profit covering ‘subsistence needs’ rather than investing 
in more profitable but riskier enterprise, ‘he is fearful of fully committing his capital in 
a single large enterprise and prefers a small but highly varied inventory’ (Fox 1969:144). 
What he does venture in is adulteration and ‘chicanery’ which are said to be less risky 
than new forms of business. Is it then subsistence needs that restrain risk-taking, or are 
they simply maximising profits through fraudulent activity? The evidence provided by the 
author for his subsistence notion consists essentially of some humble statements by some 
merchants. But the evidence provided on the growth and loss of fortunes and the power 
of money in Tezibazar casts considerable doubt on the assertion that the merchants are 
restrained by some conventional standard of attainment (see, for example, Fox 1969:150).
Owens and Nandy have attempted to apply the McClelland’s n/ach approach to groups 
of entrepreneurs in the Howrah (Calcutta) small-scale engineering industry where a
14The latter was the precursor of the right wing Bharatiya Janata Party (B.J.P).
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community of skilled artisans, the Mahisya, have been taking over many units in the 
industry and now represent 65 % of its ownership. The Mahisya, were originally a 
middle-ranking cultivating caste and constituted the bulk of the skilled labour force in that 
industry. However, successful Mahisya business did not show particularly high n/ach 
scores on psychological tests, but non-Mahisya did show higher scores than various 
control groups. Owens and Nandy suggest that perhaps the entry of Mahisya 
entrepreneurs depended more on factors such as intra-caste co-operation, numerical 
strength, and their retaining ties with their natal villages which acted as a constant supply 
of labour. The supply of financial credit was minimal; typically, a business is started with 
savings from wages, and the new entrepreneur was often sub-contracted by a relative or 
former employer.
The Mahisya in their sample are best perceived as a caste group which for several 
generations had been moving away from agriculture and their rural origins, and 
establishing ties with urban business and industry first as employees and then as 
entrepreneurs. They were in a position in take advantage of boom in demand during 
World War Two and, by 1961, 120 entrepreneurs were millionaires. As they have 
increased in affluence, their factories have been expanded and modernized, their children 
receive a better education, and families intermarrying thus strengthening their dominance 
of the industry. On the other hand, Brahman and Kayastha entrepreneurs’ had to break 
with an anti-commercial ethos and a relatively expensive lifestyle, which is reflected in 
their preference for ‘white collar* employment, but were more likely to have relatively 
easy access to capital. They conclude that the link between entrepreneurship and need for 
achievement is both a product of the state of the economy at a particular time and the
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cultural environment. This environment facilitates entry for achievement-motivated 
individuals but cannot ensure a better performance in their new role over other 
entrepreneurs (Owens and Nandy 1978:200).
Cottam makes the urban/rural contiguity the centrepiece of her study of traders and 
trading in a small Rajasthani town; it is what she calls an ‘attempt to show their crucial 
function as a nexus in the rural-urban flow of information’ (Cottam 1980:327).
The Marwaris - Jain and Vaisnavite - of pseudonymous Mandi prefer to be designated 
Mahajan (‘lord’) rather than Baniya as the latter is a popular term of abuse meaning 
thief, cheat or miser. Cottam claims that the Marwaris have a reputation, both inside and 
outside Rajasthan, for their conservatism which derives from their religious beliefs, but, 
as we have seen, this conservatism in lifestyle does not manifest itself in business 
practises. And in Mandi simple wholesaling and retailing are being replaced by 
commission agencies and small-scale industries: oil and flour mills, soap, candle and ice 
factories. The state administration encourages this industrial development with generous 
injections of capital, it being part of their ‘bring the Marwaris back to Marwar’ campaign 
(Cottam 1980:333).
Some of the most important reasons for the Marwaris’ business success, Cottam argues, 
arise from their traditional niche in the social hierarchy, their industriousness, and their 
establishing and consolidating considerable business networks. The first network is that 
between the Mahajan and the small shopkeepers in the surrounding villages and with the 
local farmers. Mahajans compete with one another to create an ongoing clientele,
offering the most favourable credit arrangements, particularly to their best customers. 
Commercial relations are personalised as much as possible both to win the confidence of 
the customer and to cross check on the ‘visibility of credit’. Thus the Mahajan is a 
recipient of a constant flow of information and this ‘permits him to perform an ongoing 
policy revue’ (Cottam 1980:335). The second and equally important network of contacts 
is that between the Mahajans and other traders, both within Mandi and the big cities, 
such as his suppliers, commission agents and commodity brokers; a knowledge of 
national price trends, stocks, etc. allows him to bid more effectively for commodities on 
the local market.
These connections and linkages, especially the second, are primarily consolidated by 
kinship and marriage. Marriage ‘symbolises the supra-local and even supra-regional 
orientation of the merchant castes* (Cottam 1980:337). As an entrepreneurial family’s 
wealth has increased so its daughters have married farther and farther away - likewise, 
its daughters-in-law come from a similar distances. Cottam sees these alliances as an 
appetite for wider and wider linkages. She gives an example of an alliance between a 
local cloth merchant and a textile factory owner in central India: it guarantees a steady 
supply of a government-regulated commodity in one direction, and a steady outlet for 
goods in the other. The role of agnates is rather different, due to the pull of the 
normative joint-family and the keeping of brothers together in the family business, 
contacts in the cities who are not affines are rather rare - the exceptions are in the state 
capital, Jaipur. But when they are not talking about money, she concludes, marriage 
dominates the Mahajans* conversation, as ‘to a very great extent, the one process is 
dependent on the other* (Cottam 1980:340).
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In conclusion, Bema’s study claiming that there is lack of correlation between social - 
i.e. caste - position and entrepreneurial success and his stress on economic factors is 
highly suspect. Eighty per cent of his sample were twice-born castes, and their socio­
cultural position would correspond to an ability to mobilize economic and other 
institutional advantages.15 Fox’s monograph is concerned as much with local politics as 
with economic behaviour and their interaction. He portrays an antediluvian business 
community characterized by what Banfield would call ‘amoral familism’, introversion and 
a lack of co-operation, a minimum of entrepreneurship and an inversion of economic 
development. The prevailing economic conditions, he believes, are a refection of the 
conservatism of the Baniya castes which is manifested in their overcautious business 
style. In the anti-entrepreneurial ambience of Calcutta, the Mahisya took advantage of the 
higher castes preference for white collar employment to carve out a considerable niche 
the small-scale engineering industry by default. But, importantly, they were able to utilize 
caste mechanisms as a foundation for their entry and maintenance to entrepreneurship. 
Owens and Nandy conclude that McClelland’s ‘need for achievement’ contributed only 
marginally to some very limited types of expansive entrepreneurial behaviour, whereas 
the economic and cultural environment were more pertinent factors for entrepreneurial 
success.
The outstanding feature of the studies by Hazlehurst is the status of inter-caste and intra- 
caste relationships as indices of business success. He shows how the Baniyas make a 
distinction between the cultural and economic parameters of caste, and the advantages of
15This theme is explored in section v/ Caste and Class below.
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inter-caste co-operation to retain economic dominance. And both the social and economic 
importance of intra-caste marriage as markers of caste integrity, prestige and 
creditworthiness. Cottam also emphasizes commercial relationships and creditworthiness, 
but rather than the urban/rural nexus it is the linkage between business and marriage 
strategies that is more apposite, and the role of supra-local marriages in extending 
business networks.
The range in the sizes of the enterprises examined in these studies is extremely varied, 
from the smallest retailers in the case of Fox’s Baniyas to the considerable successful 
businesses described by Owens and Nandy. But the outstanding feature of 
entrepreneurship in these studies, with Fox’s being the outstanding contrary example, is 
the importance of ongoing affinal, intra-caste and inter-caste co-operation, resource 
networks which are prerequisite for entrepreneurial success.
v/ Caste and Class
Social structural studies of Indian and S. Asian societies generally have largely focused 
on the institution of caste, focusing on the changes or otherwise it has undergone since 
the imposition of the pax Britamica and later Independence. Dumont (1980) maintains 
that the holistic hierarchical structure of Indian society has remained basically intact over 
the last two centuries. Srinivas (1962) argues that caste has declined with regard to 
concerns, for example, of purity and pollution but the emphasis is rather political, on 
inter-caste competition through caste associations rather than interdependence. Leach 
(1960) acknowledges the competition between castes and even within castes but argues
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that rather than reinforcing caste the system is being undermined, and South Asian 
stratification is taking on the character of a class structure. But as Beteille reminds us, 
historically, caste and class were never mutually exclusive, delations of production had 
a certain autonomy although they were often subsumed by caste* (Beteille 1969a: 19).
The above studies were largely concerned with a rural environment where arguably caste 
distinctions are more pronounced; in urban centres there is equally disagreement about 
the contemporary impact of caste. For example, in attempting to make a general 
theoretical point, Marriott sees the difference between rural and urban adherence to caste 
as basically two contrasting systems, ‘The closed, interactionally ranked corporate caste 
systems of rural communities on the one hand, and the open, attributional, non-corporate 
rankings of individuals and groups in cities on the other hand*; although he concedes that 
these polarities may be insufficient to account for cases at an interstitial level (Marriott 
1968a: 108). ‘Reference behaviour’ in cities is less in terms of ritually ranked corporate 
identity but more concerned with identifying with a group or individual whose status the 
aspirant(s) emulates. However, Rowe’s empirical data on Bombay migrants sees ‘caste 
and kinship as the bases of residence and interaction’, and are the ‘most meaningful’, and 
these are the foundations of newer urban forms of association but alas these areas are 
‘virtually terra incognita* (Rowe 1973:242-43). Whereas Marriott seems to be unsubtly 
overstating the urban/rural divide, Rowe’s concern (pace Lynch 1969) is with low caste 
immigrants in a rural-urban continuum, and provides little insight into the behaviour of 
these migrants in an overall urban context when they leave there ghettoized environment.
In an attempt to analyze this discrepancy Molund, while recognizing that there is a
greater freedom of action vis-a-vis caste in an urban environment, sees such distinctions 
as contextual. He is primarily concerned with the home/work distinction whereby an 
individual may behave by two quite different sets of caste rules ‘each of which he regards 
as right and proper in its situational context*. But these oppositions are never categorical, 
‘The general rule is presumably that the willingness to forget about caste increases as the 
differential in traditional rank diminishes* (Molund 1988:13). Ames suggests that 
industrial workers as well as managers tended to compartmentalize their spheres of 
domesticity and employment. The imposition of occidental industrial practises in Tata’s 
Jamshedpur factories did not imply that traditional institutions, practises and values had 
been displaced. The employees ‘compartmentalize’ between their natal village and their 
life in the company town, to the extent that many considered their quarters in the 
company housing colonies as part of the working rather than the home environment. And 
in respect of inter-caste commensality, ‘Behaviour acceptable in town could be 
inappropriate in the village, and vice versa, but respondents did not seem to find it 
difficult to switch from one context to the other as occasion demanded* (Ames 1973:127).
But with respect to the division of labour, Molund notes that in an urban situation lower 
caste individuals are rarely in a position of authority over the higher castes, that castes 
were to a certain extent ‘preadapted’ for various roles in the modem occupational 
structure (Molund 1988:13). Gould also argues that ‘there is an undoubted tendency for 
occupational choices in the modem economy to be related to traditional caste occupations’ 
(Gould 1970:73). Caste, he continues, is to some extent an ‘adaptive structure*, but at 
the same time the enormity of restructuring the occupational order in an industrialising 
society places severe limitations on this pre-adaptive process. ‘Perhaps it would be more
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accurate to say that the sociological restructuring of occupations makes detailed 
applications of skills and social orientations acquired as a ja ti member to the modem 
occupational order an unlikely possibility, but there are general functional and ethnic 
attributes of jatis which differentially affect mobility decisions and indeed the very 
capacity to make decisions’ (Gould 1970:72 - original emphasis).
As an example, Gould argues that it is pointless for a village scavenger to aspire to 
become a high civil servant; but with considerable economic, educational, nepotistic, and 
status resources behind him, it is not unreasonable for a Brahman to have such 
aspirations. He notes that among two Vaisya castes who emigrated to Lucknow from 
western India, that more than 70% of the Khatri and more than 80% of the Sindhi 
households were involved in business enterprise (Gould 1971:118).16
The modem occupational structure of urban India is very different from that of the 
village and less caste-based. At first, new occupations were gradually absorbed into the 
caste order, but eventually the system proved too inflexible and as the occupational 
structure expanded the former lost some of its rigidity. However, Beteille argues that this 
flexibility was much more pertinent to a heterogeneous ‘upper caste, middle class* which 
can be distinguished not only by caste but by three hierarchical ‘socio-economic strata’ - 
‘upper’, ‘middle’ and ‘lower’ - on the basis of income, occupation and education. He 
also makes an important conceptual distinction between the urban middle class as a ‘class’ 
(in any Marxist sense) and as a ‘status class’, and deems the term status as more 
appropriate designation for its core, ‘namely, people in professional, managerial and
16A similar correlation is noted by Panini (1977).
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similar occupations’. ‘"Traditional" components of status based on caste and "modem” 
ones based on income, occupation and education combine in different ways and the 
consequent patterns manifest themselves differently from one context to another’ (Beteille 
1969b:68-70).
Beteille* s appellation of status as opposed to class neatly sidesteps the problem of class 
consciousness. Molund also circumvents the issue by arguing that class consciousness 
does not define class; neither is class necessarily ‘a form of social inequality existing 
wherever one can identify a category of non-producers exploiting a category of 
producers’ (Molund 1988:7). By invoking Leach’s argument above and Bourdieu’s 
‘cultural capital’, Molund arrives at a conflation of class status and caste status not 
dissimilar to Beteille’s: An individual’s socio-economic background is a mix of caste and 
class factors, that contemporary urban India is a complex hybrid of both status and class 
society, or ‘that the transformation from status society to class society remains 
incomplete’ (Molund 1988:10).
After this general survey of the literature on Indian entrepreneurship, business 
communities and caste, the next chapter focuses more specifically on the historical 
commercial background of northern India in the eighteenth century and the establishment 
of Jaipur as a mercantile centre.
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Chapter 3: Economic History and the Political Economy of Jaipur
This chapter begins with the economic background of the north Indian Baniya 
communities in the eighteenth century, particularly focusing on their trading and financial 
expertise. Secondly, it describes the geographical setting of the city of Jaipur in eastern 
Rajasthan; the setting is the context for the inauguration of the city in 1727 A.D., its 
unique town planning and the allocation and facilities made available to immigrant 
merchants. Besides trade, Baniyas also had an important role in an extensive 
banking/moneylending sector of the regional economy during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. Jaipur’s relations with the British Raj in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries provides the circumstances for the types and volume of trade undertaken by the 
city. The account ends with an examination of the growth of the lapidary industry in the 
city and the part played in it by Jains.
i/ Banivas. Banking and Trade in the Eighteenth Century
Gadgil has argued that although historically there were considerable differences in the 
scale of commercial operations, this did not lead to any marked differences in the types 
or methods of business. Both small and large traders customarily belonged to one of the 
trading castes or communities, and there was little difference in their social status. The 
distinctions among them were not due to any particular branch of commerce, as they 
often indulged in a variety of businesses, but were due to their ability and command over 
capital (Gadgil 1959:29). The wealth of merchants was largely derived from trade, but 
links with the political powers could also be an important source of income both as
bankers to the monarch and as revenue farmers. For example, the son of a Rajasthani 
banker from Amber (Jaipur) acquired enormous wealth and influence as the financier to 
the Nawab of Bengal; the son, Manik Chand, became the legendary first Jagat Seth, 
literally ‘Banker to the World’, chiefly through usury and his collection of the Bengali 
revenue and its transmission to Delhi via the family banking house (Raychaudhuri 
1982:341). The large banking houses would devote themselves chiefly to financial 
services, but all at some time combined the roles of financier and merchant; even the 
largest participated in lucrative trading when the opportunity presented itself, and most 
large traders’ performed some of the functions of a banker.
Existing alongside a minority of great trading houses were a large number of small 
traders often confined to a particular locality or a specialized area of trade. The Jain 
Banasidas’ autobiography of a small-scale gem trader in seventeenth century Agra 
portrays an almost subsistence level of commerce (see, R. S. Sharma 1970). But even at 
the lowest level, there could a blurring of commercial functions. In the Rajput states 
during the eighteenth century, for example, there was the possibility that the cultivator 
may have sold his produce at the local market; or the Marwari acting as a revenue officer 
would have collected the revenue in kind and converted it to cash; a cultivator’s 
creditors, to whom he had sold his produce in advance, might be an urban trader, his 
agent or the village moneylender (Raychaudhuri 1982:342).
The individual commercial establishment was typically the traditional extended family 
operating in the economic sphere. Nothing like the enduring joint-stock company seems 
to have emerged during this period, although short-term ad hoc business partnerships
were commonplace. A large extended family embracing many collaterals, together with 
the practice of adoption where there were no male heirs, secured continual operation of 
the family firm over many generations; and the successful operation of a family 
enterprise over time could lead to considerable capital accumulation. That the family was 
synonymous with the commercial enterprise does not appear to have acted as a hindrance 
against the accumulation of potentially large resources by individual families.
‘In the economy of the town the rational economic calculus held sway and for long 
periods of time it was possible to save considerable resources’ (Gadgil 1959:34). In part, 
these resources were utilized to operate the financial and trading system itself. Financial 
services through networks of agents concentrated mainly on money-changing and the 
remittance of funds using hundis or bills of exchange.1 Due to a number of states having 
their own coinage, money-changing was a lucrative business requiring the dealer to hold 
a large and varied stock of currencies. Transport of commodities was often in the form 
of large slow-moving caravans, and the delays in transportation and the consequent 
comparative immobilization of funds demanded that there should be large resources of 
capital to operate the system. Trading also required the capacity to hold capital in the 
form of commodities often over a long period of time (Gadgil 1959:34).
'The hundi was a ‘bill of exchange promising payment’, usually within two months, 
‘at a particular place and allowing a discount which included interest, insurance (bima) 
charges and cost of transmission of money. Hundis, rather than cash, increasingly became 
the standard form of payment in major commercial transactions. In long-distance trade, 
this form of payment not only met the requirements of an expanding demand for credit, 
but reduced risks involved in the transmission of cash to distant places....As a market in 
these fully saleable hundis developed, they provided a channel for investments. The 
business was mainly in the hands the professional money-changers - the sarrafs or shroffs 
-who thus acquired a new and crucial role as commercial bankers, providing a specialized 
service as suppliers of credit* (Raychaudhuri 1982:346).
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Gadgil also makes the important point that trader-fmanciers were peripheral to agriculture 
and industry and were not involved in either agricultural or industrial development; they 
would finance artisans and cultivators in the production of commodities which they could 
trade, but ordinarily this was in the form of loan capital not venture capital. ‘Therefore, 
accumulation of capital in [the] hands of trader-merchants did not augment in any way 
resources invested in capital equipment for industrial production’ (Gadgil 1959:34-35). 
The unit of industrial production was the small individual artisan’s workshop, only when 
a ruler organised production in the form of the Moghul karkhana or factory, usually the 
production of luxury goods for a court, were larger industrial units introduced. But state 
capital expenditure in the Moghul period was mainly concerned with the construction, at 
great expense, of edifices that served no economic function at all: mosques, mausoleums, 
palaces and gardens, such as can be seen at the Taj Mahal in Agra.
The most important means of financing commercial investment was a fledgling form of 
deposit banking, where the sarrafs’ accepted deposits (amanat) payable on demand. In 
Agra in 1645, a sarrafv/as offering a monthly rate of interest of 5/8 % per month and 
an annual rate of 7 1/2 % per annum; the sarrafs’ invested deposits at between 1 and 2 
1/2 %. Deposits were accepted in both cash and kind, and it was not unknown for state 
officials to deposit government funds and personally pocket the interest. According to 
Raychaudhuri, the government machinery offered full protection to the bankers. 
However, the credit system depended heavily on reputations for probity rather than any 
legal sanctions (Raychaudhuri 1982:346-47).
At the lower levels of commerce, usury was an indispensable ingredient and, Koranic 
interdictions notwithstanding, was a widespread practice in Muslim territories. The 
moneylender provided the necessary capital to the cultivator, the artisan or the merchant, 
and the capital with interest was recovered on the sale of the commodity. Rates of interest 
in eighteenth century Bengal could be as high as 150 % per annum, and shows how 
extortionate rates could be imposed on those whose bargaining power was weak; at the 
other extreme, for those mercantile debtors with greater creditworthiness, interest rates 
were calculated at between 6 and 12 % per month (Raychaudhuri 1982:347-48). From 
his data collected from the Benares region in the early nineteenth century, Bayly has 
shown that the moneylenders’ differentials in designating the creditworthiness of their 
clients was largely caste dependent; that is, in respect of credit, caste was 
indistinguishable from risk: ‘The lower castes in traditional India were seen as "unruly" 
and a danger to hierarchy....people of the bazaar were not "respectable", and the risk of 
default was very high* (Bayly 1983:407).
On the question of risk, Das Gupta has commented, ‘Rich and poor, Indian merchants 
accepted uncertainty as the basic fact of life’ (Das Gupta 1982:424). Business activity was 
orientated around the merchant’s family and members of the merchant’s caste, and 
uncertainty restricted commercial confidentiality to a minimal number of kinsmen and 
business partners. The conduct of business would invariably be self-regulated, an 
autonomy that was a general feature of Indian social arrangements. Overarching legal 
sanctions which may have engendered inter-caste or inter-communal collaboration were 
either non-existent, unenforceable or only implemented for a ruler’s favoured banker,
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thus disputes were resolved largely through intra-caste fora.2
And, as Gadgil has argued, the eighteenth century hiatus between the demise of the Great 
Moghuls and the imposition of British hegemony were times of considerable political 
instability. In times of uncertainty when trade may be seriously dislocated, precious 
metals and jewellery play an important role in economic life. They have the advantage 
of easy concealment, are convenient to transport, and have comparatively little risk of 
depreciation. ‘In the absence of avenues of capital investment for productive or 
development activities accumulation of resources in these times logically became 
tantamount to hoards of bullion and jewellery* (Gadgil 1956:35).
The activities of merchants from the eighteenth century impressively show the complexity 
and range of their operations, assiduity, and the utilization of caste and kinship ties to 
secure economic relationships. Initially, much of this activity was undertaken in the 
interests of regal courts and powerbrokers, notably in the supply of financial services and 
luxury goods.3 The networks of inland trade provided a basis for the commercial 
expansion of the economy initiated by the arrival European trading companies and later 
the British Raj. Through their trading links, Indian merchants could to a certain extent 
facilitate the expansion and to their own advantage; under favourable circumstances they 
would even profitably finance their European counterparts (see, Timberg 1973).
2The exception was the unique Gujarati multi-caste guilds known as mahajans which 
were uncharacteristic of north Indian mercantile organization, and not to be confused with 
the epithet for an individual Baniya; see, Gillion (1968:23-24) and Mehta (1984).
3On the role of luxury goods as a prerequisite of other forms of commoditization see, 
Appadurai (1986:37-40).
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Thus economic activity in northern India during the eighteenth century was centred on 
the multifarious roles of the Baniya. Distinctions among Baniyas were less concerned 
with caste criteria or in methods of business but rather more with the differences in the 
scale of commercial activity. Besides trade, the Baniya often functioned as a banker, 
insurer, money-changer, revenue collector, and acted in the important role of usurer. 
Without any overarching legal sanctions, the conduct of business was largely self- 
regulated, and particularly the allocation of credit was dependant on an individual’s 
financial and social status. The large merchant and banking houses also had important 
links with local courts whom they financed and supplied with luxury goods, but with the 
exception of state organized factories, production largely revolved around small-scale 
manufacturing. Typically, the commercial enterprise was synonymous with an extended 
family which guaranteed confidentiality and continuity of the firm; and extended family 
businesses and partnerships created a variegated network of inland trade. For the business 
family, capital accumulation could be considerable, even in times of economic and 
political uncertainty, if not in cash then in the form of stock or jewellery and bullion.
ii/ Geography of Jaipur
Modem Rajasthan is a state of independent India occupying the north-western desertified 
area of the country; it is bounded by the Indian states of Panjab and Haryana to the 
north-east, Uttar Pradesh in the east, and Madhya Pradesh and Gujerat to the south; the 
western border of the state is the international frontier with Pakistan. Rajasthan is largely 
desert or semi-desert, the more so in the west of the state where it forms the Thar or
Indian Desert, the most important topographical feature of region, which continues across 
the border into the Pakistani provinces of Panjab and Sind. The arid regions lie to the 
west of the second important geographical feature, the Aravalli Range, which bisects the 
state from the north-east to the south-west, running for 700 km. from Delhi to northern 
Gujarat.
The state of Rajasthan is divided into twenty-eight administrative districts. Jaipur district 
is a mosaic of rugged mountainous terrain, uplands and valleys occupying 14,068.09 sq. 
km. or 4.1% of the total area of the state; the mean average of the district is 
approximately 300 metres above sea level. Situated in the centre of the district, the state 
capital Jaipur lies at the extremity of a plateau surrounded on two sides by the northern 
limit of the Alwar Hills, part of the North Aravalli Range (Gupta 1987:1,5).
iii/ Inauguration of the City of Jaipur
Amber or Amer was one of the small number of princely states of an area of the Indian 
sub-continent which became designated by the British as Rajputana. The hereditary rulers 
of Amber state were one of the Kacawaha clan of Rajputs who migrated from the 
Gwalior region of central India in the tenth century A.D., and established their capital 
at Amber about 1150 (Tillotson 1987:209n.ll). In the Moghul internecine struggle that 
followed Aurangzeb’s death in 1707, the then Maharajah of Amber, Sawai Jai Singh II 
(ruled 1699-1743), who like his forefathers had served in the Moghul army, took 
advantage of the interregnum to incorporate Moghul khalisa (crown) lands into his 
territory. This enlargement, and alliances with two other large Rajput states of Jodhpur
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in the west and Udaipur to the south, plus the blessing of Moghul Emperor Mohammed 
Shah, had by 1739 established Jai Singh as the pre-eminent power in Rajputana (Roy 
1978:2-8).
But Jai Singh was an atypical Indian prince: a combination of soldier, statesman, 
astronomer, religionist, and in his later years a dissolute alcoholic and opium addict; with 
the consolidation of his state he confidently embarked on the building an entirely new city 
8 km. south of Amber. As Tillotson in his monograph on Rajput architecture has argued, 
the transfer of a Rajput capital was not unknown, but it was usually strategic and either 
of necessity (Udaipur) or more likely defensive (Jodhpur). He argues that the relocation 
was wholly prestigious, Amber had become too small for a prince of his stature and, in 
fact, the new city of Jaipur was much less defensible than Amber as it was vulnerable to 
attack from the south and west (Tillotson 1987:167).
In 1727, Jai Singh laid the foundation stone of the city, and within seven years the 
principal thoroughfares had been sited and the major buildings erected (Roy 1978:52-53). 
The uniqueness of Jaipur is that it is the only example of a systematically planned Indian 
city, after the construction of the proto-historic cities of the Indus Valley and before 
Lutyens’ and Baker’s New Delhi. Many Rajput cities were informally planned, but the 
pattern is difficult to identify as they were built piecemeal over many years and deviated 
from a symmetrical plan. Some Indian cities such as Shahjahanabad (Old Delhi) had 
planned elements (Roy 1978:33), but Jaipur’s unifomity, its perfectly straight streets 
which intersect at right angles, the original uniform height of the buildings, were 
facilitated by the rapid construction of the city and its adherence to the original master
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plan (Tillotson 1987:171).4
According to Singh, India's traditional cities, as opposed to their later colonial additions, 
were constructed on the principal of hierarchy. Theoretically, the king or ruler's 
residence was built on the most favourable site around which, in caste precedence, were 
situated the Brahmans* neighbourhoods, then the Baniyas; the lowest and untouchable 
castes were located on the periphery of the city. The concentricity of the ritually pure 
castes at the centre and the polluted on the margins of the city formed a ‘sacred- 
hierarchical geography’ and attempted to facilitate security from invasion (Singh 
1988:107). ‘At the ideal level the city is the centre of caste as at the political level it is 
the centre of the king whose prime duty, one need scarcely stress, was the maintenance 
of the caste order’ (Pocock 1960:66).
Besides a craving for harmony which is reflected in Jai Singh’s interest in astronomy, it 
was an important consideration that the uniformity should appeal to merchants and traders 
who would move to, not only an attractive orderly and organized city, but one where 
they would have an equality of opportunity to openly display their wares on the broad 
open thoroughfares rather than in the dank overcrowded labyrinth that was, and largely 
still is, the typical Indian bazaar. One of the emphases of the new city would be on trade 
to the extent that, unlike the archetypal hierarchic traditional city, the bazaars surrounded 
the palace on three sides - the forth was inhibited by a cliff bordering the north side of
4On the controversy surrounding whether the plan for Jaipur was derived from 
ancient Sanskrit texts such as the Silpasastras or Kautilya’s Arthasastra see, Roy (1978 
ch.2) and Tillotson (1987:171-76).
the city.5 The uniformity of the shops, built under state control, was reflected in the 
conception of each as an individual entity; and each main street had an arcade running 
along its length to protect the citizens from the sun, unlike the narrow streets of the 
typical Rajput city which are permanently shaded. The uniform pink wash of the city 
walls and the main thoroughfares appears to be contemporaneous with the city’s 
construction and is probably an imitation, as is the design of the walls, of the Moghul 
Red Forts of Delhi and Agra (see, Tillotson 1987:169).
Between the interstices of the main streets, often extensive individual havelis (courtyard 
houses) were built to accommodate the new residents, and away from the main 
thoroughfares these were less uniform in design. The haveli was originally a two-storey 
building built around an open courtyard and housed an extended family. A clutch of 
havelis formed a mohalla (neighbourhood) whose inhabitants were almost invariably of 
the same caste. This is reflected by the fact that even today, as in many Indian cities, a 
large number of shops situated together sell almost identical products and thus the 
retailers are of the same caste. But the systematic organization of caste/merchandise in 
exclusive enclaves has been progressively fragmented. For example, Jauhri Bazaar may 
once have exclusively housed the jewellers and allied occupations, and a large number 
are still situated there today, but it is possible to find a shop selling almost any other 
form of merchandise along this street.
5Although Jai Singh was probably unfamiliar with it, an early eighteenth century 
Marathi treatise on statecraft, the Adnyapatra, devotes a section to traders and bankers: 
It states that the prosperity of a kingdom is dependent on them, they provide non- 
indigenous commodities and are a source of finance, the state should protect them and 
accord them status. ‘Leading merchants should be encouraged to reside in the aristocratic 
quarter* (quoted in Gadgil 1959:22n.l8).
Many of today’s Jaipuri Baniyas claim that there was an entreaty for their ancestors to 
move to the new city, and that the bazaars and shops were amongst the first buildings to 
be erected. And there is considerable historical evidence to substantiate this claim, and 
they were given financial incentives to move to Jaipur.
The earliest recorded description of the city is found in a treatise on dietetics, the 
Bhojansara, written by a poet who probably resided at the court of Jai Singh, Girdhari, 
in 1739.
‘[Jaipur] should be populated in one year and should be twelve kosas [24 miles!] in 
extent. Merchants from different places should be called to stay here. (187)
‘I have got immense treasure. Take what you want and use it. Sawai Jaipur should be 
made a unique city. (189)
‘There are many cross-roads and shops on them and thousands of markets where 
merchants of different countries are plying their trades. (196) ‘Many
elephants, Arab horses and camels from Kutch come here. Embroidered cloth, plain cloth 
and jewelled ornaments are brought to Jaipur for sale from different parts of the World 
as Jaipur is founded by Rajadhiraja. (197)
‘In this way merchants of many places have come there. Hundis of lacs and crores are 
current here. They are all happy and do their business peacefully. (199)’6
One of my Oswal Jain informants, a descendent of a Delhi jeweller who migrated to 
Jaipur during the reign of Jai Singh, recounted a family tradition of how his ancestor was 
given free land for his residence as an inducement to settle in Jaipur. In addition, his 
ancestor was given tax concessions on establishing a business and relief from import and 
export duties (octroi). Finally, there were specific instructions as to the manner of
6Portions of the only extant copy of the manuscript, held at the Bhandarkar Oriental 
Research Institute in Poona, were translated and published by P. K. Gode as part of his 
Two Contemporary Tributes to Minister Vidhyadhara the Bengali Architect at the Court 
o f Sawai Jaya Singh o f Amber (1699-1744A.D.) in Dr. C. K. Raja Presentation Volume, 
Madras 1946. Extracts are reproduced in Roy (1978, Appendix vii).
construction of their dwelling which is externally unchanged to this day. One of the 
earliest known British travellers to the city notes that Jai Singh, while constructing the 
palaces, the observatory, city walls and gateways, devoted resources to: ‘building the 
pucca shops and bazaars with every splendour, and summoning traders and bankers, and 
artisans from Udaipur, Delhi and other places at a cost of thousands of rupees, colonised 
Jaipur....whoever pleaded poverty was given money for their construction out of 
government funds’ (Browne [1785], quoted in Sarkar 1984:207).
iv/ Jaipur’s Economy in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries
For all his hyperbole, Girdhari’s panegyric’s reference to hundis of large amounts 
indicates that credit facilities, which implies facilities for commission agencies to arrange 
the transport and insurance of commodities, were an important commercial element in 
the city from the very beginning.
The eighteenth century texts on Jaipur gives no indication as to total populations of the 
city or what percentage of it were involved in trade, but they do offer some indications 
as to its rapid rise to prosperity. One of the main reasons was the sheer size of the new 
state: Amber state consisted of only three parganas (an administrative unit of several 
villages) with a disputed total area of between 5 - 7,500 sq.km., and the town of Amber 
was little more than a village dominated by the palace; the new enlarged state consisted 
of the modem districts of Jaipur, Sikar, Jhunjhunu, Sawai Madhopur, Tonk, Alwar and
part of Bharatpur7 (Roy 1978:2). Thus, the larger administrative retinue and the army 
formed a substantial part of the population. Besides inviting merchants to reside in the 
city, Jai Singh attempted to order his jagirdars (revenue landholders) to build residences 
in Jaipur. The order, dated 1728, states that residences will be constructed by the state 
and they can pay for the buildings through a ten per cent levy on their annual incomes 
thereafter. Coercion or not, Jaipur contained a number of considerable palatial buildings 
many of which were later converted into hotels. It has been estimates that nineteen large 
residences on one of Jaipur’s nine city blocks belonged to jagirdars (Roy 1978:58-59).
With probably a large number of government officials, wealthy jagirdars and merchants 
living in the city there was a high consumption of luxury goods. This flourishing market 
boosted the handicrafts industries; the earliest crafts were traditionally the production of 
gold and silver ornaments, cloth printing and the enamelling of brassware. A Jain 
religious text - the Buddhi Vilas - written in the Jaipuri dialect by Bakt Ram Shah in 
1770, although mainly about precepts and ritual, includes some descriptive details of the 
city. Besides noting that tax concessions were one of the main incentives in attracting 
merchants to the city, it lists that gold ornaments, jewellery, expensive fabrics, pan, and 
various kinds of spices were sold in the city; and there were thirty-six karkhanas, some 
which were state-owned, supplying weapons, jewellery and clothes to the palace, others 
producing food, pan, medicines and perfumes (Roy 1978:58-59).
But Jaipur flourished not only as a centre for consumption but also as a new trading
7The Rajputana Gazetteer (1879, Vol.iii:123) puts the size of the state at 14,465 sq. 
ml. and the Imperial Gazetteer (1908, Vol.xxi:233) at 16,456 sq. ml., both less than 
Stem’s estimate of ‘about 50,000 sq. km.* (Stem 1988:11).
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centre due to the political and militaristic circumstances of its neighbours. The Moghul 
empire was on the point of collapse, besieged from both the Islamic north and the Hindu 
south. After only twelve years of the establishment of Jaipur, the Persian monarch Nadir 
Shah sacked Delhi and massacred its inhabitants in 1739. This was followed by another 
plunder of Delhi in 1756-57 by the Afghan leader Ahmed Shah Abdadi. Simultaneously, 
the Marathas, who had fought an ongoing guerilla campaign against Moghul imperial 
ambitions, were waging a successful campaign on the southern edges of the empire in 
Malwa and Bundelkhand (Spear 1978:71-75). These depredations of the region would 
have made the nearby Hindu kingdom of Jaipur a further ideal refuge for Baniyas, but 
they also had the important effect of moving trades routes to pass through the city. 
Previously, the only trade route passing through Jaipur was one connecting Agra in the 
east to a number of cities in the Rajputana interior, notably the important pilgrimage 
centre at Ajmer, the Chhisti Dargah.8 With the main route from the Moghul cities of 
Delhi and Agra - via Gwalior - to both the Deccan and the Gujarati port of Surat cut by 
the Marathas, trade was diverted through Jaipur, Ajmer, to Pali - arguably the most 
important trading centre in Rajputana - and onwards to the west coast (Sarkar 1937:312). 
Until the arrival of the railways, this remained one of the most important routes in the 
country and was one of the first roads to be constructed by the British between 1865-75 
{Imperial Gazetteer 1908, Vol.xxi:135).
Another political ingredient that added to Jaipur’s increase in trade was the rise of the 
Sikhs north-west of Delhi, who forged suzerainty over the Panjab in the power vacuum
8For details of these routes mentioned in an account of 1835 see, Boileau (1937:213-
22).
bequeathed by the collapse of Moghul power. For the Sikhs, robbery was regarded as a 
hereditary profession, and their ravaging of the imperial highway from Delhi to Lahore 
shifted trade westwards through Jaipur and across the Thar desert to the north-west of the 
sub-continent, circumventing the Panjab. Indeed, one British commentator, writing in 
1798, considered this the pre-eminent reason for Jaipur’s prosperity: ‘This city has of late 
years increased in commerce and opulence; for since the communication through the 
provinces of Lahore has been stopped by the Sikhs, the merchants from the north have 
been accustomed to enter Hindostaun by the route of Jypore’ (Francklin 1973:86).
One final factor which contributed in Jaipur’s thriving economy was the absence of 
escheatment on property; in the Moghul world, on the death of a jagirdar his total 
property was forfeited to the state (Gadgil 1959:31). Even servants of jagirdars who may 
have been given jagirs in lieu of a salary were not exempt: The Jain merchant from 
Agra, Banarsidas, in his autobiography described how a hundred years earlier his servant 
grandfather’s property was seized on the death of the latter’s employer (R. S. Sharma 
1970:53). The jagirdars of Jaipur had no such fears of their property being confiscated 
by the state and were free to build large residences, display their wealth and leave the 
results to their heirs. There were also a number of religious jagirs, land and villages were 
given to the various Vaisnavite sects, both Rama Bhakti and Krishna Bhakti devotional 
cults, who had traditionally been patronised by the Amber rulers (Roy 1978:167-68). The 
jagirdars, wealthy or modest, along with the large number of merchants in the city would 
have provided Jaipur with a considerable bourgeoisie, unlike the Shajahanabad of a 
hundred years earlier where ‘there is no middle state. A man must either be of the 
highest rank or live miserly’ (Bernier 1914:252).
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In the early years of the nineteenth centuries Jaipur, as did much of Rajasthan, suffered 
the depredations of raids by bands of Marathis and Pindaris followed by drought and 
famine. Eventually, Jaipur became a British protectorate in 1818 (Stem 1988:11-14). 
These events had a devastating effect on a city that depended overwhelmingly on trade, 
commerce and the income of absentee landlords; and famines tend to depopulate the 
countryside and correspondingly swell the urban population. There is an important 
account by traveller who passed through Jaipur, an officer of the Survey of India, A. H. 
E. Boileau, in August 1835. He described Jaipur as having ‘An empty treasury, desolate 
palaces, stagnating commerce, ferocious populace and a rabble army’; and the main 
streets were ‘very much disfigured by the mud platforms, stalls and hovels that have been 
erected along their centres’ (Boileau 1937:155). The latter structures were doubtless built 
by the refugees, the influx of famine stricken villagers from the countryside.9
But Boileau offers some observations on the population of the city. He described a ‘native 
estimation’ of 400,000 people in 80,000 houses as an ‘exaggeration’ (Boileau 
1937:158);10 nevertheless, he repeated the figures and provided tables of castes and 
professions, and their relative numerical strength was probably more accurate. Twenty 
per cent of the population were Brahmans, some jatis were religious specialists and 
merchants, others were unspecified; another 20 % are various Baniya castes -‘Muhesree’ 
(Maheswari), ‘Oswal’, ‘Ugurwal’ (Agarwal), and ‘Siraogee’ (Digambar). (Boileau
9According to one informant, a similar situation occurred in 1947 after Partition when 
numbers of refugees from Sind - in newly created Pakistan - sought sanctuary in Jaipur.
10Roy more accurately estimates the population of Jaipur at this time to be between 
80,000 and 100,000 (Roy 1978:67).
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1937:232-35). Members of these castes may have taken temporary refuge in the city due 
to the ravages of the countryside. The actual numbers he provides for these castes were 
inflated but these two vamas have always dominated Jaipur’s populace. In the 1901 
Census, Brahmans and Baniyas were 15 % and 14 % of the city’s population respectively 
(Census Report fo r Jaipur State o f 1901:144-49).
The large numbers of Brahmans can be explained by the fact that Jaipur is a ‘city of 
temples’, some housing significant Vaisnavite images originally brought from the 
devotional centre of Vrindaban, although the city has never been a centre for 
pilgrimage.11 Anecdotaly, Jaipur has over a thousand temples and arguably, other than 
Benares and Ayodhya, no other city in northern India has anything like that number, 
many of which date from the early history of the city, some pre-dating the city by 200 
years.12 In 1802-3, Tod compiled a schedule for the revenues of Jaipur State in which 
the total revenue was Rs.82 lakhs (8,200,000); of this Rs.16 lakhs - nearly 20 % - was 
given away as ‘charity lands, chiefly to Brahmins’, this he compared to the jagirs for the 
army with only an annual revenue of Rs.7 lakhs. He commented: ‘can anything more 
powerfully mark the utter prostration of intellect of the [Jaipuri] princes than their thus 
maintaining an indolent and baneful hierarchy to fatten on the revenue which would 
support four thousand....cavaliers’! (Tod 1961, Vol.ii:350-51).
“ On the role of sacred images in the legitimization and perpetuation of political 
power in eighteenth century Rajputana see, Peabody (1991).
12It is impossible to estimate the exact number of temples in the city as many are 
situated in residential buildings, but the Devasthan Department in 1973 had registered 606 
(quoted in Roy 1978:55n.47).
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Of greater interest is Boileau’s data on the artisan castes: the most numerous were 
‘15,000 Cheepas’ (calico printers), all Hindu; the other major artisans were *6,000 
Durzee’ (tailors), all Hindu; ‘4,500 Sonar* (goldsmiths), all Hindu; ‘700 Johalas’ 
(weavers), all Muslim; ‘500 ivory-bracelet makers*, all Muslim; ‘2,500 Chamars’ (leather 
workers), all Hindu; ‘625 Jureea* (lapidaries), all Hindu; and ‘1,000 Lohars’ 
(blacksmiths), all Hindu (these figures should probably be divided by five to arrive at 
more realistic estimate). The remaining artisanal occupations reflect the needs of the city 
at that time - game killers, horse doctors, bearers, prostitutes, pimps, and so on (Boileau 
1937:232-35). The occupations show that Jaipur’s mercantile wealth was generated not 
by indigenously manufactured merchandise but rather by inter-city and inter-regional 
commerce, in commodities produced outside the city. There were a relatively small 
number of artisans for a city of that size, the one exception was calico printing, which 
implies it was the most important industry at that time with the importation of plain 
cotton and the export of the printed fabrics.
The other main source of income, directly and indirectly, was from jagirs. The Rajput 
Thakurs (aristocrats) - ‘10,000’ in Boileau’s table - and other feudatories, Brahmans, and 
many state officials received their salaries in income directly from jagir revenues. Tod’s 
schedule of Jaipuri finances mentions that one household official received a jagir income 
of Rs.3 lakhs and a minister Rs.2 lakhs (Tod 1961, Vol.ii:351). Thus a sizable proportion 
of the population depended for their livelihood directly on jagir income, indirectly the 
service castes would have depended to an extent on the expenditure of the jagirdars for 
their livelihood.
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v/ Jaipur and the British Raj
In the macro-political economic realm of Jaipur’s relations with the East India Company, 
the protection treaty of 1818 stipulated that Jaipur state would pay tribute to the Company 
ofRs.400,000 in the 1819, increasing by annual increments to Rs.800,000 in 1823, then 
by that amount in perpetuity plus five-sixteenths of the state’s annual revenues in excess 
of Rs.4 million. By 1818, after twenty years of plunder and famine, Jaipur’s revenues 
were Rs.2.3 million, which did not cover its expenditures, and it was heavily in debt to 
‘native bankers’. Stem has argued that the swingeing tribute stipulations were not, as the 
Company negotiator Tod suspected and objected to, an excuse to bankrupt Jaipur and use 
this as means of incorporating the state into Company’s empire. Rather it was simply 
greed, and to prove to London that the protection business could make a profit (Stem 
1988:65). Geo-politically, the British wanted an ordered pacified western border to its 
domains and from Jaipur they wanted tribute. Good order produced good revenue. One 
of the Company’s first acts in Jaipur in 1818 was to issue with the darbar (court) a joint 
proclamation to the Thakurs ‘ordering them to vacate the crown lands that they had 
expropriated, perform their feudal services and pay their feudal dues, desist from taxing 
and otherwise disturbing commerce, and abandon their patronage of banditry’; and the 
Company’s army was used to enforce the order (Stem 1988:66).13
By 1842, the state’s tribute arrears was Rs.4.6 million, the equivalent of Jaipur’s total 
revenues for two years; to make any payment, it had borrowed Rs.1.3 million from its
13The coercion by the British and the darbar on the independent-minded Rajputs was 
not always so successful; for a history of the relationship between the Jaipuri 
administration and its Thakurs see, the many references in Stem (1988).
bankers and was paying 12.5% interest on this debt annually. The governor-general in 
Calcutta realising that the Jaipur could never pay its arrears, in 1842 the Company 
reduced its tribute by half, cancelled its arrears, and returned to Jaipur its salt revenues 
from Sambhar Lake which the British had earlier sequestered14 (Stem 1988:92-93). In 
1860, Maharajah Ram Singh (ruled 1835-80) asked that the earlier stipulation, five- 
sixteenths of revenue in excess of Rs.4 million, be abrogated in exchange for an 
undertaking that Jaipur would initiate a wide-ranging programme of public works. The 
alternative for the new British government in India was to suffer continuing evasion of 
the stipulation by Jaipur’s misrepresentation of its total revenues as less than Rs. 4 
million: the political agent reported that the total revenues for 1871 were Rs.50 - 60 lakhs 
not the declared Rs.39 lakhs (Stem 1988:142-43). And as Stem argues, unlike the old 
East India Company which was dissolved after the mutiny of 1857-58, the new British 
administration’s concerns in Rajputana were more about business per se and less about 
the business of protection. By 1867, it was estimated that after sugar, the second largest 
import into Jaipur was ‘English piece goods’, and if the state’s programme of public 
works enhanced commerce with British India this was ultimately far more preferable than 
a lack of tribute (Stem 1988:142).
The Viceroy, Lord Mayo, acceded to Jaipur’s request in 1871 and, although the state 
continued to misrepresent its revenue income, Ram Singh in 1876-77 alone spent Rs.5.63 
lakhs on public works, almost half on irrigation; expenditure to such an extent that the 
political agent reported, ‘probably in no other state in India’ was ‘such a large proportion
14This was one of two major sources of salt in northern India, nominally shared with 
Jodhpur, and in 1836 produced annual revenues of Rs. 150,000 (Stem 1988:78); the 
other major source was near Lahore (Bayly 1983:58).
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of revenue spent on works of public utility* (quoted in Stem 1988:143). Attempting to 
emulate his ancestor Jai Singh by completely refurbishing the city, Ram Singh’s 
improvements actually began in 1860 and involved a modem waterworks, gas lighting 
for the streets, a public library, hospitals, schools, colleges, museums and gardens, the 
latter providing work for victims of the great Rajputana famine of 1868-69 (Roy 1978:78- 
79). A railway line to Agra was completed in 1874 and to Ajmer in 187515 (Gupta 
1987:377-78).
The first decennial census of the city in 1870 found the population to be 137,887 in 
27,686 houses (Report on the Political Administration o f the Rajpootana States 1870- 
77:84-85), there was 3.6 % increase in population in 1881 and 11.4 % in 1891 (Roy 
1978:83), and the increase in population reflects the relative prosperity and growth of the 
city. New sources of employment were facilitated by the public building programme and 
the creation of new administrative departments such as water, public works, telegraphs, 
and so on, but the departments of a more technical nature became the responsibility of 
British officials as Jaipur’s population remained largely illiterate and poorly educated until 
the 1920’s (Roy 1978:127). But the death rate for the years from 1875 to 1922 exceeded 
the birth rate, which implies that the increases in population were entirely due to 
immigration from outside the city (Roy 1978:144).
From the historical data it is unclear if any increase in population was contingent on an 
increase in trade and industry. The only relevant document is a report by the political
l5The line became part of the Bombay, Baroda and Central Indian Railway Company 
of which the Jaipur darbar was a major shareholder (Stem 1988:191).
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agent detailing the external trade of Jaipur state for 1868: The main imports were sugar, 
rice and cloth, and the ratio of imports to exports was Rs.23.19 to Rs.2.96 lakhs, more 
than 7:1. Virtually no foodstuffs were exported, and the import and export of textiles by 
volume was almost equivalent - approximately 4,000 maunds.16 Recalling Boileau’s 
calico printers, weavers and tailors, Jaipur’s textile production and its related trades was 
one of the city’s most important industries; 94 maunds of silk and gold cloth at a value 
of Rs.34,600 were imported and only 5.5 maunds were exported worth Rs.21,450 
(Report on the Political Administration o f the Rajpootana States 1869-70:105). This 
suggests not only that Jaipur was a market for luxury goods, but that such a small amount 
of imported expensive fabric was re-exported at a relatively higher price shows that the 
materials were re-fabricated into articles of a much higher value. But with respect to the 
trade deficit, the level of imports into the city itself was probably far higher; the report’s 
statistics are for external trade with the state of Jaipur, but the city must have been 
getting the large bulk of its foodgrains from the surrounding district.
There was no mention in the trade figures of other luxury goods, however:
‘Jeypore supplies nearly the whole of Rajpootana with gold, silver and precious stones, 
but during the last two years of scarcity the trade in these articles has very much 
diminished.... Business is certainly not so active as to account for the enormous banking 
transactions which are continuously going on. The only possible explanation is that 
Jeypore is as it were a sort of Lombard street of Rajpootana and the amount of legitimate 
trade actually done within its four walls has little influence on its banking 
interests....There are as many as seven Banking Firms, doing an aggregate business 
estimated at two crores and a half rupees per annum, and possessing a capital of upwards 
of 6 million sterling. In addition to the above there are many Seths with means under a 
lakh of rupees whose collective business is not less than half a crore of rupees a 
year....The import of gold before 1868 could not have been less than 75 lakhs of rupees, 
the greater proportion of which buried by the many rich merchants who have their houses
16A maund (man) in the neighbouring United Provinces was approximately 30 lbs. 
see, Bayly (1983:478).
in these states....but a large amount of gold produced by its possessors in consequence 
of the high prices lately prevailing has found its way into Jeypore’ (Report on the 
Political Administration o f the Rajpootana States 1869-70:108-10).
But this comment does nothing but exacerbate the potential imbalance in trade even 
further as precious metals and, with the exception of garnets (see below), gemstones were 
imported into Jaipur. However, the following year the political agent offered an 
explanation:
‘[T]he excess to the export of precious stones and metals which has been omitted from 
the Returns, much of which while imported in a raw state were sent out manufactured, 
and to a large extent found their way to the houses of wealthy Marwaris which lie in 
Shekhawatee, Bikaner etc., and to increase of imports and decrease of exports in a
corresponding ratio and to the fact that while it is very probable that a correct and
minute register of the imports is kept, it is very doubtful whether the same exactness is 
observed in respect to the numerous articles particularly precious stones and metals which 
by various means find their way into foreign territory. But there is still another cause, 
which I ought to have added, which appears to account for this discrepancy in a greater 
degree than perhaps any other, namely that owing to the fact of the Jeypore bankers and 
traders having branch firms as well in Bombay, Calcutta and other places, with which 
the trade is carried on by the State, a large portion of the imports is paid for by drafts 
on these places, a circumstance which though not affecting the "actuals” as shown by the 
"Returns" must of course have considerable bearing in counteracting the discrepancy and 
preserving the equilibrium of trade* {Report on the Political Administration o f the 
Rajpootana States 1870-71:14).
The implications of the report are that banking was an important area of commerce and 
the precious metals and gem trades provided a source of manufacturing, but the numbers 
of people involved must have been minuscule. From the 1901 Census, which was one of 
the most detailed in respect of caste and occupation undertaken, only 835 artisans and 716 
dealers were involved in the precious metals and gem trades (and only 684 men and 
women were engaged in banking and moneylending) {Census Report fo r Jaipur State o f 
7907:180-215).
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As the earlier report of 1869-70 had noted, it was not clear what relation the high level 
of banking activity had to do with the amount of ‘legitimate* commerce in Jaipur. These 
traders would have financed local trade, which had increased substantially from the 
second half of the eighteenth century when the westerly trade routes had shifted to 
Jaipur’s advantage. The Jaipuri bankers would have financed the import of foodstuffs, 
textiles, precious metals and gemstones and the re-export of some of the latter. There 
were two other commodities which did not pass directly through Jaipur but with which 
its bankers had a financial interest: salt and opium. Trade in salt was extensive after its 
revenues reverted to Jaipur in the 1840’s, and with respect of opium: ‘Upto about 1896 
a heliograph from Jaipur to Fatehpur in Sheikawat was maintained by the opium 
merchants of the latter town for use in their business’ (Imperial Gazetteer 1908, 
Vol.xiii:393).
But probably a greater source of banking transactions involved loans to the rulers, 
Thakurs and cultivators. Roy reproduces a document, a request from the ruler to a 
Purohit CBrahman) banker for Rs. 16,000 to pay tribute to Holkar, the Maratha leader, 
in 1791 (Roy 1968:92); and we have already seen how the Jaipur rajas' borrowed to 
attempt to pay off some of their tribute to the East India Company. These loans were 
often repaid in the form of ijara (leaseholds), revenues from apportioned crown - but not 
jagir - lands; but many Thakurs were impoverished and indebted (see below). During this 
period, the prevalent system of land revenue collection on crown lands was much as had 
been when Tod described it:
‘It is the practice in this state to farm its lands to the highest bidder....The farmers 
general are the wealthy bankers and merchants who make their offer for entire districts; 
these they underlet in sub-divisions, the holders of which again subdivide them into
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single villages, or even shares of a village* (Tod 1961, Vol.iii: 1431).
And Jaipur’s financiers were not only contracted to collect the state’s estimate on its 
crown lands, they also lent the money to the cultivators on those lands to pay their 
assessments. Thus apart from enriching themselves, they also served the state not merely 
by collecting revenues but also by holding cultivators to their lands by indebtedness 
(Stem 1988:162).
In 1853, the Company made a concerted effort to replace the revenue farming system on 
Jaipur’s crown lands by the British Indian ryotwari system. This involved a publicly 
registered survey of the crown lands and the ryots (cultivators), ‘on whom particular 
lands were settled, were to be held responsible for paying their own Hscientifically" 
assessed rates....[These] rates, preferably in cash, were to be collected by salaried 
officials of a [Jaipur] revenue department* (Stem 1988:168-69). However, within three 
years, the Raja rescinded the British measure and reintroduced revenue farming (Stem 
1988:162-3). For Stem, the abandoning of the system the system was for three reasons: 
firstly, the system would have been unpopular with the peasantry (although he does not 
say why); secondly, due to a local lack of expertise, establishing and maintaining the 
system would have meant that the revenue department would have to be administered by 
the British, and this was unacceptable to the Raja as it would reveal the state’s deliberate 
underestimation of its revenues; and finally, the Raja was loath to alienate his bankers 
by reducing their income and whose services he may need to call upon in the future 
(Stem 1988:163-64,169-70).
And in a society where indebtedness was endemic, the banking and moneylending
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activities of the Jaipuri financiers were closely related to their other occupations as 
lapidary and bullion merchants and revenue collectors. We have already noted that Jaipur 
supplied the whole of Rajputana with gold, silver and precious stones. Precious metals 
and stones, sometimes fashioned into jewellery, were and are the usual forms in which 
savings are held all over India; and the usual way these savings are converted into cash 
is either by their sale or by pawning them to moneylenders.
The Rajputana Gazetteer of 1879 provides a compendium of indebtedness; the compiler 
of the Jaipur chapter, Major C. A. Baylay, supplies a list of the principal castes and 
classes and their relative prosperity:
Brahmans he divided into two classes, ‘the higher class’ were in service or officiated in 
temples, the lower class were the more numerous Bagra Brahmans who formed one of 
the principal classes of cultivators in the state. The Rajput Thakurs he divided into three 
classes - landowners, in government service and cultivators - the last were few in number 
as Rajputs would not work the land unless pressed by poverty. The Baniyas were ‘a very 
numerous class of a great many clans’, the bankers were principally Jain and the traders 
Hindus. The numerous Jats and Gujars were primarily cultivators. The two major castes, 
the Ahirs and Rabaris, and the major tribal group, the Minas, undertook the lowest 
service occupations (Rajputana Gazetteer 1879, Vol.ii: 146). He then went on to delineate 
what he called the ‘state of society’: The principal Thakurs were wealthy landowners but 
the majority were impoverished and indebted; many of the bankers were very rich and 
generally ‘well-to-do’; the traders, artisans, village heads and a proportion of the 
cultivators were prosperous - particularly the Jats, followed by the Gujars and Bagra
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Brahmans', however, the bulk of the peasant cultivators were in debt to the moneylenders 
and 'the mass of them live from hand to mouth’; finally, the Minas were almost always 
very poor (Rajputana Gazetteer 1879, Vol.ii:147).
Baylay estimated that the population of the city was 140,000, but ‘for such a large place, 
very little trade is carried on, and this is for the most part confined to banking and 
exchange business’ (Rajputana Gazetteer 1879, Vol.ii: 158). He also noted the paucity of 
manufacturing, but Jaipur did produce fine enamel-work and textiles. External trade for 
1874-75 was estimated at Rs.35-40 lakhs for exports and Rs.65-70 lakhs for imports, the 
discrepancy he explained with reference to the information available in the two British 
reports quoted above (Rajputana Gazetteer 1879, Vol.ii: 148-50).
The Gazetteer of 1908 only adds that the chief imports are sugar, rice, tobacco, hardware 
and English piece goods; the main exports were salt, oilseeds, ghi, textiles, marble 
images, brassware and lacquered bracelets. The chief manufactures were woollen and 
cotton cloth, chintzes, marble sculpture, pottery, enamel, brass and lacquer-work. In 
respect of printed cotton, ‘perhaps the most characteristic of Jaipur textiles’, ‘their sale 
has decreased owing to the presence in the bazaars of cheap imported imitations’ 
(Imperial Gazetteer 1908, Vol.xxiv:244-45). The implication is that textiles were still 
Jaipur’s major industry and the data from the 1901 Census shows that to be the case, but 
the number of individuals involved in all areas of textile manufacturing - excluding 
retailing and trade - was relatively small. We have already noted that more than a quarter 
of the population were either Brahmans (15%) or Baniyas (14%), although they were 
neither exclusively ritualists nor merchants. Out of a population of 160,000, about 3% -
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just over 5,000 - were Rajputs; many of these and a minority of Brahman and Baniya 
castes were employed in the civil and military administration, the city’s largest employer 
with almost 20,000 posts at all levels. But less than half that number, 8706, were 
involved in all areas of textile manufacturing (Census Report fo r Jaipur State o f 
1901:180-215).
Thus the economic and demographic data from the end of the nineteenth and the early 
years of the twentieth century portray Jaipur as only a marginal industrial and 
manufacturing centre. The increases in population over this period would have been 
absorbed by the programme of public works and the expansion of the administration. The 
city’s emphasis is one of an administrative centre whose commercial activities revolve 
around financial services - largely moneylending - and an external trade which was 
orientated towards the premier emporia of British India, Bombay and Calcutta. The 1870- 
71 report claimed that a large portion of Jaipur’s imports was paid for in these and other 
cities. Jaipur was, and always had been, a net importer of commodities and, as the 1908 
Gazetteer implies, one that was increasingly so to the detriment of particularly the city’s 
indigenous textile industry. That Jaipur was integrated not only into British India’s 
economic system but also into a British-inspired nascent ‘world system*, can be seen 
from a traveller’s account of the goods available at the Ganesh festival in Jaipur, about 
1880, in which local products appear as mere ephemera:
‘There are all the products of Rajasthan and of Hindustan, as well as of Europe are 
collected. Magnificent shawls from Thibet, scarves from Bundelcund, figured kincobs 
[brocades] from Benaras and gauzes from Bengal are found side by side with shirting 
from Manchester, printed calicoes from Belgium and Turkey reds; while armouries offer 
you daggers from Herat, Gorkha Krisses [knives], Katars [daggers] from Mewar, and 
cutters from Sheffield and Chatelherault. The principal products of Jeypur industry which 
are exposed for sale are embroidered turbans, marble idols, copper stoves, embroidered
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shoes, the salt of Sambhar and enamels of fine gold’ (Rousselet 1882:236).
vi/ The Historical Role of Jaipur’s Jains
Even if we accept Tod’s claim that ‘nine-tenth [sic] of the bankers and commercial men
of India are.... chiefly of the Jain faith’ (Tod 1961, Vol.ii: 127), as an exaggeration, there
is no doubt that Jains’ played a crucial role in the economy of Rajasthan. The Rajput
princes appointed moneylenders to collect the revenue (potedars) at the pargana and state
level (G. D. Sharma 1984:187), and we can assume that a large percentage of these
appointees were Jains. The first Jaipuri reference to Jains is as ‘all important courtiers*
and as merchants in a circulating letter inviting them to a Jain religious ceremony in
1764. The letter requested Jains in Delhi, Agra, etc., to not only attend the celebration
but also to forward the invitation to Jains in other cities. The letter states that the Raja
and two of his Jain Dewans (ministers) of the Terapanthi sect would make financial
contributions to the staging of the event.17 The letter goes on to say:
‘And there are many Jainas resident here. All important courtiers are Jainas. And all the 
merchants are Jainas. Though there are others too, but they are in a minority, not in a 
majority. Six, seven or eight or ten thousand Jaina merchants have their residences here. 
In no other town you would find so many Jainas* (quoted in Roy 1978:57).
Besides its self-congratulatory tone, the letter intimates not only at the large volume of
trade undertaken by the city less than forty years after its foundation, but also a
substantial number of Jain residents.
17These were members of the Digambar Terapanth sect as the Svetambar Terapanth 
was only formally constituted in 1764, the same year, but had only a small number of 
adherents and was restricted to Marwar (Jodhpur) and Mewar (Udaipur) (Dundas 
1992:221).
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Baylay estimated the Jain population of Jaipur state as ‘one-sixteenth’ of 1.75 million, 
about 110,000 (Rajputana Gazetteer 1879, Vol.ii: 145). The 1901 Census does not record 
the number of Jains in the city, and confusingly the Oswal and Sarogi (Digambar) castes 
were designated, along with the Kayasthas and Khatris, as ‘writers’. Oswals and 
Agarwals were described as Hindu.18 The next Census of 1911 adjusted the Oswal and 
Sarogi appellation to ‘Mahajan', they made up 5.5% or 7,500 of the city population and 
notes that half the Jain males in the state were literate (quoted in Roy 1978:181).19 Their 
earlier designation as writer castes and their comparatively high rate of literacy was due 
to their position not in the commercial world but in the civil administration of the state.
Historically, Digambar Jains held important positions in the Amber administration, and 
there are epigraphic references to their patronage of Jain temples in Amber from 
medieval times (K.C. Jain 1963:44-49). With the establishment of Jaipur, most of the 
Jains in the service of the Jaipur darbar moved from Amber. New Jain temples were 
built simultaneously with the construction of the new city. One of the earliest dates from 
1738 (Kasliwal 1967:49). Particularly during the eighteenth century, Jains held a number 
of senior ministerial positions at both Amber and Jaipur (Roy 1978:182). However, their 
ministerial power and influence diminished during the nineteenth century and their 
community was the victim of anti-Jain riots, the result of palace intrigues instigated by 
rival Brahmans and Thakurs (Roy 1978:186-89). The Digambar Jains were also riven by 
sectarian schisms between the orthodox Bispanth and reformist Terapanth and
“ The Oswals of Jaipur are largely but not exclusively Jain and Agarwals are both 
Hindu and Jain see, Chapter 5: The Svetambar Jain Community of Jaipur.
“ Other literacy rates recorded in the 1911 Census for Jaipur state are Kayastha 
males, 40%, Brahman males, 14%, and Rajput males only 5% (quoted in Roy 1978:181).
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Gumanpanth. The last has almost disappeared from Jaipur, and the later Digambar Jain 
population of the city can be divided between Bispanth who are largely of the Khandelwal 
ja ti (60%) and Terapanth who are mainly Agarwals (40%) (Roy 1978:183). Many of the 
Jain Baniyas who migrated to Jaipur in pursuit of commerce were largely Svetambar Jain 
Oswals and Srimals.20
There was a general belief among my informants that Jaipur’s position as a world centre 
for gem-cutting was the responsibility of Banjilal Tholia, the son of a cloth merchant bom 
in 1857. He was regarded as the first Digambar Jain to enter the industry, and by the age 
of 28, ‘he was reckoned as one of the foremost businessmen of Jaipur city’ (Jaipur Album 
1935, ch.xviii:7). The city’s jewellers* claim that it was Tholia who introduced the direct 
importation of rough uncut emeralds for fabrication that made Jaipur an internationally 
famous lapidary centre. The city attracted a second wave of Jain emigrants who 
established themselves in the export of gemstones. One of the most important firms and 
arguably the wealthiest was established by an Oswal, Khailshankar Durlabhji - known as 
the ‘Emerald King*, who migrated from Morvi in Gujarat in 1911. We can measure the 
Jain’s prominence in the gem/jewellery trade in the mid-thirties from a city directory 
where of the 49 leading traders in the industry, all but six are Jains (Jaipur Album 1935, 
ch.xviii:8-23).
vii/ The Gem/Jewellerv Industry
The British data offers a tantalizing glimpse of what sounds like a fully-fledged precious
20See, Chapter 5: The Svetambar Jain Community of Jaipur.
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metals and gemstone industry - importation, manufacture and export -that was to become 
one of city’s most important and largest industries, and made Jaipur a world centre for 
gem-cutting. But the 1901 Census recorded that less than a thousand artisans were 
employed in the industry which appears to contradict this level of activity; unless the 
industry contracted, which seems unlikely as Jaipur always had a demand for luxury 
items and the city was a part of a growing world market. However, the information on 
the lapidary and allied trades is at best fragmentary, and the evidence for the origins of 
precious metals and gemstone manufacturing is equally sketchy. Several observers have 
remarked on the high quality of Jaipur’s enamelling on gold produced by the city. This 
is the speciality of particular Sikh families whose ancestors were brought from the Panjab 
in the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries by the ruler of Amber, Man Singh II (ruled 1590 
- 1615), where he had been the Moghul governor (Roy 1978:89). The first literary 
evidence of jewellery vendors in Amber comes from a manuscript dated 1613, the Man 
Charitra, by Amrit Rai which lists dealers in gold, silver and jewellery including rubies, 
pearls, coral, diamonds, inlay work and ivory.21
There were no large deposits of precious stones in Jaipur state, however, there was an 
insignificant supply of emerald and a rich source of semi-precious garnets and these were 
cut and polished by Jaipuri gem-cutters. Hence, it is likely that these cutters obtained 
their later expertise by cutting garnets. The larger pieces were used in jewellery 
fabrication and, towards the end of the nineteenth century, smaller pieces were exported 
to Switzerland and other European countries for the manufacture of watches and 
musicboxes. The 1901 Census mentions that, ‘Garnets and crystal-garnet, necklaces and
21Yaduendra Sahai, personal communication.
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other ornaments are made chiefly for Europeans....good lapidary work is done here’ 
(Census Report fo r Jaipur State o f 1901:9). And an earlier British report commented: ‘It 
may be noticed that there is now a large trade in garnets, which are collected here in 
mines mostly in other Rajputana States, though partly also in Jeypore and are exported 
to Europe, the smaller ones being for use in watches and the larger yielding, according 
as they are cut, carbuncles or other ornamental forms of the Stones’ (The Report o f the 
Political Administration o f Rajputana fo r the year 1882-83:10).
By the mid-nineteenth century, the prices of jewellery were fixed by the state, and it was 
compulsory for traders to display the prices in their shops. Complaints, if any, could be 
made to the faujdar (magistrate) who then took action against the culprit. Jewellers were 
also licensed by the state: when a new jeweller was considered qualified, he visited the 
palace treasury to register, collect his weighing scales and given permission to wear the 
jewellers’ distinctive topi (hat) and white dhotiP  As in Amber, one of the jewellers’ 
primary functions was to service the Jaipuri royal family and members of its court, which 
was the most powerful in Rajputana. The largest number of customers for Jaipuri lapidary 
were, by the end of the nineteenth century, no longer the court but Europeans. An early 
modem history-cum-guidebook of the city, written specifically for British visitors, 
provides lists of a large number of shops retailing various handicrafts such as enamels, 
embroideries, paintings and carpets (Notes on Jaipur 1916:47-49).
What information can be gleaned from the various administrative reports of the 1920’s
^See, footnote n.21.
and 1930* s, show Jaipur’s jewellery in decline due to the worldwide economic 
Depression. In 1932, the annual report noted that for silver and gold jewellery: there was 
'[less] demand consequent on depression in trade and low prices of agricultural produce* 
(Report on the Administration o f Jaipur State 1931-32:27). There is little information on 
the gem trade per se, but the annual statistics from the Customs Department show that 
receipts for the importation of gold and silver fell from Rs.4501 and Rs. 13,469 
respectively in 1927-28 to a low of Rs.68 for gold and Rs.1450 for silver in 1934-35, 
reflecting the low demand for fabricated jewellery (Report on the Administration o f Jaipur 
State 1927-28:81 and 1934-35:95).
There is substantially more information in the Census of 1931, which was the last major 
British census for the sub-continent and still referred to by contemporary Indian 
governments as it gives the last distribution of the population by the criteria of caste. The 
city’s major industries were cloth printing, gold enamelwork, woollen cloth production, 
lacquer work, and stone and marble carving; it goes on to add that all these industries 
were in ‘crisis’. Of the sixth, precious stone-cutting, that it was limited to Muslim Julahas 
(weavers) and ‘Begris’ (labourers). It continues, the ‘naginars’ (gems) had a large market 
in British Indian trade centres and overseas; ‘But owing to financial crisis and general 
depression of trade....this industry is not prosperous [sic] and is in a decadent state’ 
(Census o f India 1931: Jaipur State, pt.l:119). In the city of Jaipur, out of the 19,303 
employed in industry and 7,495 in trade, 3,282 were in jewellery manufacturing and 299 
in the jewellery trade (Census o f India 1931: Jaipur State, pt. 1:136,161).
The Census notes that there were only 7,242 Jains in the city, which must be an
105
underestimation, but this is not correlated to occupation (Census o f India 1931: Jaipur 
State, pt. 1:191). But this is the first reference to a substantial if regressing industry, and 
that the fabricating lapidarists were Muslim and by implication former weavers. The only 
subsequent British reference to the industry is in a wartime report: the important 
industries were metal, paper, cotton, and khadi (hand spun cotton), the last named 
reflects the influence of the nationalist Swadeshi (self-made) movement. Of Jaipur’s ‘arts 
and crafts’: gold and silver jewellery, watercolour painting, pottery, brassware, marble 
and wood carving, lace, carpets, etc. (Report on the Administration o f Jaipur State 1942- 
43:52-54).
The lapidary industry appears to have reverted to its former anonymity, and the 
remaining jewellery industry to an industrial adjunct. The census material in the post- 
Independence period applies different criteria for each decade, sometimes as ‘gem setters 
and precious stone dressers’, sometimes ‘jewellers’, or as ‘manufacturers of jewellery and 
related articles’. But these are all for urban areas for the whole state of Rajasthan and, 
with the advent of tourism in many cities in the state, makes the size of the industry in 
Jaipur impossible to quantify. Except for some hints from the British material at the end 
of nineteenth century and the Census of 1931, there is little official evidence for the 
growth of Jaipur as a world centre for the importation, fabrication and export of precious 
and semi-precious gemstones.
From the growth of the city, its trade and industries and nascent lapidary fabrication, the 
next chapter investigates the contemporary lapidary economy of Jaipur.
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CHAPTER 4: LAPIDARY ECONOMY OF JAIPUR
if Introduction
In this chapter I intend firstly to examine the lapidary economy of Jaipur in terms of its 
social relations, that is the Jain commercial dominance of an industry where the 
workforce is almost exclusively Muslim, and political relationship of both these 
communities with their Hindu neighbours. Secondly, the socio-economic organization of 
the lapidary industry in terms of partnerships, bargaining and credit. Thirdly, the family 
business is the paradigmatic business in the industry, and the compatibility of the Indian 
joint-family and entrepreneurship will also be analyzed. Fourthly, the role of corruption 
and the ‘black economy’ which has important economic and social ramifications. And 
finally, the applicability of the concept of a dual economy will conclude the chapter.
Jewellery exports are an important source of foreign exchange for India but, in a world 
market estimated in 1990 at $ 56 billion, India’s share was only 5.5 %. Officially, 
exports of gems and jewellery from India during 1989-90 reached an all-time high of 
Rs.5,479.37 crores, an increase of 19.6% over the previous year. More than 90 % of 
this figure was in fabricated diamonds, coloured gemstones accounted for Rs. 194.82 
crores, exeeding the target of Rs.175 crores set for the year; this constitutes 3.55% of 
the total exports of gems and jewellery. Rajasthan exported a record Rs. 150.52 crores 
of precious, semi-precious gemstones and jewellery for 1989-90, an increase of 32% over 
the previous year. The bulk of the exports were to the U.S. and Japan (The Hindu 
22/4/90).
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Jaipur is the leading centre in India for the cutting and polishing of coloured gemstones; 
but an important constraint faced by the lapidary industry is an acute shortage of good 
quality rough gemstones. The industry is very largely dependent on imported raw 
materials from Brazil and Columbia (for emeralds), Burma, Sri Lanka, Cambodia and 
African countries such as Zambia. These countries are encouraging the growth of their 
own lapidary industries, and subsequently the surplus available for export to India is 
limited. Nevertheless, India possesses considerable indigenous resources of her own, in 
Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and particularly Orissa have deposits of 
garnets, rubies, sapphires, etc.; but the exploitation of these resources has never been 
systematically carried out by the central or state governments.
Jaipur achieved its unique expertise in the lapidary industry through its traditional 
production of garnets, but since the end of the nineteenth century the speciality of the 
industry has been the fabrication of emeralds. Emeralds now make up an estimated 70% 
of Jaipur’s lapidary exports. Diamonds do not play a role in the Jaipur industry as their 
processing and export are largely concentrated in Bombay and Gujarat.
It is impossible to overestimate the degree to which the gem economy of Jaipur 
participates not only in the national but in the international economy as well. In the 
period 1990/1991, at least four events, two of them domestic - the Mandal agitation,1
^ e  policy of the central government to implement the Mandal Report of 1980, 
which recommended the extension of reservation for government employment, i.e. 
reverse discrimination, to ‘Other Backward Classes* - an Indian bureaucratic euphemism 
for Sudra castes. This political decision led to strikes, rioting and ‘self-immolation’ by 
the higher castes, the net losers of such a policy, in many parts of Northern India during
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inter-communal (i.e. Hindu-Muslim) violence - and two of them international - the Gulf 
War and the economic recession - had severe repercussions on the Jaipur lapidary 
industry, particularly in a dramatic fall in the export of coloured stones. And in the two 
domestic events Jaipur, itself, was involved in a series of bands (closures), hartals 
(strikes) and riots to the extent of virtually closing down the industry for four months at 
the end of 1990. These and the two subsequent international events led to a sharp 
decrease in the number of tourists and/or buyers both Indian and non-Indian of Jaipur* s 
products, and the income of manufacturers, retailers, exporters, fell accordingly.
As we shall see, even though most of the transactions in the industry was between the 
jauhris (jewellers) themselves,2 the overwhelming bulk of the business is in exporting 
to their clients and relatives in N. America, Europe, S. E. Asia and Japan. In the 
lapidary industry, and 80% of gem/jewellers - as opposed to artisans - are Jains. The 
family business is the norm with the family home usually doubling as the business 
premises;3 but a small number of larger enterprises have grown into extra-familial 
undertakings, with an attendant management structure, paid employees and separate 
business premises.
According to the Gem Jewellers’ Association (GJA) of Jaipur there were 930 registered
1990.
2 Strictly speaking, they are not ‘jewellers* in the sense of manufacturers and/or 
retailers of jewellery, even though a minority do undertake this role it is a marginal 
activity only. A more accurate designation would be gem trader or gem merchant.
^ e  identification of the family and the business is total, and as Fox has observed 
these are ‘business families’ rather than ‘family businesses’ (Fox 1969:143).
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exporters of coloured gemstones and thus bona fide  members of the association in the city 
in 1990. Unofficial estimates for the gem/jewellers in the city range from 2,000 to more 
than 10,000, most of whom are involved to some extent or other - legally or otherwise - 
in the export trade, but the exact number is impossible to quantify. Likewise, the 
number of artisans, who are overwhelming Muslims, who are engaged in fabrication, the 
cutting and polishing, of gemstones.
But according to the GJA, employment in the industry had remained static, and may 
actually start to decrease. The growth of the Indian lapidary industry has not been as 
great as that of Thailand or Israel. As a spokesman for the GJA explained to me: 
‘Thailand had stolen a march over India’, with almost three lakh artisans employed in the 
gemstone processing industry as against 50,000 a decade ago. ‘Israel has an edge over 
India* with its advanced technology and latest robotics. Lapidary technology in India has 
remained confined to traditional tools and equipment which does not encourage increased 
production. ‘These tools may be suitable for expensive emeralds but an industry cannot 
survive on production of only one item*. He argued that suitable modem machines with 
high yields and uniform cutting should be installed. The production of calibrated stones 
(fixed sizes) should be undertaken on a large scale so as to dominate the world market 
in quantity alone. The biggest effort, in this respect, has been the state government’s 
establishment of an Gemstone Industrial Park at Sanganer on the edge of the city, where 
it is hoped that 400 lapidary units will be inaugurated.4
4But by the end of 1990 only about ten units were occupied.
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ii/ The Social Relations of the Industry: Jain. Muslim and Hindu
The Rajasthan District Gazetteer (1987) for Jaipur gives the proportion of Muslims in 
Jaipur tahsil (sub-district) as 20%; this, however, is a 1976 statistic and is probably an 
underestimate (Gupta 1987:65). Anecdotal estimates put the Muslim population at 
between 25 - 30% out of a total population of approximately two million. There is no 
official breakdown, but the GJA estimate that approximately 5 % of its members and 95 % 
of the workers in the industry are Muslim. The Muslims largely reside in Paharganj and 
around Motidongri Road in, respectively, the northeastern and southeastern areas of the 
city. The workers are overwhelmingly employed in cutting and polishing stones on sub­
contracts for the city’s manufacturers. The contract is in terms of piece-work, time, and 
place of work, the rates are negotiable and depend on the skill of the artisan. The 
contracts are verbal as many of the Muslims are illiterate and, for both manufacturer and 
artisan, nothing recorded forestalls detection, and it engenders trust. There is no formal 
regular working arrangement between manufacturer and worker, but obviously there is 
some form of minimal economic symbiosis between a contractor and that pool of artisans 
whom he considers competent to undertake the work and/or that he inherited with the 
business.
The accounts of earliest artisans in the lapidary industry - for example, Boileau’s table 
of 1835 - of Amber or Jaipur suggest they were Hindus. The relatively large Muslim 
population of the city stems from immigration during the latter part of the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries from U.P., when the ‘new* city beyond the Pink City’s walls 
was planned (Roy 1978:84). This also coincides with the modem ‘take-off of the
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lapidary industry. The techniques of cutting and polishing gemstones were initially 
bequeathed from father to son, as in any traditional industry on the Indian sub-continent. 
The Muslims’ train their sons from an early age, six or seven, in their own homes, as 
their only education is probably in a madrasa (Koranic school).
The work may be done at either the Muslim’s home or on the premises of the 
manufacturer; the Muslims themselves own the cutting and polishing equipment and will 
bring it to the manufacturers if necessary, leaving it there each night until the work is 
completed. The division of labour between the homes of the Muslims and that of the 
manufacturers is about 50/50. The cutting and polishing equipment is almost entirely a 
solid wheel made of carborundum (silicon carbide), which can be interchanged with other 
wheels of various hardness and smoothness depending on the faceting and degree of 
polishing required. Traditionally, the wheel was operated manually by a bow-shaped saw, 
and a majority of the operators - particularly the home-based workers -still use this 
equipment. The rest use a more recently introduced electrically-operated grinding-wheel 
which, except for its power input, is almost identical to the traditional equipment. The 
advantages of the latter are that the wheel speed is consistent, faster and all-purpose, its 
great disadvantage is its total incapacity during daily power cuts or ‘load shedding’ as it 
is euphemistically called.
The workplace in the worker’s home is often the one room that he and his family 
occupies, or it might be a communal yard, balcony or roof which he might share with 
other lapidary artisans. At the manufacturers there will be a designated area of the haveli 
for fabrication, typically, either a large room on the ground floor or a covered area of
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the flat roof. In either place, the artisan sits cross-legged on a cotton mat on the floor in 
front of his wheel, with a bowl of water to continually clean the stones of powder 
produced by the abrasive action. Hard diamond powder was used as an abrasive on softer 
stones, but this technique has died out with the use of all-purpose machines. In the 
primary cutting process, 75 % of the rough stone will be discarded. But from the highest 
quality off-cut one can produce second quality stones, and so on, down to the powder 
which is purchased by Ayuvedic practitioners - vaids - for their mineral-based 
preparations.
The piece-work rates are variable and dependent on the quality of the stone and skill of 
the worker: typically, cutting can range from Ps.50 to Rs.2 and polishing from Rs.4-5 
per carat, but a highly skilled worker could expect to double these rates.
The introduction of simple technology has had no impact on traditional work patterns or, 
more pertinently, on Muslim employment in the city. But one of the larger manufacturers 
in the city decided at the end of 1990 to purchase $2 million German machinery for the 
cutting of uniform stones. And his example, plus his employment policy, is a potential 
threat to Muslim employment and the tenuous symbiosis between manufacturer and 
artisan.
During the national elections of November 1989, there was serious rioting in Darwaza 
and Ramganj Bazaars in the predominantly Muslim area of Paharganj. This was the first 
sectarian riot in the city since before Independence. Those responsible were members of 
Shiv Sena (a rightwing Hindu party) - not from Jaipur - whom, while participating in a
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pro-Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) demonstration, broke away to attack Muslims and 
Muslim-owned shops.5 One of the many consequences of this action was that, by 
universal agreement, the local police did nothing to protect the Muslims and, in fact, may 
have facilitated or even encouraged the rioters in their action. Thereafter, there was 
understandable unease in the Muslim community, that the Jaipuri police could not be 
relied upon to protect Muslim interests. An unease that was to be vindicated eleven 
months later when Muslims were again attacked, this time at the behest of local BJP 
politicians.
A consequence of the rioting was that many Muslim workers, for several days or weeks, 
would not leave their homes, neither to work at the manufacturers, perhaps less than a 
kilometre away in Jauhri Bazaar, nor deliver the gemstones which they had fabricated in 
their own homes. The large manufacturer, a year before he decided to purchase expensive 
machinery and who is almost dependent on a large turnover for the export market, 
reacted by hiring Hindus to be trained as artisans and work exclusively for him on his 
premises as his employees. Since then, a few other large manufacturers have followed 
his example, although there was always a minority of businesses that directly recruited 
employees. And the process has been accelerated since the riots in October 1990 with 
even small and newly-established manufacturers’ following this pattern.
The newly recruited workers are always Hindus and the majority are from Bihar and 
U.P. rather than from Jaipur. They are usually young men who have migrated to Jaipur
^ e  BJP is the major rightwing Hindu party which is strong in the ‘cowbelt’ across 
northern India, including Rajasthan.
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looking for employment; Jaipur, with its reputation as a wealthy city through tourism, 
attracts young unemployed men from all over India. When asked why he preferred to 
employ non-local men, an employer said that they were less likely to disappear to a 
relatives wedding, etc., firstly, because they would not know about it and, secondly, if 
they did, it was too far away. This explanation has to be taken with a certain scepticism 
as, if necessary, even the poorest Indian can be an indefatigable traveller in his or her 
own country; and their are certain rites where, say, the oldest son is indispensable. 
Nevertheless, it is a fact that absenteeism, not just in the lapidary business, is seen as a 
major problem, whereby the absence of one key worker can bring a business grinding to 
a halt. -
This change to direct employment, which was only beginning and only affects a minority 
of manufacturers and artisans, has an obvious economic rationale: a move from an 
uncertain 'putting out* system to a mode of rational and structured factory production. 
Arguably, the strategy of employing migrant labour was an exercise in cutting labour 
costs, but both employees and sub-contractees were paid the same piece-work rates - 
hence no work, no pay - although this was an unlikely situation for the large 
manufacturers. The introduction of intense mechanization requires considerable capital 
expenditure, and will almost inevitably lead to a change from piece-work to fixed-wage 
rates. Direct employment guarantees a stable and controlled workforce, centralized and 
easily supervised, which facilitates the managerial rationalization of production.
On the politics of change from sub-contracting to direct employment, as one of the 
smaller manufacturer’s explained in regard to Hindu-Muslim communalism, Jains are by
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and large ‘"fence-sitters" - except where their interests are concerned.’ Within the city 
of Jaipur, Jain Baniyas generally support the BJP which is largely a coalition of Brahman 
and Baniya interests. It is not that Jains are ‘communalist’, but it is commercially prudent 
for the Jains to employ Hindus even if it means alienating their Muslim workers as in the 
eventuality of future conflict, more often than not, Muslims are the victims rather the 
beneficiaries of inter-communal violence.
iii/ Partnerships. Bargaining and Credit
In the ‘formalist’/*substantivist’ debate, Sahlins viewed the theories of economic action 
in ‘market’ societies as inappropriate for non-market ‘band* societies. The substantivists* 
argued that there were two diametrically opposed types of economic systems, different 
‘not in degree but in kind* (Dalton 1961:10). In market societies, economic transactions 
were impersonal and ‘atomised*, whereas in band societies, transactions were personal 
and ‘embedded’; or in Parsonian jargon, they were respectively ‘undersocialised’ and 
‘oversocialised’ (see, Granovetter 1985). Impersonal transactions involve the actors 
having little or no social relations with each other, their encounter is transient and 
singular. Conversely, personal transactions involve the actors in a web of social relations 
which are protracted and multi-dimensional. In fact, substantivists’ would argue that the 
economy of band societies is itself, a priori, embedded within the society and cannot be 
meaningfully separated from it. On the other hand, formal, i.e. neo-classical, economic 
theory sees perfect market competition as the actions of atomised self-interested actors 
engaged in impersonal transactions, who have no interest in durable relationships but only 
with a specific economic act.
In the Indian context, the traditional form of an embedded transacting relationship is the 
‘jajmani system* found in many parts of rural India. Debate about this Indian form of 
patron-clientism is complex and highly contentious but, briefly, so-called jajmani 
relationships are historically a ritualised and/or economic exchange of goods and services 
renumerated in either cash or kind (Kolenda 1963:11-12).6 With minor alterations, it is 
those factors of the arrangement which focus on the transaction of goods and services 
between a jajman (patron) and his kamin (client) that could be said to most resemble the 
ongoing embedded relations of a trader and his customers. The transactions as described 
by Wiser implies reciprocity, durable relationships, which are inheritable and even 
transferable, and ‘fixed rates [which] show little course of changing throughout the course 
of the years’ (Wiser, quoted in Harper 1959:761-762). On this last point the evidence 
seems to be less than conclusive: Harper claims that in the Carnatic equivalent of the 
jajmani system there is ‘little bargaining over wages and prices* (Harper 1959:764). 
Again, an economic historian using only a historical source affirms that, ‘there was no 
bargaining, and no payment for specific services rendered* (Neale 1957:226). Kolenda, 
argues that we need much more information about ‘the negotiations and bases of 
payments* before we can arrive at a definitive conclusion (Kolenda 1963:28). However, 
M. Sharma (1978:106) and Parry (n.d.) both convincingly argue that under certain 
circumstances bargaining was an integral part of the jajman/kamin relationship.7
6For a historical overview of jajmani relationships see Fuller (1977, 1989).
7But Sahlins saw any form of ‘haggling’, or even ‘barter*, as ‘the most impersonal 
sort of exchange’ and, therefore, as ‘negative reciprocity’ (Sahlins 1974:195). But, as 
Khuri has argued, reciprocity in ‘nonmarket systems is not incompatible with the self- 
interest or aggressiveness [sic] motive* (Khuri 1968:698). He also argues that bargaining 
is not necessarily ‘dysfunctional*; in market economies, bargaining can be either ‘socially
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But the claims for both the embeddedness of economic relations being peculiar to non- 
market societies, and the impersonality of economic transactions being axiomatic for 
market societies are unsupportable. There is a wealth of demonstrable evidence to show 
that in certain markets, such as the bazaar/peasant environment, durable personalized 
embedded relationships offer a host of advantages for economic entrepreneurship. The 
implications of durable economic relationships are a knowledge of the other’s person, 
their family, biography, and so on. And the greater the knowledge the greater the 
potentiality for trust, mistrust being engendered by a lack of information about one’s 
partner. In economic transactions, information lessens the risk. Embeddedness stresses 
the role of concrete personal relations or networks generating trust.
To the outsider, the bazaar of developing countries looks chaotic, exotic and incoherent.
Amid the plethora of detail, how are we identify social entities and relationships:
retailers, wholesalers, manufacturers, distributors, peddlers, importers, exporters, and
so on? Yet these designations imply that the bazaar does have a particular structure.
‘Extremely complex webs of causal connection cross and recross the whole field of 
bazaar life, but not only are they extremely difficult, if not impossible, to isolate, they 
are not germane (or, anyway, not immediately so) to what we here want to display: how 
the institutions of the suq combine to provide a coherent framework for the processes of 
exchange and how these processes, in turn, fit intelligibly within that framework. The 
constraints are partial, the logic approximate, the motivations incomplete, the 
comprehensibility limited - and the system, thus, as all social systems, far from fully 
coherent. But, however imperfect, the organization of bazaar institutions into an ordered 
whole with properties of its own is real. It can be described. And described, it can extend 
our understanding of how the suq operates and why; can clarify just what sort of animal
conflictful* or ‘socially cooperative*, and non-market economies can be either ‘socially 
integrative* or socially conflictful (Khuri 1968:698-699). For a further discussion of the 
substantivist view and functionalism see Davis (1973:19-27).
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the bazaar economy is’ (Geertz 1979:213) (cf. Fanselow 1989).
To give one example of what appears to be an incoherent institution of the lapidary 
industry, one has only to witness the daily unofficial street market (hat) that convenes 
twice a day, Monday to Thursday.
At about 10.30 am., men start to gather outside one of the larger gateways on Jauhri 
Bazaar, one of the major thoroughfares that traverses the old walled city. The gateway 
bares a sign upon which is written - in English - ‘Standard Pharmacy’, but there the 
connection with pharmacology ends. Gathered below and around the gateway on the 
pavement are about 200 men who meet to buy, sell, broker, eavesdrop, and most 
important of all, gossip about gemstones and the gem business in general. The twenty or 
so metres on either side of the gateway becomes for an hour or two a fluctuating 
unofficial bourse or exchange. Ubiquitous white paper packets of various sizes, that 
always hold the stones, are being opened, closed, examined, gesticulated, poured over, 
argued over. A stone will be removed from the packet with forefinger and thumb and 
delicately placed on the join of the first two fingers, all in one movement; another will 
be held upto the light, another weighed in the palm of the hand as the potential buyer 
looks the vendor in the eye.
The same scene is re-enacted at about 3.30 in the afternoon in one of the wider side 
streets off Jauhri Bazaar, Gopalji ka Rasta. Why these two events take place at these 
particular places, at these particular times or when it began, nobody knows - it is 
‘parampara’ (tradition). The sights and the timings are completely arbitrary; but the
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reason why there is no congregation on Fridays is that a large minority of the participants 
are Muslim - the market is closed on Saturdays and Sundays.8
Out of the couple of hundred individuals gathered in the street, perhaps a dozen or so are 
members of the GJA. The majority are brokers (dalals) and unregistered dealers from the 
margins of the lapidary business, the rest are artisans and workers doubling as 
entrepreneurs. As there is no gem exchange in the city the street market acts as its 
equivalent; its main function is as an almost daily source of information on prices, 
availability and trends in the gem market for those mainly on the middle and lower rungs 
of the business, particularly brokers, and it acts as an outlet and source of gemstones 
from the margins of the industry. Thus, the quality and quantity of the stones, specimens 
of which are examined on the street, are unlikely to be high. The larger registered gem 
traders can command quantity, quality stones, brokers, buyers and information and have 
little need of the hat.
The ‘market* of the lapidary industry is very much an interior one. With the exception 
of the street bourse as described above, jewellers, brokers and a large number of artisans 
tend to work from their own homes in the walled city or from havelis which have been 
converted into offices/factories. Depending on their opening hours, there is constant 
activity and movement between the jewellers* premises to deliver, to collect gemstones 
or just to gossip and eavesdrop. The consignments can range from just one or two small 
packets which can be produced from a pocket to overflowing carrier bags and cases. No
8On the role of this market and whether this is a manifestation of an ‘informal sector* 
will be explored in section vi/  A Dual Sector Economy?
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one has any qualms about carrying several lakhs * worth of gemstones around the streets 
of the old city. ‘We don’t worry, we know everybody’, one of them explained. Likewise, 
security within the haveli is no more than the thickness of an almirah's (cupboard) door; 
and many of the jewellers keep a sort of ‘open house’ where anybody can walk in off the 
streets, but I never heard of anybody being robbed.
The Jaipuri lapidary industry comprises importers, manufacturers, wholesalers and the 
occasional retailers; these are usually conflated into one firm or individual. Typically, a 
jeweller will be involved in all aspects of the industry, only a small minority specialize 
in one occupation such as wholesaling.
The biggest problem for someone entering the manufacturing process, and it may be a 
deterrent, is the unquestioned tradition that consignments of uncut stones cannot be 
divided into smaller lots.9 Another ‘trick of the trade’ is to match a high quality 
fabricated stone with one, which to the untutored eye, appears in size, shape and lustre 
as identical, when in fact it is of inferior quality - it is simply a means of disposing of 
the poorer stone. But as in this last instance, consignments of finished stones can be 
divided but there is a 20 % surcharge on the sale price. These strategies are accepted as 
traditional and legitimate business practices.
Because of import controls and restrictions on foreign exchange, only the larger traders 
have the resources to deal with the governmental bureaucratic web of hard currency and
9The same ‘all or nothing* practice was found at the ‘sights’ of uncut diamonds held 
by De Beers in London (Independent on Sunday, Business supplement, 13/9/92).
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import licenses, and pay the required bribes. They import larger quantities of uncut 
stones, particularly emeralds, than they in fact require for fabrication and the excess is 
sold to other manufacturers in the Jaipur market through brokers. On the other hand, 
manufacturers may accept export orders for quantities and qualities of cut stones which 
they do not possess, in these circumstances the deficit is supplied by brokers. Exporting 
cut stones is the most lucrative area of the industry, but the international market can be 
transient and capricious; without this outlet the manufacturer, who cannot afford to hoard, 
will mobilize his brokers to unload any surplus of processed stones. A small minority 
of manufacturers may supply local retailers or perform this role themselves, where the 
stones are fabricated into jewellery but, with the exception of the quality end of the 
market, it is not a profitable area due to the sheer number of competing retailers often 
selling low-quality merchandise.
The linkages between the various aspects, or rather between the various jewellers, are 
facilitated by brokers who are basically middlemen. They thrive on lapidary gossip, on 
whom has what to buy and sell. The broker’s network can be visualized as a wheel with 
himself as the hub, and his buyers and sellers are dyadic spokes on the circumference of 
his clientelized lapidary world. Similarly, individual jewellers can deal with anything 
from 5 to upto 150 brokers, thus the industry can be seen as a series of overlapping 
networks. A broker is an intermediary between buyer and seller in highly organized 
markets where margins are relatively small. The difference between the Jaipur lapidary 
market and an occidental commodity market is that in the latter it is not necessary for the 
commodities to be physically exchanged, only the rights to ownership. The broker’s 
function is to negotiate an agreeable price for both parties by commuting between them
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until both are satisfied, or the transaction is aborted. Often, a broker is instrumental in 
introducing a buyer to seller so they can negotiate directly; nevertheless, the broker still 
receives his usual commission: 2% for precious and 4% for semi-precious stones.
At any particular time, brokers may hold large quantities of stones but as a middleman 
he only does so on behalf of the vendor. For each package of stones, cut or uncut, the 
vendor will stipulate a maximum and minimum asking price, thus it is in the interests of 
both vendor and broker to obtain the highest price possible. If the vendor’s minimum 
price cannot attract a buyer, depending on the former’s economic circumstances, the 
vendor can either negotiate - via a broker - a lower price or hold the consignment in the 
hope of finding a potential buyer in the future. Either each packet has the total weight 
and the maximum price per carat written on it, or the packets are simply numbered and 
accompanied by sheet of paper with the corresponding details. One quirk of enumeration, 
and nobody knows why, is that prices but not the weight are underwritten to the tenth 
power, i.e., for example, Rs.40per carat is written as Rs.4, 4 as .4 and so on.
Like the jauhri, the majority of brokers were Jain and they inherited their function from 
their forefathers. A minority of traders had a brokerage ancestry, and the expertise 
learned from brokering can provide an entrance into gem trade proper, a means to 
graduate into full-time trading. But the reverse from trading to brokering is unheard of; 
although, like jewellers, brokers require a reputation to survive in the gem trade, both 
the status and rewards of brokering are comparatively lower than trading. Occasionally, 
some jewellers’ indulge in what they call ‘brokering’. Strictly speaking, what they are 
doing is acting as arbitrageurs: exploiting a differential by buying when prices are low
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and selling when they are higher, or hopefully so (cf. Geertz 1979:188). In fact, whether 
the transfer involves brokers or not, most gem transactions are between the traders 
themselves; packets or their contents may go through a dozen or more hands before they 
arrive at a final consumer.
The market lives on a network of information, gossip, that is theoretically available to 
everyone (cf. Cottam 1983:215). But, obviously, not everyone can have perfect identical 
information; by its own logic, the receipt of market information among several thousand 
people must have an unequal distribution or else everybody would be undertaking 
identical transactions. ‘That whole complex of information, misinformation, hopes, and 
fears which go to make up "anticipations"; but a number of additional and highly 
localized elements in each sale situation make it difficult to predict a particular price on 
a particular day or to understand how the [seller] or the buyer may feel about and react 
to the price realized* (Neale et al. 1965:138). For example, jewellers will admit to 
‘hoarding* particular gemstones in the expectation from the grapevine - and this 
information is limited to a few - that there will be a shortage and prices will rise 
accordingly or, more likely, they are being withheld in anticipation of a sale to an 
overseas* buyer. Such information is the result of a trusted clientelized relationship, and 
the reciprocation of some similar information will probably be forthcoming in the future. 
These transactions, which are the exception rather than the rule, may well be done over 
the telephone or, if not, when business can be conducted privately with no one else 
present. But competitors are often friends and vice versa, so how does a jeweller decide 
when to communicate confidential information? ‘If he is my mbhaim [‘brother’, i.e. a close 
friend] I should tell him*, said one informant, implying that there were occasions when
he did not.
It is in peasant and/or bazaar markets that long-term economic relationships have been 
most often observed, an environment where both embedded and atomistic transactions 
intermix.10 It is the ground where the objective is one’s own economic self-interest but 
not at the expense of long-term economic relationship for an immediate short-term 
gain. Such enduring trading relations have been described and analyzed in several parts 
of the world: for example, in Haiti - ‘pratik’ (Mintz 1964); the Phillipines - ‘suki’ (Davis 
1973); Morocco - ‘clientelization’ (Geertz 1978); and Central Java - ‘langganan’ 
(Alexander & Alexander 1987). The most important facet of these relationships is that 
transactions do not have to be reciprocated in the short-term but can be adjusted in an 
ongoing long-term series of exchanges.11
Granovetter, noting that one incentive not to cheat is that it damage one’s reputation, 
outlines four arguments for personalised embedded relationships: ‘1/ It is cheap; 2/ one 
trusts one’s own information best....; 3/ individuals with whom one has a continuing 
relationship have an economic motivation to be trustworthy....; 4/ continuing economic 
relations often become overlaid with social content that carries strong expectations of 
trust and abstention from opportunism’. To emphasise the point, he continues, ‘more 
intimate relations... .make behaviour more predictable’ (Granovetter 1985:490 - emphasis
10For a discussion of the difference between peasant and bazaar markets see, 
Thompson and Huies (1968).
nThis feature probably comes closest to Sahlins’ notion of ‘generalized reciprocity’ 
whereby the promise of return is non-specific and nebulous; short-term atomistic 
transactions resemble his ‘balanced reciprocity’ (Sahlins 1974:193-95).
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added). This last point cannot be emphasised enough in instilling a large degree of 
confidence in economic transactions and eliminating uncertainty.
‘The search for information - laborious, uncertain, complex and irregular - is the central 
experience in the bazaar’ (Geertz 1963:30b). Following Geertz, what we can call 
clientelization can obviously assist a buyer overcome their ignorance, their lack of 
information, of bazaar prices, availability, and so on. But the consequence of 
asymmetrical knowledge is bargaining, ‘where buyers and sellers have unequal access to 
price information’ (Alexander & Alexander 1987:42).12
There are no fixed prices in the Jaipur lapidary market, theoretically prices are what the 
market will bear.
‘The price mechanism can function as an efficient communicative system for the 
optimal allocation of resources only if buyers and sellers are relatively certain about the 
quality and quantity of commodities in the market, so that they are comparable relative 
to price. Thus the logical corollary of the price system is an accurate and verifiable 
system of measurement and quality control’ (Fanselow 1989:262 - emphasis added).
Those in the daily market for a specific quality or quantity of stones will obviously scour
the bazaar for maximum information. But the unequal distribution of information for a
particular item on a particular day is usually such that buyers and sellers will have set
maximum and minimum parameters. Thus there is an approximate price, the
approximation is the differential between maximum and minimum prices which can be
12 From Eastern Java, both Dewey and Geertz have observed bazaar bargaining where 
any form of clientelization was absent. Dewey noted that the less homogeneous the 
commodity and/or the more irregular the supply, such as for agricultural produce, the 
more intensive the bargaining with a wider range of bids (Dewey 1962:73-74). Geertz 
claims, that in pursuit of a killing, the seller makes no attempt ‘to build up a stable 
clientele or a steadily growing business* (Geertz 1963b:35).
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resolved or not by negotiation between buyer and seller.13
However, this negotiation is rarely a basis for acrimony. If the transaction is to be 
conducted in the presence of third parties, which is often the case, and they want the 
price or quantity to be a secret, then they resort to the cloth. A cloth or handkerchief is 
spread over the hands of the buyer and seller by one of the parties and they ‘transact* by 
squeezing the appropriate number of fingers on each others’ hands: two fingers, for 
example, will indicate Rs.2000 per carat. The fact of each finger equalling Rs.1000, or 
whatever the financial circumstances may be, is so obvious to the participants as to not 
need mentioning.14 They simply nod or shake their heads. Thus a transaction could take 
place with the third parties knowing nothing of the final agreement, but this procedure 
was only resorted to on approximately 25-30 % of the transactions that I observed.15 On
13Geertz* later Moroccan example is underpinned by the theoretical model developed 
from the Mexican experience of Cassady (Geertz 1979:226-227). But Cassady’s model 
implies, via information already gleaned and analyzed ,^ that buyers and sellers have 
arrived at respective maximum and minimum prices. His model is an isometric stepped 
triangle from the crucial initial offer of the seller to the final bid of the buyer. (Cassady 
1974:46-56). The Alexanders* conclude that Cassady’s model is only the ‘Settlement 
stage’, not the whole of the bargaining process, ‘for which "negotiated price fixing" is 
an appropriate term for it is here that the differences between buyer’s and seller’s prices 
are negotiated* (Alexander & Alexander 1987:60-61 - original emphasis).
14This camouflaged bargaining was also described among the cotton traders of Indore 
(L. C. Jain 1929:91).
15Laidlaw observes that transactions are not only private but secret and ‘are valuable 
pieces of knowledge which no one reveals’ (Laidlaw 1990:108-09). This is true to a 
point, particularly in respect of revenue collection, and no individual jeweller will ever 
know the true financial worth of his competitors, but the majority of transactions of the 
smaller and middle range traders which generally involve small amounts of high quality 
or large volumes of low quality stones often take place in ‘public*. Their generality 
renders secrecy unnecessary. These observable run-of-mill transactions are commonplace 
and an important source of mercantile information in the daily round of business.
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rarer occasion when more than just numbers are involved, buyer and seller will retire to 
another room for private negotiations.
However, a minority of transactions can take place in less than amicable circumstances, 
but disputatious claims are less about the price per se and more about the quality of the 
stones. So-called ‘experts’ can have loud acrimonious slanging matches and these 
arguments tend to regularly involve the same individuals. They seem about to come to 
blows when, instead, the rest of those present inteiject themselves between the 
combatants and restrain them. One recalcitrant broker who was often involved in these 
bickerings was generally described as ‘saifira’ (eccentric or crazy) - i.e. he had a 
reputation for this sort of behaviour. But often it seemed more like a game. There is 
undoubtedly a point in these disputes, perhaps measured in decibels, which they cannot 
go beyond. However, the sound of raised voices does not always imply disagreement, 
some dealers and brokers become very excitable when negotiating and transactions can 
take place in a feverish atmosphere.
Within the Jaipur gem trade, it is accepted as axiomatic that anyone who attempts to 
undertake fraudulent transactions will not remain in the business for very long, they will 
simply be boycotted out of existence. Nevertheless, this does not stop tourists and 
inexperienced overseas buyers being regularly ‘ripped o ff by gem/jewellery retailers - 
but these are not considered ‘real’ jewellers and dismissed as mere ‘alankarwalas'
Transactions involving large quantities of high quality stones and dealings with overseas’ 
clients are of a different confidential order. But the fear in respect of highly profitable 
international market, which Laidlaw acknowledges, is that customers will be ‘poached’ 
by competitors.
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(ornament sellers). Although theft is accepted as an inevitability and is mainly confined 
to the manufacturing process, encroachment on a competitor’s business is considered a 
very serious abuse. This abuse usually revolves around the poaching a rival’s overseas 
customers. As the most lucrative area of the business is exporting there is a fierce 
competition for overseas orders, and the cultivation of an overseas clientele has a high 
priority. The large exporters who can produce in quantity and quality have a largely 
guaranteed market, but almost all my informants in the lower and middle rungs of the 
industry had instances of encroachment on their export trade, and thus had a number of 
jewellers either through first-hand experience or reputation with whom they would not 
undertake business. They ask their overseas buyers not to tell anyone in which hotel they 
are staying, as that is where they are usually approached by a competitor.
Good bargaining skills are socially recognized as are experience and expertise.16 
Sometimes, both buyer and seller will congratulate each other on arriving at a bargain 
that is satisfactory to both parties. Some jewellers* have a reputation of being better 
buyers than sellers or vice versa. Expertise, also, in a particular type of stone is also 
recognized: a jeweller who has a reputation for his knowledge will be consulted for his 
professional opinion on a doubtful item. One informant, who was considered an expert 
on emeralds, seemed to spend a great part of his day giving second opinions on the 
quality and value of individual stones.
In the overwhelming majority of transactions no money actually changes hands between 
buyer and seller which neatly circumvents a 3 % sales tax; there is an ongoing
16The same point is made Khuri (1968) and Mintz (1961).
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reciprocation of non-monetary transactions which is dependent on the degree of 
clientelization between the participants. The price was fixed and is entered into the debit 
or credit column of the partnership. Theoretically, the traders’ settle their outstanding 
debts at Diwali, the north Indian new year, but many confess that debts do run over into 
the next year. But the settling of accounts is in practice intermittent, at the convenience 
or necessity of the partners as, for example, when one party is short of cash. Overseas 
transactions are generally paid for in cash, although this may be illegally paid into a 
foreign bank account or held by the consignee to be surreptitiously repatriated at a later 
date. However, with such a wide network of overlapping credit and its concomitant 
secrecy it is difficult to macroscopically gauge the exact role and degree of liquidity in 
the Jaipur lapidary economy.17
Where money does change hands its ultimate transference is the responsibility, as the 
agent of the transaction, of the broker who survives by commission, but he does not 
personally transfer the payment from buyer to seller. There is also a widespread system 
of trading discount saving of between 16 1/2 and 20 1/2 % dependent on the quantity and 
quality of the consignment transacted and, again, the degree of clientalization. There is 
a theoretical interest charge if a debt is not repaid after an agreed date, but in the ongoing 
give and take of trading this is rarely adhered to. Where it does, the interest is usually 
repayable over a period of two to six months and dependent on the creditworthiness of 
the debtor. After the lapse of the agreed date, and payment is further delayed, interest 
at 2 % per month is charged usually by reducing the agreed discount.
17Cottam noted the mutual co-operation among the Mahajans of ‘Mandi’ in the form 
of an ongoing system of loans and credit between firms (Cottam 1983:193-94).
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The interest rate of 2 % per month is co-incidently the same as any dealer can borrow 
on the gem market, but per annum  it is higher than bank lending rates.18 But as Timberg 
and Aiyar have argued, the advantages of borrowing from an unofficial market as 
opposed to a bank are that funds can be provided far more quickly, the loan is generally 
unsecured, is non-bureaucratic and is therefore unlikely to be undetected by the revenue 
authorities (Timberg and Aiyar 1984:48-49). Thus behind the gem trade and intimately 
enmeshed within it is a considerable unofficial banking system, but how large or 
resourceful the system might be is difficult to quantify. The complementarity of trading, 
credit and finance for investment or short-term loans are characteristic of economic 
clientalization, and arguably constitute the viability of the Jaipur lapidary industry, ‘the 
entire economy is indirectly dependent on informal market advances* (Timberg and Aiyar 
1984:48).
The topic of credit, except that outlined above, was the most difficult area on which to 
obtain any hard evidence. In theory, while conceding that such arrangements exist, none 
of my informants would offer any personal details. This was understandable, not just 
because of the possibility of competitors finding out, but also because of prying 
government officials. And any informal credit arrangements in the form of cash will 
almost certainly involve ‘black money’.19
Hazlehurst distinguishes between two forms of credit, ‘legal’ and ‘social’. Legal credit
18Two % was the most often quoted interest rate, higher or lower rates would depend 
on the amount involved and the creditworthiness of the potential borrower.
19See section v/ Corruption and the Black Economy, below.
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is in the form of cheap loans from national and state government agencies. A plethora 
of similar credit arrangements are available in Rajasthan but not for entrepreneurs in the 
lapidary industry;20 it is thought to be unnecessary, as there is enough spare cash in 
circulation and there are other forms of credit available to the industry. Social credit is 
the ability to manipulate elements of social organization such as kinship, affinal links, and 
conspicuous displays of wealth (Hazlehurst 1968:289). For Hazlehurst’s Panjabi 
entrepreneurs, credit has always been a source of ready finance, so much so that it is ‘the 
merchant himself who wishes to become a debtor (that is, to gain the use of another’s 
capital)....[Merchants] find credit essential to the entrepreneurial function’, and adds that 
access to credit is determined by status, i.e. creditworthiness (Hazlehurst 1968:288-89 - 
original emphasis). Timberg has pointed out that the ‘genius of a trading community lies 
in its manipulation of credit’ (Timberg 1978:29). For the majority of Indian urban 
traders, the problems of repayment are minimal. In this respect, embeddedness and 
personalism facilitate credit.
‘The borrowers in the [credit] market a re"known” parties - under continuous surveillance 
in the closely packed lanes of the urban wholesale markets. [They are] observed by 
neighbours, the finance brokers and bankers among them; an expensive night on the town 
is reported and judged the next morning in market gossip. Most of the intermediaries 
interviewed seemed incredulous at the suggestion that they would have to ask formal 
questions of borrowers....they visited every day and with whose business confreres they 
were in continuous contact. In fact, the people in the market not only have a 24-hour 
relationship, they typically have one that extends over generations. We asked one finance 
broker how he evaluated "new borrowers" - he answered that he never took them. All 
his clients were children and grandchildren of businessmen with whom he and his father 
and grandfather had done business’ (Timberg and Aiyar 1984:45).
“ Government agencies arrange credit facilities through the nationalized banks for 
non-lapidary entrepreneurs; official credit facilities are of course available to individual 
jewellers but are outside the remit of those agencies and are negotiated directly between 
the entrepreneur and the bank.
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This quotation aptly sums up a comparable situation in the teeming alleys of the walled 
city of Jaipur. There is always a modicum of privacy but day-to-day existence is largely 
lived out in the public arena. The inhabitants live in a state of almost constant sociability. 
There is a gregarious interaction with one’s neighbours and/or clients that begins before 
dawn and goes on late into the night, probably the only time of day that can considered 
as ‘private*. Such an environment is an ideal arena forjudging creditworthiness.
Another area where it was difficult if not impossible to obtain data was on the jewellers’ 
account books (Jbahi khata). How or how many transactions are actually written down is 
impossible to say. ‘It is estimated that the state governments cannot realize more than 
50% of the sales tax due to them from trading transactions because retailers’, as well as 
wholesalers’, book entries are generally fictitious or non-existent* (Sunday, 25-31 March 
1990). Before Independence every Jain jeweller had elaborate and probably accurate 
commercial records often going back to the origins of the business (cf. Timberg 1971, 
1973). But there were no taxes administered at all to the jewellers who led a tax-free 
existence. With the coming of independence, Jaipur was incorporated into the new Indian 
state of Rajasthan, and also into the federal tax structure. The jewellers’ claimed that the 
reaction of the older business houses was to destroy their commercial records, although 
this was probably an exaggeration.
Bayly has explained how there was an extreme reluctance to show account books to 
outsiders, and the Jains were the most reluctant to release of any information about 
ancestry and commercial practices. The fear of the loss of credit was so strong that 
access to the books would be a source of both discredit and dishonour (Bayly 1983:380).
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One jeweller informed me that he and the average trader kept a record, in a personal 
code, of payments to be made and recovered as most of business was transacted on 
credit,21 and he never compiled a balance sheet - although he would not allow me to see 
the record. The new yearly account books which are inaugurated at Diwali are purely and 
auspiciously ritualistic. Payment of taxes was a ‘personal arrangement* between him and 
the revenue official. He conceded that large firms which deal with hundreds of clients 
keep detailed accounts of transactions, stocks, and produce annual balance sheets, but it 
is doubtful whether these show the true worth of the business; and larger firms which are 
private limited companies do not have to publish their accounts. There is a widespread 
perception among the jewellers that nobody keeps accurate accounts, or if they do they 
are not available for scrutiny to anyone outside the family business.
iv/ The Family Business
The most extreme form of personalized economic relations is within families. Ideally, a 
parent encourages his or her children to work in the family business; the advantages of 
employing a close relative are primarily ones of trust, and it provides gainful employment 
in an environment where there is probably chronic unemployment or at least 
underemployment. Thus, in India as in many other countries, for a parent to bypass his 
children and employ a non-relative would seem downright eccentric.
21 Hazlehurst (1966:62) reports that Panjabi merchants keep cryptic account books. 
Cottam, from a small town in Rajasthan, argues that although the Mahajans' claim they 
use a secret language and their books are unique, they were written in Marwari or 
Persian script and rather difficult to decipher; but she was never allowed to see the Jains’ 
account books (Cottam 1983:137-38,184,189).
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Benedict has identified the key features of the family firm which combines business with 
the extended family: 1/ it provides business training, particularly for sons; 2/ it maintains 
business secrets; 3/ family members can be expected to work long and irregular hours 
for little or no direct renumeration; 4/ liquid resources: residence can double as business 
premises, the joint family can have lower level of consumption, thus reducing expenditure 
and allowing more capital to be invested in the firm; 5/ it is small and flexible enough 
to take advantage of new business opportunities; 6/ it is a stimulus to economic growth 
in developing countries; 7/ its extended kinship network can be activated for additional 
finance, forging business connections, and recruiting extra personnel (Benedict 1968:5- 
11). The extended family is a multi-purpose ‘resource group or resource network*.22
Ideally, for Jains and non-Jains, an individual lapidary business is organized on family 
lines as described above. Although, since Independence there has been a steady outflow 
of potential heirs from these families into other businesses and the professions, there has 
never a shortage of sons and sons-in-law to carry on the family tradition. And there is 
an acute awareness that this a Jain tradition that should continue. There is still 
considerable pressure on erring sons and other immediate relatives who have opted-out 
of the business to return to the fold, particularly if they reside in Jaipur. For example, 
one younger brother of an established jeweller has, among other minor business 
dabblings, an unsuccessful record/cassette shop in a marginal suburban area of the city.
22See, K. N. Sharma (1969). From an exploratory study of Panjabi entrepreneurs, 
Tangri observed that the ‘closer* the family were to each other, the more effective and 
entrepreneurial the business; success of the business was proportional to the number of 
male adults in the family. But importantly, ‘A firm owned by a nuclear family....seemed 
to have reached its maximum economic size’ (Tangri 1982:201). On the compatibility of 
the joint Indian family and entrepreneurship see, also Singer (1968).
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But after a great deal of cajoling, he has been persuaded to establish an outlet for the 
family business in Bangkok.
It is not unknown for a son/brother to establish an independent lapidary business and still 
remain with his family in the natal haveli, and retain the usual domestic arrangements by 
contributing a percentage to household expenses. However, although these claimed to be 
separate ventures, there was a certain amount of overlap with the parent business when 
it came, for instance, to sharing expenses for a consignment of uncut stones.
With respect to Benedict’s ‘ideal-type’ family business above, there was one important 
exception to the training of sons in the lapidary business, Traditionally, sons were 
apprenticed to a non-relative in what I would describe as the ‘guruship’ (guru rekha - 
guru line), whereby the jewellers trained the sons of their co-practitioners and friends in 
not only the purely commercial side of the industry but, more importantly, in the art of 
gemology. However, as we shall see, this method of training was in decline.
Towards the end of the 1860’s, a Srimal Jain jeweller, Sugan Chand Jagard, started to 
train non-family members, adolescents from other Jain families, jewellers and otherwise, 
as apprentices in the lapidary business. Quite why he decided on this altruistic course, 
not even his descendants can answer. But he did train a large number of the forebears of 
todays’ leading jeweller and broker families; his first apprentices perpetuated the system 
creating several apprenticeship lineages, the guruship was seen as flourishing until 
comparatively recently.
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The main reason given for the apprenticeship system by an independent non-related 
jeweller is that it is a matter of discipline; Indian fathers* having a well-known proclivity 
for indulging their sons, particularly the eldest. The lapidary guru was seen as the answer 
to this indulgence, and the son was seconded, after appropriate negotiations about 
suitability, for a period of not less than five years. The advantages of training an 
apprentice were that he didn’t have to pay his charge and that the apprentice could 
supervise the artisans.
The guruship still exists but in a much truncated form. The claim that the majority of 
todays’ jewellers were trained by this system, even by those whom were trained by their 
fathers, does not bear close examination. Where the guruship system does still exist it is, 
instead of the five year plus apprenticeship, a mere six months or so where the trainee 
concentrates only on the commercial aspects of the business. The long-term gemological 
expertise is now seen as accruing with experience. But the longer apprenticeship does still 
exist in the form of fathers* training their sons and in the larger numbers of more distant 
kin, nephews, cousins, etc., often from outside the city, coming to be trained for upto 
several years. Two nephews had come from Calcutta to learn the business from their 
maternal uncle for an indefinite period. They were not paid and lived with another 
kinswoman in the city, commuting each day to the business household.
Thus the major change that the guruship has undergone is that the longer apprenticeship 
is reserved only for kinsmen. Probably a large minority were always trained by their 
fathers, but the guruship is still seen as the normative course. Another paradox is that, 
although sons and other kin are still receiving the longer apprenticeship, there is a
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perception among many jewellers - many whom have trained their own sons - that 
eventually there will be no ‘real jewellers* (pakka jauhri) left. And the training has 
almost returned to what it was just over a hundred years ago.
There is a shared perception among the jewellers that they never have commercial 
dealings with relatives who have an independent business, because if there is 
disagreement in business then there is a danger of a rupture of familial relations as well. 
But the overwhelming majority of my informants did conduct business with relatives, 
even though it was hedged with ‘not if we can avoid it* and ‘but eventually its 
inevitable*. Indeed, in the widest sense, everybody is related to everybody else: If 
someone from Jail (lineage) A marries someone from Jail B, and someone from Jail B 
marries someone from Jail C....then eventually we arrive back at Jail A. In fact, one 
could describe several circles from A back to A, some of these ‘marriage circles’ would 
be quite small. Thus, it is almost impossible, particularly as the affines are often resident 
in Jaipur and probably in the lapidary trade, to avoid doing business with ‘relatives’.
A distinction is made between immediate relations within the household or lineage such 
as father/son and between brothers where trust is implicit, and wider kinship ties such 
as affinal ones where economic relations may have to be more circumspect. But this 
discourse on familial breakdown and the distinction made against trading with affines is 
largely rhetorical, as there is a widespread assumption that affines are a potential source 
of business and trading partners may become affines. And empirically, the following 
example is very much the exception: Two cousins had a business arrangement, one 
established a gem and silver business complete with shop, the other would supply the
materials to be sold. Due to the failure of some financial arrangement between the 
partners, their respective households did not communicate with one another, and the split 
seemed irrevocable. The fallout from a business disagreement can prove terminal for the 
relationship between the households involved, but this particular instance was an 
aberration from the norm.
One Jain jeweller, a descendent of the first Digambar family to enter the industry in 
1870, is a firm believer in what he called the ‘Krupp’s business cycle* - boom and bust: 
his great-grandfather came from a modest mercantile background to become one the 
wealthiest merchants in the city, and established the family as one of the leading jewellers 
in Jaipur. But his father and grandfather instead of entering the business preferred to be 
‘pakka s a h a b s entertaining maharajahs, the British Queen, conspicuous consumption, 
and even indulging in sikar (hunting)! As his two predecessors had frittered his birthright 
away, he was into retrenchment if the family business was to survive.23
This was an extreme case and the only example I could find of profligacy and depletion 
at the expense of the business. Another instance was of sheer indolence: One aged 
informant told me how he had to re-invent the family business fifty years earlier; his 
immediate ancestors had not been involved in gem business or worked at all for six 
generations, they survived on wealth created in the eighteenth and earlier centuries but 
by the 1940*s the family wealth had been dissipated. And there were other examples of 
‘decadence*, apocryphal stories from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries of
23This is redolent of the Hindi proverb: ‘do pusht panditai; tin pusht daulat* - the 
priesthood lasts two generations, the wealth three (Parry 1980:110 n.28).
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mistresses being set up in their own establishments, which the jeweller would visit in the 
afternoon with his cronies for a bhang party.24 And more recently, the case of an 
illegitimate son who eventually became a legitimate heir through the sheer will and 
personality of his progenitor.25
Today, the financial objectives are a means for a constellation of other goals: investment 
for commercial expansion provides an even higher standard of living, the consumption 
of foreign goods, weddings, higher education, giving dana (charitable gifts) to the sangha 
(religious community), being ‘public spirited*, plus all the prestige that accrues. And 
expenditures on prestige items, the conspicuous consumption at weddings, can be 
rationalized as status enhancement, as important markers of creditworthiness, and 
ultimately contributing to the growth of the firm.26
v/ Corruption and the Black Economy
Corruption among Jain Baniyas can be divided into firstly, that which can be seen as an 
extension of personalized clientalism, and secondly, individual and collective attempts to 
defraud the state.
24 Bhang is edible cannabis indica :
“ Reynell has remarked that, with regard to Jain men, as long as they are perceived 
as good businessmen, provide for their families and donate generously, such 
transgressions are forgotten; but for a woman to behave in such a manner would be 
unforgivable (Reynell 1985a: 172-73).
“ Other non-economic areas of the family and household will be pursued in Chapters 
5, 6 and 7.
According to Schenk, corruption in India can only be understood within its socio-cultural 
context: The Hindu caste system is structured upon both ritual and socio-economic 
inequality; secondly, the lower castes are dependent upon the higher castes in the form 
of patron-client relationships. Thirdly, poverty and scarcity of resources reinforce these 
relationships sometimes to the point of bonded labour for the impoverished; and lastly, 
India is in the process of ‘modernization’ which engenders a parallel system of mores, 
rules and regulations alongside the traditional system (Schenk 1989:112-114).
As with the debate on the jajmani system above, one might quibble about who was 
dependent on whom, the degree of penetration of non-traditional procedures, or the 
language in which it is couched. Nevertheless, in terms of the examples that he presents, 
his hypothesis does have a certain coherence. His main point is that in the allocation of 
government resources and services, civil servants’ decision-making is skewed in favour 
of local elites and/or the higher castes as they are obligated to reward them, not because 
of bribery, but because the bureaucrat’s continuing employment depends on the approval 
of the local elite. Indeed, the bureaucrat may be related to them and may have gained the 
post through their influence; this favouritism is repaid as the need and occasion arises. 
Bribes and gifts usually come from those to whom the civil servants are not so obligated 
(Schenk 1989:115).
‘Bribery and corruption! These were foreign words, it seemed to him, and the ideas 
behind them were also foreign. Here in India, he thought, one did not know such words. 
Giving presents and gratifications to Government officers was an indispensable courtesy 
and a respectable, civilized way of carrying out business* (Prawer Jhabvala 1956:54).
There is no doubt as to whether the Jain jewellers of Jaipur would see this as an example
of corruption but, nevertheless, it is something that has to be accepted and practised. As
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to whether a businessman would be obligated as a patron or would be obliged to bribe 
an official, would depend on kinship ties and/or the social position and influence of the 
Baniya. As in the commercial clientalized relationship, the entrepreneur-bureaucrat 
connection is an ongoing series of reciprocating favours ‘as one would do in any sort of 
business’. Indeed, it may be a necessity for the entrepreneur, the creation of predictable 
relationships for instrumental ends.
The Baniya’s relationship with the bureaucrat is an additional guarantee that the wheels 
of government are turning, and turning in the former’s favour. Such essential connections 
with government officials help accelerate the progress of the paperwork through the 
labyrinthine bureaucracy and will prevent the ‘loss’ of any relevant applications. The 
successful progress of paperwork may well involve several departments and officials, and 
these essential connections will have been cultivated over a considerable period and even 
be transferred from, respectively, father to son and bureaucrat to bureaucrat. In some 
instances, local or regional politicians may be approached in an effort to supply the 
appropriate bureaucratic connections or apply pressure to the relevant department. The 
Indian bureaucracy is seen as being notoriously pervious to political pressure and 
politicians have a reputation for being equally venal. One jeweller refused to join the GJA 
as he claimed it was donating funds to particular politicians at the state and national level 
who the GJA felt would better represent the jewellers’ ‘interests’.
These arrangements are neither ethical nor legal. Lobbying for a price, kickbacks, 
nepotism, influence-peddling and cronyism between businessmen, politicians and 
bureaucrats at all levels are assumed and widely reported in the press. Such an
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assumption reflects a widespread belief that the whole edifice of government and business 
is essentially corrupt, and to successfully participate in commerce the businessman must 
indulge in unethical practices. Wertheim has suggested in an Indonesian context, 
corruption does not necessarily impair the effectiveness of an administration; corruption 
is an ethical question rather than a matter of operational efficiency (Wertheim 1964:103- 
104). But it is widely accepted that corruption does interfere with the efficacy of the 
Indian bureaucracy. However, many Jains recognized and defined many of the practices 
they indulged in as theoretically corrupt but, nevertheless, a necessary exercise in which 
they participated without moral qualms. As one informant observed, to be in business 
‘everybody has to do it*.
The above can be seen as manipulations of the government apparatus, likewise individual 
attempts to defraud the government of revenue as the state is considered ‘fair game*. 
Government employees at every level are perceived as basically dishonest, obstructive 
but malleable. One informant explained at length about the taxes he should pay. If he had 
payed them all ‘honestly’, he would never make a profit. The application of government 
regulations is anyway often minimal, a bureaucratic connection allows an individual’s tax 
bills to be ‘negotiated’ - i.e. an undervaluation - by the payment of an agreed sum. 
Misleading the government is not considered immoral, it is just another element of the 
way that business is rationally conducted, and it is viewed as a means of recouping 
expenses paid to officials.
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Corruption has become institutionalized and is to be expected.27 The Jain jewellers of 
Jaipur offer a variety of explanations for widespread corruption. The major complaint is 
not the fact of it but its total pervasiveness and institutionalization. It is widely assumed 
that in the immediate post-Independence period or earlier only key officials, not 
necessarily the highest but those who had a certain responsibility in decision-making, 
were susceptible to influence; and with whom the average Jain jeweller’s contact was 
minimal. But latterly, the whole bureaucracy, every official at every level is perceived 
as wanting bakhses (a ‘tip’) to undertake any task. As one informant explained, ‘Now 
every damn babu (clerk), now matter how low, is putting his hand out - they all want 
something’. Another argued, that to obtain an export licence, he had to complete four 
different sets of forms in four government departments and pay four officials.
A favoured explanation of some older informants for this decline is that with the loss of 
the Srimal and Oswal monopoly of the gem trade and the arrival of other castes into the 
industry over the last twenty-five years, it is the interlopers who are responsible for 
unethical practices and corruption. The largely untenable implication being that the 
arrivistes 9 with their ‘sharp practices* initiated the systematic bribery of officials, and the 
Jains’ had little choice but to follow suit. But a more prosaic explanation is to blame the 
extended tenure of the Congress Party in Delhi and in many states, and their politicization 
of the bureaucracies. Ultimately, they see the responsibility for the lack of integrity in 
public life as Nehru’s, not that he was personally corrupt, but it was he who turned a 
blind eye to the then embryonic corruption in the pursuit of ‘economic development*.
^Similarly, the Mahajans of ‘Mandi’ accept administrative corruption as a ‘fact of 
life* (Cottam 1983:164).
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Likewise his daughter, Indira Gandhi, and her thoroughly reprehensible son, Sanjay. The 
consequence was that corruption became routinized and the norm rather than the 
exception. Ironically, a minority Congress (I) national government which was elected in 
1991, the successor to if not the ideological inheritor of Nehru’s legacy, proposes to 
unravel the ‘licence-permit raj’, to rationalize and remove bureaucratic bottlenecks in an 
attempt to stimulate India’s international trade, and reverse the political role of the state 
as the fons et origo of Indian industry - although empirically this was never always the 
case.
Among the black economy’s practices are not only double, double-entry or non-entry 
bookkeeping, but the non-repatriation of foreign exchange earned from exports and the 
manipulation of import and export invoices. A major feature of the parallel economy is 
that it distorts consumption and investment patterns. For example, black money finds an 
outlet in luxury consumption, lavish weddings, and illegally imported goods; loans and 
credit from unofficial banking and gold absorb a major part of the unaccounted for 
money. India’s insatiable appetite for gold is largely met by smuggling. In the macro- 
economy, black money is inflationary: it generates speculation as it is generally reckoned 
that unofficial prices are over and above the official value. Black money further 
concentrates the ownership of wealth and income, and it also has a negative impact on 
revenue collection as it frustrates the government’s attempts to tax those who are able to 
pay {Business and Political Observer 4/1/91).28
28It has been estimated that the parallel economy could generate as much as 
Rs.94,000 crores per annum or more than 20% of Gross Domestic Product, but nobody 
to date has established a viable methodology for measuring how much black money is in 
circulation; and it should be assumed that these statistics from a former finance minister 
are an underestimate (Business and Political Observer, 4/1/1991).
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On the smuggling of gemstones, it is generally estimated that only 1 % are smuggled into 
the country - rubies, for instance, come across the land border with Burma. Most 
emeralds are legitimately imported from Brazil, Columbia, etc. But an inestimable 
percentage of the rough gemstones coming into Jaipur are internally smuggled across 
India from, say, Orissa which has deposits of almost every gemstone. Approximately 
65% are ‘smuggled* out in the form of underinvoicing, thus making the official export 
figures about one third of their real amount.
But when all these strategies and contingencies have been allowed for, they still do not 
100% guarantee that an individual or his business will not be investigated by a new 
overzealous revenue officer or a parallel inquisitive government agency. The latter is 
where the state and national government agencies have overlapping responsibilities which 
may involve the policing of the revenue service or even the policing of the police.29
vi/ A Dual Sector Economy?
In Jaipur, the lapidary industry provides an arena for entrepreneurs some of whom 
already are, or have the potentiality to become, the business elite of the city. In terms of 
economic development, the entrepreneurial aptitude and its organization is much more
^On visiting the head of Jaipur’s state anti-corruption police department, I noted that 
none of the previous office-holders - displayed on a large plaque - had held the office for 
more than one year. Ironically, the current office-holder was smoking cigarettes that were 
not legally available in India!
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widespread than may have been supposed. The Baniyas have demonstrated a continuity 
between their indigenous capitalism and developing international commercial and 
manufacturing enterprises. The entrepreneurial problem in Jaipur as in other parts of the 
developing world, if problem it was, was less one of technological innovation but rather 
one of organization (cf. Geertz 1963b: 82).
Traditionally, the most popular model of the structure of developing economies among 
social scientists is the dual economy.30 There are dimensions of scale and of history in 
the dualistic scenarios but these are variations on the same theme: Modem capitalist 
enterprise enters into a ‘backward* society, and until such time as it comes to transform 
that society in terms of formal, impersonal, corporate organizations, perhaps for an 
extended period, and which makes a sharp contrast with the indigenous economy. Thus, 
from this point of view, there is a formalised part of all developing economies today 
which often owes its existence, to a larger or lesser extent, to extraneous international 
institutions encouraged by state regulations and which is seen as a prerequisite for 
genuine development. Equally, much that goes on in these economies is only marginally 
the result of state regulation, this marginal economic activity is informal. Informality is 
a matter of the degree of social organisation: The ideal-type informal sector is 
unregulated and highly competitive, labour intensive, using a ‘string and rubber-band*
^ ts  first common currency was by Lewis (1954) when the ‘traditional* was 
contrasted with the ‘modem*. Here the dichotomy stresses the contrast between two sets 
of economic activities or two economies. Geertz’ model (1963b) distinguished between 
a ‘bazaar’ and a ‘firm* type economy; the most well-known designations are ‘formal’ and 
‘informal’ sectors, not to mention ‘upper and ‘lower* circuits and ‘organized* and 
‘unorganized* sectors. Though these terms have slightly different connotations we can 
treat them as analogous. For an overview see, Moser (1984) and Rogerson (1985).
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technology; since little initial capital is needed, entry into the market is comparatively 
easy; the family usually supply the workforce who often work long and irregular hours, 
and the level of operations is small-scale. Whatever the formal economy cannot control 
or comprehend is ‘informal*.
Although such models can have an expedient shorthand usage when it comes to 
sociologically analyzing the urban economy in its totality, there is a danger of reification, 
of imposing a spurious categorization on every workshop or enterprise. The sectoral 
approach tends to see two sets of economic activities as distinct, fixed and closed. But 
the economies of developing countries are complex and far from static, and one of the 
major criticisms of the notion of a dual economy concerns the linkages between the two 
sectors. In sub-contracting, for example, one sees that what may appear as distinctive to 
the informal sector enterprise - a different level of capitalization, firm size, and a 
management style differing from major larger firms - may in fact function simply as the 
more disreputable and less visible production end of the larger firms. A situation in 
which the small enterprises sell to large buyers and buy their manufacturing inputs from 
large firms seems to call into question the whole notion of two separate sectors.31
There is no doubt that there are two aspects to the lapidary economy of Jaipur: an 
entrepreneurial and visible commercial world and a largely invisible manufacturing 
world. With regard to the manufacturing element, it is unregulated, labour intensive, 
possesses simple technology, easy entry if one has the expertise, a family affair with long
31For Indian examples see, Bose (1974), Goldblatt (1979), Streefkerk (1981) and J. 
Harriss (1985).
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and irregular hours, and definitely small-scale. So does it meet the criterion of an 
informal sector which manifests itself in the twice-daily street unofficial bourse?
One broker explained how he used the hat as simply an alternative supply mechanism 
when a potential buyer needed a quantity and quality of stones that the latter had been 
unable to hitherto locate. Hence, the broker may either locate the source, the seller, 
directly on the street or learn through an intermediary where the required stones may be 
available.
A minority of the stones that are traded on the street were originally stolen, and after 
cutting and re-cutting these are obviously impossible to trace. Jewellers’ nonchalantly 
accept theft as a fact of life, particularly during the manufacturing process, and 
everybody in the industry allows for a 15% ‘loss’; many jewellers* suspect the hat is 
where their depreciation re-surfaces and are re-cycled back into legitimate enterprises.
It has already been noted that many of those attending the hat are artisans and those on 
the margins of the industry ‘moonlighting’ as lapidary entrepreneurs. This dual role is 
paralled by a south Indian study of the dynamics of small enterprises by B. Harriss which 
completely cuts across the formal/informal distinctions. She found many instances of 
activities which would usually considered ‘informal* - for example, illegal - being 
pursued simultaneously while holding a formal occupation. Individuals are keen to secure 
formal employment because of their subsequent ability to simultaneously operate 
unofficial enterprises in their spare time, or to cultivate contacts for use in later self- 
employment. This dual employment she labels ‘quasi-formal*, to suggest that typologies
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of economic behaviour are no substitute for disaggregated analysis (B. Harriss n.d.). 
Moser finds there is ‘complete confusion about what is actually meant by the informal 
sector’ and adds: ‘The informal sector is too broad to be meaningful; at one end is a pool 
of surplus labour, at the other a skilled high income entrepreneur; at one end a 
proliferation of residual enterprises involuntary in nature, at the other end of the spectrum 
dynamic evolutionary enterprises’ (Moser 1984:178).
The interpenetration and interdependency of each element in the lapidary industry is so 
transparent as to discount any notion of two distinct economies. Jaipur’s lapidary industry 
already had its own indigenous capitalism which transcended two economic sectors. The 
need was not how to come to terms with a bifurcated internal lapidary economy, but in 
expanding the industry to incorporate it more fully into the world economic system. The 
entrepreneurial solution, which probably applies to other industries as well, has been to 
expand the flexible personalized and familial networks, to develop a personal coalition 
of interests, capital, resources, skill, marketing, and influence to compete in an ever- 
changing world market.
Traditional commercial strategies possess an organizational logic that was, anyway, never 
incompatible with international capitalism. And contra Weber, neither do the Baniyas - 
Hindu or Jain - harbour a religious ethic which discourages rational commercial 
expansion. There is a palpable drive towards economic improvement, a higher standard 
of living, and economic independence. Even the smallest jewellers had to re-invest in new 
stock despite the anxieties of 1990. They can demonstrate a patient capacity by having 
capital tied-up in stock that yields no quick returns. Nor do the highly personalized
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familial strategies preclude the formation of extra-familial enterprises with a centralized 
management structure, several of which already exist in the lapidary industry in Jaipur.
The lapidary industry in Jaipur is dominated by the Svetambar Jains, and the next chapter 
is an examination of the nature and role of their community structures.
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CHAPTER 5: THE SVETAMBAR JAIN COMMUNITY OF JAIPUR 
if Introduction
While always a Jain, an individual may also describe their community as, say, Srimal i.e. 
their ja ti, or Kharataragaccha i.e. their religious affiliation, or even jeweller. Ideally, all 
three were synonymous and for the majority of my informants this was often the case, 
but when an individual insists that any one or all of these elements is his community, or 
the city, or that there is a pan-Indian Jain community, then there may be other 
contextualizations at work. The Svetambar Jain jewellers represent a concurrence of 
interests, predominant of which are a Jain religious identity, socio-cultural organization 
and business activity. A business community that is embedded in a Jain cultural tradition 
(sanskar) that embraces religious sects, castes and occupations, and some elements of this 
tradition are shared with non-Jains.
The use of the English term ‘community’ is widespread among the Jains of Jaipur and 
is used much more frequently than any Hindu equivalents such as samuday or samaj; in 
Jaipur, the word ‘sangha' is also often heard but it is almost always in respect of the 
religious community. But whereas the sangha has almost exclusively religious 
connotations, community can in the appropriate context embrace the religious dimension 
as well. Frankenberg defines community as ‘an area of social living marked by some 
degree of social coherence*. And, ‘The bases of community are locality and community 
sentiment* (Frankenberg 1971:15). However, perhaps the geographical dimension can be 
jettisoned in favour of functional elements emphasizing co-operation and interdependency
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among members of a collectivity, regardless of spatial boundaries. Or what M. M. Weber 
has called an ‘interest community’:
‘Specialized professionals, particularly, now maintain webs of intimate contact with other 
professionals, wherever they may be. They share a particular body of values; their roles 
are defined by the organized structure of their groups; they undoubtedly have a sense of 
belonging to the groups; and, by the nature of the alliances, all share in a community of 
interests. Thus, these groups exhibit all the characteristics that we attribute to 
communities except physical propinquity* (M. M. Weber 1964:302).
But the Jaipuri Jains can belong to several communities, ‘imagined*, potential and 
empirical dependant on context; there is a constellation of Jain groupings involved in 
overlapping social, economic, and religious activities that can remain separate, 
amalgamate, fragment and re-combine in varying combinations depending on 
circumstance - and may even form a nexus with non-Jain elements. It is not always easy 
to delineate a community boundary, and it is often problematic attempting to analyze Jain 
allegiances to religious sects, social divisions, occupational groups, economic interests 
and other collectivities. In respect of any Indian business community, Tripathi argues 
that:
‘If all of these in varying degrees influence the expression of the human desire and need 
to belong, if the interests flow from more than one centre, then to think of a community 
is to think of a series of intersecting circles. And since the social situation is seldom 
static, the boundaries of these circles would always remain fluid and somewhat 
indeterminate’ (Tripathi 1984:xiv-xv).
ii/ The Svetambar Jain Religious Community
The fundamental parameter of the Jain community is its distinctive religious heterodoxy 
which is the inheritance of a non-Vedic non-brahminical tradition, and it is in opposition
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to Hindu precepts that Jain religiosity is characterized.1 Initially, the Jain community is
divided into its ascetic and lay modalities, and the fourfold division into sadhus (male
ascetics), sadhvis (female ascetics), sravakas (laymen) and sravikas (laywomen).2 And
this fundamental division reflects the symbiosis and interdependence of the two groups
upon one another: In return for materially maintaining the ascetics, the latter can sustain
the exemplary ascetic traditions of Jainism; the laity need the ascetics to maintain the
central spiritual credo of the faith which they themselves might otherwise allow to lapse;
the laity also need the ascetics as spiritual guides and confessors; and, Jainism being
highly schismatic, should a charismatic acarya (religious leader) attempt to establish his
own sub-sect he will need a substantial lay following to sustain it. The ascetics also need
the richer members of the laity to sponsor major socio-religious events and, indeed,
specifically request individual laymen to underwrite such events and finance, say, the
building of a new temple or dharmasala (religious rest house). As Norman has argued,
‘Both Buddhists and the Jains correctly realized that no religious institution can survive 
without the laity being involved in an active way. If there is no laity, or if the laity 
renounce all their wealth, then the institution cannot survive. The essential concomitant 
of a begging wanderer is a non-wandering donor, whose generosity (dana) enables the 
ascetic to live and gain release (moksa)....Without dana there could be no ascetics, and 
therefore no transmission of the doctrines of Jainism and Buddhism* (Norman 1991:35- 
36).
Jains have a secondary division of their overarching religious community. The primary
!In a purely religious context, 4["Hinduism"] denotes only those theistic movements 
or traditions which are either of Vedic origin or have long since been incorporated into 
the brahminical fold. Jainism as [a] surviving example of the sramana religions....meets 
neither of these criteria* (Jaini 1979:293n.30).
2I prefer the use the indigenous terms sadhu, or muni, and sadhvi rather than ‘monk*
or ‘nun*, although these English terms are commonly used, as these imply a coenobitic
monastic order which is not in evidence in Jainism (see, Cort 1991:667n.l).
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sectarian division among Jains is between Digambars and Svetambars, and this reflects 
the primary schism that was formalized by the first century A. D. over largely whether 
the ascetics should be naked or clothed. Digambar Jain ascetics are all male, solitary, 
naked and number about a hundred in the whole sub-continent.3 Svetambar ascetics of 
the individual gacchas travel (vihar) in small single-sex ‘families’ (parivars/ganas) led 
by a senior sadhu or sadhvi (ganin/ganini);4 they are answerable and duty-bound to one 
of the acaryas of the gaccha who initiated the ascetic into the order and act as their 
spiritual mentors. The ratio of Svetambar sadhvis to sadhus is about 3:1, and the sadhvis 
are also subject to an intermediate female pravartini (promoter), but the latter are 
subordinate to the male only acaryas. Unlike the laity, ascetics cannot perform puja 
(ritual) in the form of offerings to images as, not only are they possessionless and can 
make no offerings, but they never bathe and would pollute the image; instead they 
perform bhava (mental) puja, a form of meditation in the presence of the image.
There are approximately 4 million Jains in India, 0.5% of the total population. The 
Digambar and Svetambar Jains are broadly separated by geography: Digambars in the 
peninsular Indian states of Maharastra and Karnataka who are largely rural and 
agriculturalists, Svetambars in the north-western states of Rajasthan and Gujarat are often 
synonymous with urbanism and trade. But Jaipur is an exception, and 80% of the Jain
^ e  Digambars have a form of semi-ascetic sadhvis called aryikyas or ksullikas, but 
these are a clothed and women anyway, for Digambars, can never achieve liberation. For 
numbers of ascetics for all Jain sects - approximately 5,600 in 1977 (see, Jaini 
1979:247n8).
AVihar means both ‘pleasure seeking’ and a Buddhist monastery; for Jain ascetics it 
is synonymous with the mendicant life which, with the exception of the monsoon season, 
involves a regime of constant travel.
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population is Digambar, reflecting an inheritance of employment and appointments to the 
local royal court. Since the demise of Jaipur’s princely status at Independence in 1947, 
many Digambars are employed as civil servants, in quasi-government agencies and in 
commerce.
Both major Jain sectarian divisions are fragmented into a number of sects. The 
Svetambars are sub-divided into murti-pujaks (‘image worshippers’) or mandir-margis 
(temple-goers) and Sthanakvasis and Terapanthis (‘non-image worshipping* sects). In 
Jaipur, among Svetambars, there are two major ‘image worshipping’ sects, the 
Kharataragaccha and the Tapagaccha, and two ‘non-image worshipping’ sects, the 
Sthanakvasi and the Terapanth. Within the sects are further allegiances whereby a 
charismatic acarya or ascetic has attracted a purely personal following inside the 
parameters of the sect. The ‘idolatrous’ Kharataragaccha and the Tapagaccha were 
reformed sects founded in the eleventh and thirteenth centuries respectively.5 ‘Kharatara' 
reflects one its founders who in debate was ‘particularly sharp-witted* (Dundas 
1992:121), and Tapagaccha is analogous to its emphasis on austerities (tapas) - 
gaccha/panth denotes sect.6
The Sthanakvasis can be seen as the ‘Protestants’ of Svetambar Jainism who, under the 
impact of Muslim iconoclasm in fifteenth century Gujarat, eschew any form of ‘idolatry’
5A11 Jain sects are ‘reformed’ as no sect, with the possible exception of Digambar 
ascetics, can claim to be strictly adhering to their founder’s teaching. Reform implies 
evolution or reaction to an earlier historical model.
6These gacchas are two of the six extant Svetambar image worshipping sects, on the 
origin of the ‘113* gacchas in the tenth century see, Sangave (1980:57-58).
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and the institution of the temple.7 Thus as opposed to temple-goers they are the sthanak 
(‘halT) vasi (dweller); they were divided into 32 sub-sects and have a large number of 
acaryas, although this organization has lapsed. The Terapanth (path of the thirteen) is an 
eighteenth century branch of the Sthanakvasi; a highly centralized sect headed by the 
Acarya Tulsi, the most well-known Jain in India and founder of the proselytising Anuvrat 
movement emphasising non-violence and self-discipline. The emphasis in all sects is on 
the role of the ascetic as an authority on the Jain dharma (faith) and spiritual guide to the 
faithful.8
Cross-cutting these religious divisions are a number of Jain jatis which can be correlated 
with the primary sectarian divide: in Jaipur, the major Digambar jatis are Agarwals and 
Khandelwals; Srimals, Oswals, Paliwals and Porwals are Svetambar. All Srimals in 
Jaipur were adherents of the Kharataragaccha; Oswals were members of the 
Kharataragaccha, Tapagaccha, Sthanakvasi or Terapanth. In Jaipur, the vast majority of 
Svetambar Jains were Oswal, and both Oswals and Srimals dominate the gem industry. 
Of the forty Jain jeweller households studied, 24 were Srimals and the remainder Oswal; 
30 were adherents of the Kharataragaccha, the remainder Sthanakvasi; all the Sthanakvasi 
households were Oswal.
According to the last district gazetteer, there are 37,427 Jains in Jaipur district, which
7Muslim iconoclasm probably acted as a more immediate catalyst, but the 
Sthanakvasis castigated the power and wealth of temples which they saw as an irrelevance 
to the spiritual path, and claimed that the quarrying of stone for temples and images 
involved himsa (violence) to microscopic life-forms (see, Jaini 1979:309-10).
%Dharma is an all-embracing Indie religious term that can be variously translated as 
faith, law, path, etc., or simply ‘religion*.
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includes the city, covers an area of over 14,000 sq. kms. (Census of India 1971, quoted 
in Gupta 1987:64). But, according to informants in 1991, the figure seems closer to 
125,000 in the city of Jaipur alone.9 The latter estimation is calculated that there are 
roughly 100,000 Digambar and 25,000 Svetambar Jains out of an unofficial urban 
population approaching 2 million - one informant calculated there were 2,500 Svetambar 
households. There are estimates of over 200 Digambar temples, although some of these 
may be defunct, and 9 Svetambar temples within the city. Some Svetambar temples were 
originally gaccha, some purely ja ti, some were both; however, these distinctions have 
largely disappeared: Srimals and Oswals freely visit each others' temples and participate 
in each others’ religious functions (cf. Reynell 1991:48); both gacchas advertise their 
religious functions in the others' premises and both honour the ascetics of the other sect. 
The important religious differences are between Jains and non-Jains, Digambars and 
Svetambars, and between Svetambar ‘image worshippers’ and ‘non-image worshippers’.
Although individuals and families may revere ascetics from other sects - Svetambars may 
honour Digambar ascetics - gaccha affiliation is primarily devotion to an individual or 
groups of ascetics and/or acaryas of one's own sect. This affiliation is inherited by the 
kul or khandan (patrilineage) and rarely ever changes, but individual kuls within the gotra 
(patrician) may follow different ascetics. The ideal-type marital alliance was intra-jati and 
intra-sect, but traditionally there have been a minority of inter-sectarian but nevertheless 
intra-jati marriages: Oswal Kharataragaccha members have intermarried with Oswal 
Sthanakvasi and Oswal Jains with Oswal Vaisnavas; more recently, Oswals and Srimals,
9On this discrepancy see, section v/ A Jain Community?, below.
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of whatever sect, intermarry and are often seen as one ja ti.10 Residency is 
overwhelmingly patrilocal and in-marrying daughters-in-law traditionally adopted the sect 
of their new household.
The Jain jeweller community is largely concentrated on the east side of Jauhri Bazaar 
which stretches from Sanganar Gate to Bari Chaupar, and is one of the main 
thoroughfares in the old walled city. Although there are many jewellery retailers along 
this and two major side streets which traverse Jauhri Bazaar, this is only the visible 
periphery of the gem trade. The lapidary industry is largely hidden away in the maze of 
galis (alleys) behind the main streets. None of the mohallas (neighbourhoods) of the old 
city are any longer self-contained corporate districts, although a few do specialize in 
particular trades, and there are no geographical boundaries to the gem trade area. Jauhri 
Bazaar is the heart of the Svetambar Jain community where it has four major temples and 
other ancillary buildings concentrated in a very small area, even though two of its major 
shrines are located outside the mohalla - the Dadabari and the Mohanbari. Since the 
1960’s many of the wealthier Jain jewellers have transferred their residence - but not 
their business - to the newer suburbs south of the old city, particularly around the 
Dadabari on Motidongri Road south of the Muslim enclave. These new suburbs were 
developed largely from the 1930’s and allowed the lakhpatis (‘millionaires’) to move into 
purpose-built palatial homes and escape the often overcrowded and squalid environment 
of the bazaar. The Mohanbari has not attracted a similar residential pattern on the 
extreme eastern edge of the city which is very much a Muslim area.
10This identity of Srimals with Oswals probably explains why both caste sabhas 
(associations), while nominally in existence, are moribund and their influence is minimal.
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The Dadabari and Mohanbari represent institutions which are unique to the 
Kharataragaccha. The Dadabari (‘grandfathers’ garden) is a temple complex dedicated 
to one of the miracle-working Dadagurudevas (saints) of the gaccha; the shrines of these 
Jain divines are the objects for devotees seeking divine intercession. It is the most popular 
Svetambar temple in the city and draws worshippers not just from Svetambar image 
worshipping sects but Digambar Jains as well. The Mohanbari (charming garden) is a 
similar large shrine dedicated to two recently deceased pravartinis who are particularly 
venerated for their piety and inspiration.11
But the ‘sacred geography* of the Jaipur’s Svetambar Jains is not confined to the city. 
There are Kharataragaccha Dadabaris at the nearby towns of Amber and Sanganer, 
Amber the old capital of the Jaipur polity and Sanganer is virtually a suburb of Jaipur. 
Malpura, 95 kms. south-west of Jaipur, is the principle shrine of the third Dada and often 
visited by Jaipur’s Svetambars. Elsewhere in the state are the important temples of 
Nakodaji in western Rajasthan and Kesariji near Udaipur in the south of the state; nearer 
to Jaipur are Mahaviiji and Padampura, the latter is renowned for its exorcizing powers 
for the spirit-possessed. All these shrines house images to which are attributed miraculous 
powers, and all have annual melas (fairs) which are also patronized by local non-Jains 
particularly ‘tribals*. These four sites have been subject to lengthy disputes over 
ownership and control between Digambars and Svetambars, but all are attended by 
devotees of both halves of the religious divide.12 Beyond the confines of the state, there
nFor both these institutions see, Chapter 6: Gifts and Charity.
12On these shrines, their fairs and disputed ownership see, Humphrey (1991).
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are important pan-Jain pilgrimage sights on the Kathiawar peninsular of Gujarat and in 
Bihar in eastern India where Jainism has its historical origins.
Of the four major Svetambar mandirs (temples) situated around east side of Jauhri 
Bazaar, two are Tapagaccha and two Kharataragaccha. The main Kharataragaccha temple 
is the Pancayati Mandir and is administered by the Kharataragaccha Sangha; the sangha 
is numerically dominated by Oswals but with a large Srimal minority. In the same street 
is the Srimalon ka Mandir, another Kharataragaccha temple and as its name implies was 
of Srimal provenance and still owned by the Srimal Sabha. The Tapagaccha has a large 
temple complex which also incorporates a library, an upasraya (preaching hall) and the 
sangha offices; the sangha is dominated by Oswals, its management committee 
exclusively so. There are an unknown number of private Jain temples in the city, both 
Digambar and Svetambar, and the second Tapagaccha temple is one example owned by 
an Oswal family in Agra but, as are a number of family-owned temples, it is open to the 
public. The west side of Jauhri Bazaar has a preponderance of Jains but these are 
predominantly Digambars and Sthanakvasi, and the latters’ main sthanak (preaching hall 
and ascetics’ temporary residence) is situated in the locality.
The Kharataragaccha administration is based at the Sivji Ram Bhavan, which doubles as 
a upasraya and a bhojansala (dining hall) for both religious and secular purposes; the 
kitchens can provide prescribed diets for those fasting as a fast usually allows for certain 
foods at certain times of day. Opposite the hall is the relatively new (1980) Vicaksan 
Bhavan, named after the pravartini, Vicaksan Sri, an upasraya reserved exclusively for 
religious purposes and where Kharataragaccha ascetics’ reside when in the city. The
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Dadabari and Mohanbari both have a upasrayas and kitchens for collective religious and 
secular occasions.
There are two further Kharataragaccha upasrayas in the area but these are residences of 
yatis (quasi-mendicants). The institution of the yati was a later medieval Svetambar 
accretion which is not unlike the southern Digambar bhattarakas (‘teacher’), a form of 
lay resident temple cleric who eventually took semi-ascetic vows. From being temple 
custodians they evolved into ritual specialists and purveyors of religo-medical services 
such as horoscopes and medical remedies, even dabbling in occult tantrik practises (see, 
Jaini 1991:196). They achieved considerable power and influence among the Svetambar 
community and, in some cases, they controlled religious property to the extent of 
bequeathing it to their male heirs. But unlike in other parts of Rajasthan, the yatis clerics 
are in decline in Jaipur. This is due to a number of factors: mainly their perceived 
usurpation of religious property, their lack of any canonical sanction, and the overspill 
from a Jaipuri campaign against the power of their Digambar equivalents from the end 
of the nineteenth century. Eventually their custodianship of religious property will revert 
to the auspices of the sangha.
Like Protestant Christianity, Jainism has historically been highly schismatic, and sectarian 
differences among Jains have often been the defining rationale of community. But as 
Carrithers and Humphrey have argued this disunity is paradoxically a concern with 
shared values (Carrithers and Humphrey 1991:11, 288). For example, the centuries old 
debate between Digambars and Svetambars about the nakedness of ascetics, whether 
women can achieve moksa, or whether image worship is prescribed in the canonical
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literature, and competition over pilgrimage sites are concerns of a distinct religious 
community.
The upasraya and the sthanak act as the public arenas for the display of Svetambar 
communalistic religiosity for the Kharataragaccha and Sthanakvasi sects respectively. 
Ritual either in the home or the temple, with the exception of important public religious 
events, is a personal individualistic matter. These venues provide the loci for the 
expression of shared belief systems of the sects; they also provide an important arena for 
social intercourse, particularly for women who may otherwise be confined to the home 
(see, Reynell 1991:54-59). They are the scene for the initiation of ascetics, group fasts 
for women, and for the interaction between ascetics and the laity, when ascetics are in 
the city, host the Sunday preaching, are centres for Paryusana-parva (‘holy week’) during 
the monsoon, and may be used for social events. It is during these public events that the 
often competitive bestowal of religious gifts (dana) is practised, whereby cash donations 
are sought for Jain religious institutions by the ascetics and/or given by the laity.13 To 
a large extent, the world of the layman revolves around the giving of dana, and that of 
the laywoman around tapas, usually in the form of fasts.
For its ascetics, Jainism is an austere faith but this is only partially reflected in the 
lifestyle of the laity; historically, all intoxicants and all forms of meat were taboo, even 
tuberous vegetables were forbidden as their uprooting involved injury to other living 
creatures. Like Vaisnavas, Jains also believe that certain foods, such as onions, ‘arouse
13See, Chapter 6: Gifts and Charity.
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the passions* which bind the adherent to samsara (the cycle of transmigration).14 This 
preoccupation with the minutiae of life forms extended to the use of only filtered water 
via a very fine gauze to exclude any insects, and a prohibition on cooking and eating after 
dark as insects may be attracted to the cooking fire. Unlike Reynell (fieldwork c. 1983), 
with the exception of meat eating and filtered water, I found all of these dietary 
restrictions had virtually disappeared: all my informants claimed that they and their 
families were strictly vegetarian, but they almost all ate root vegetables, dined after dark 
and the men were invariably habituated to pan; a few even openly drank and smoked. I 
was told that a few older women still practised the prohibitions on tubers and not eating 
after dark, but they were considered almost eccentric (cf. Reynell 1991:54-55).
According to one medieval source, the six daily duties of the layman are devapuja 
(worship of the Hirthankaras), guru-upasti (listening to and veneration of one’s teacher), 
svadyaya (studying scriptures), samyama (self-control), tapas (austerities) and dana 
(giving gifts) (Warren, quoted in Sangave 1980:214).15
In Jaipur, for Svetambars, individual ritual observance is threefold: within the household, 
visits to ascetics and, for certain sects, temple worship. The household ritual is less a 
form of worship but rather a daily samayika (equanimity or meditation) performed before 
the household shrine for forty-eight minutes (the ghanta) after bathing in the early
14Thirty-two foodstuffs were prohibited to the laity, see, Williams (1963:110-16); 
these proscriptions are also part of a unique Jain taxonomy concerned with which plants 
possess nigoda (‘single-sense creatures*) (Jaini 1979:168). See, also Cottam Ellis 
(1991:92-94) for a contemporary list from a small town in Rajasthan.
15This has become the standard list and was devised by Somadeva (tenth century). For 
alternatives and variants see, Jaini (1979:189-91).
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morning.16 Sthanakvasis have no shrines although in fact many Sthanakvasi homes have
discreet images of Mahavira or their ascetics. Fasting was perceived by men as very
much a womens* province, the longer fasts are often a public affair and concluded in the
upasraya, but some men will fast for a minimum one day a year usually during
Paryusana-parva. Within the sect, many devout Jains are followers of individual acaryas
or ascetics who act as spiritual mentors to their neophytes. In any one year, the
preceptors will circulate around those centres where their known devotees* reside to allow
the latter the opportunity for a consultation and advice.17 And on occasion, the devotee
may even travel to where their mentor is known to be in attendance either for advice, or
to revere their preceptor as an ‘object of pilgrimage*. Temple ritual involves once or
twice daily visits which may involve anything from a simple darsana (view) of the
images and a recitation of the panca-namaskara mantra (in praise of the five holy beings
of the faith),18 to the complete eightfold puja (see, Humphrey 1987 and Babb 1988).
‘While various social factors (jati, residence, occupation and so forth) can serve to link 
small groups or micro-communities of Jains, the religion itself (or perceptions of the 
religion) can act as a tie for all Jains. In this way, Jainism serves as a resource pool, a 
set of elements, from which an identity can be constructed.... [There] is a religious system 
which offers the potential for various interpretations, each of which offers the promise 
of salvation’ (Banks 1991:258).
iii/ Banivas. Jains and Caste
16The ghanta or muhurt = 2 ghadi (24 minutes)
17The ascetics will take up temporary residency in the upasraya or sthanak; but these 
encounters between the ascetics and the laity may be at any time of the year, and may 
be quite separate occasions from the residency of the ascetics during the monsoon months 
which are a much more public event (see, Chapter 6: Gifts and Charity).
18The Jinas (Tirthankaras), siddhas (kevalins - omniscient), acaryas, upadhyaya 
(preceptors) and ascetics.
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Jati designations raise the vexed question of whether Jains have caste or not. The 
evidence is not unambiguous: its ritual attributions, caste ranking in the idiom of a 
pure/impure hierarchy is rejected; but in practice it has been accepted as the basis of Jain 
social organization, it is seen not as a religious but a purely social institution.
The Jain attitude to caste is ambivalent: on the one hand it is theoretically castigated for 
its divisiveness and its potentiality for exclusiveness, but historically it has been 
interpreted as a form of social organization. As with the early Buddhists, the system was 
condemned by Mahavira and the early acaryas of the Jain church; the only concession 
being that vamas should be occupational, equivalent, could be exchanged by an individual 
one for another and not ascribable by birth (Sangave 1980:61-68). Nevertheless, as later 
befell the Christians and Muslims, caste is pervasive among Jains complete with natal 
ascription.19 Thapar notes that the Sramanic traditions, besides being opposed to 
brahmanical sacrifice, sruti and smrti (Vedic religio-legal precepts), were ‘open to all 
castes and although social hierarchy was accepted it did not emphasise separate social 
observances but, rather, cut across caste’ (Thapar 1989:212 - emphasis added). She adds 
that their attitude to the caste hierarchy was rather one of accommodation, and their 
initial appeal was to large numbers of the upper castes although there were no restrictions
19Among non-Hindus, caste exists without an ideology of purity and pollution 
suggesting that the latter is not essential for the existence of caste. Dumont, the most 
important exponent of this ideology, explains this anomaly in terms of ‘proximity’: The 
influence of the Hindu setting is all-pervasive and decisive, and each of the smaller non- 
Hindu communities failed to create any workable alternative social structures (Dumont 
1980:210-11).
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on lower class recruitment and later support from such groups was substantial.20
Co-incidental with the debate of Jainism vis-a-vis caste is the obvious question of 
occupation. We have noted that the central tenet of the faith is ahimsa to the extent that 
whole of Jainism revolves around this principle. It is not simply a matter of refraining 
from violence against humankind and animals, but an ontology that sees the cosmos as 
filled with innumerable souls in every animate and inanimate object which cannot but be 
destroyed. The centrality of ahimsa to Jainism is to conscientiously minimise and avoid 
violence and destruction. In the extreme, one commentator describes five domestic chores 
as the ‘slaughter houses’: pounding, grinding, cooking, cleansing, and sweeping, as they 
all involve the destruction of living organisms (Williams 1963:122). Understandably, 
there arose proscriptions on certain occupations that involve injury to plants and 
animals.21 Williams, paraphrasing another medieval commentator, notes that ‘the eternal 
dilemma of Jainism is laying down an ethos for the layman.’
The lay estate....cannot exist without activity and there can be no activity without the 
taking of life; in its grosser form this is to be avoided sedulously but the implicit part of 
it is hard to avoid. It follows that at least the keeping of animals and contact with any 
destructive implements are to be eschewed’ (Williams 1963:121).
20For the appeal of Jainism to Vaisyas in the post-Vedic period see, Ghurye (1969:63- 
69), Bhattacharya (1973) and R. S. Gandhi (1977). These scholars claim that Vaisyas 
were officially classified with Sudras as agriculturalists and artisans; but for the rising 
mercantile castes Jainism offered higher status, separation from the Sudras castes, 
equality with and escape from brahminical strictures. On the contemporary appeal of 
Vaisya affiliation - as opposed to Ksatriya - as a means of upward mobility for the 
Gujarati Patidars see, Shah and Shroff (1959) and Mandelbaum (1970:460).
21For a complete list of the fifteen forbidden trades and variants see, Williams 
(1963:117-22). These proscriptions are to a large extent Svetambar as the Digambar 
tradition has rejected some of the prohibitions, thus the majority of southern Digambar 
Jains were agriculturists, and historically there has often been a Jain soldiery (Sangave 
1980:259).
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Thus in both Svetambar and Digambar traditions there arose what Williams calls an 
occupational ‘sequence of desirability’ with trade as a preference.22
Unlike Hindus castes, in Jaipur, Jain jatis have never been hierarchically ranked. The 
total number of Jain jatis in the sub-continent is unknown, and as some had only small 
numbers and were endogamous, these have either disappeared or amalgamated with larger 
jatis over the centuries. A further complication is the fact that some of the larger jatis 
such as Agarwals, Porwals and Oswals are both Jain and Hindu and historically have 
intermarried. Collectively, both are known as Baniyas, or mercantile castes, and have 
been designated as Vaisya in the pan-Indian Hindu vama scheme.23
Like several other Baniya ja tis, the Oswals and Srimals were divided into the 
endogamous Bis and the Das, literally the superior twenty and the inferior ten.24 But 
unlike Jaipur, in Gujarat where this division is still much more prevalent, Banks argues 
that these intra-yVzri divisions can be explained by ‘the degree of purity or legitimacy of 
ancestral blood’ in respect of descent from the castes’ founders (Banks 1992:52). But the 
fact of this division is less significant than intra-subcaste sectarian distinctions and 
whether members have an urban or rural provenance (Banks 1992:58-64).
A preoccupation of South Asian anthropology has been caste ranking, particularly as
22Weber wrongly implies that the principle of ahimsa led Jains to adopt mercantilism 
rather than the reverse (Weber 1958:199).
^However, not all members of the Baniya castes are traders, and probably never have 
been, conversely, many traders are also from non -Vaisya jatis.
^For the mythic origins of these divisions see, Sangave (1980:85,87).
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expressed in terms of inter-caste exchanges as in, for example, respect of food.25 These 
studies were largely concerned with caste interaction in a village environment, but inter- 
caste relations in urban centres tend to be much more flexible. In an ideal-type village 
setting there is often an agreed ritual hierarchy with Brahmans at its apex and Harijan 
castes at its base, and the interstitial castes fitted between these extremities. But in Jaipur 
with respect of the dvija (twice-born) castes - Brahmans, Rajputs, and Baniyas - there 
appears to be a degree of parity or rather no public claims to superiority between 
them.26
In respect of inter-caste and inter-household dining these appeared to be minimal. Many 
informants stated that they only dined in their own home, and one informant claimed that 
he could be sure that the food from his kitchen was ‘suddh* (pure) as only family 
members and servants could enter. The overwhelming majority of business transactions 
take place in a separate ‘office* within the home, and these were frequently interrupted 
by bouts of tea-drinking with namkin (‘Bombay mix’) and sweets; from my observations 
these were available to all regardless of caste. But there were exceptions to this minimal 
commensality: Two of my informant families regularly entertained non-Jains, their 
families and non-Indians in their own homes, and their kitchens were open to visitors.27
“ See, for example, Mayer (1966:33-41), Marriott (1968b) and Parry (1979:92-107).
“ These co-equal Brahmans tend to be ‘out of state’ rather than indigenous Brahmans. 
In private, however, Brahmans do claim ‘intellectual* superiority, Rajputs cite their 
illustrious martial past, and Jains their moral (i.e. ahimsa) precedence; Baniyas in general 
claim that they ‘run things* anyway as Jaipur is a ‘Baniya raj*.
“ For this state of ‘impurity* these households were neither available to nor visited 
by ascetics (see, Chapter 6: Gifts and Charity).
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Many more preferred to entertain guests in restaurants. Only in respect of religious 
occasions and weddings did all invitees dine together.
An even further complication arises from the fact that the Oswals and Srimals of Jaipur 
claim that their jatis were originally Rajput, pertaining to the higher second Ksatriya 
vama: They are the descendants of converts to Jainism in the eighth or ninth centuries, 
the Oswals from Osia near Jodhpur and Srimals from Srimal (Bhinmal) in S. W. 
Rajasthan.28 All my informants were familiar with versions of these origins, their Rajput 
‘ancestry’ and the historical antagonism between Brahmans and Rajputs. For Svetambars, 
their vama origins are reflected in the belief that Mahavira and all the Tirthankaras were 
bom to Ksatriyas as opposed to Brahmans, the normative Hindu vamas of religious 
sages.29 Such mythic history can be seen as part of what Thapar calls the ongoing 
ideological creation of ‘imagined religious communities’ which utilises mythic, folkloric 
and various historical materials. Minority communities are engaged in a ‘reconstruction 
of history seeking to project a unified community stance in all historical situations’. ‘The 
projection of such communities historically is that of their always having been alien to 
the dominant culture and therefore refusing to assimilate with the majority* (Thapar 
1989:230).
As the city was only inaugurated in 1727 A.D., Oswals and Srimals have an immigrant
28See, K. C. Jain (1977:155-56,180-84), Sangave (1980:83-87) and Babb (1993) on 
the accounts of these ja ti origins and conversion.
29This belief is particularly pertinent to the transfer of Mahavira’s embryo from a 
Brahman to a Ksatriya womb, a belief not shared by Digambar Jains (see, the pratistha 
ritual in Chapter 6: Gifts and Charity).
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pedigree. Virtually all of my informant families initially claimed to be ‘first families’, 
that is, they insisted they migrated to Jaipur when the city was first established or were 
invited by its founder, as were many Baniyas, to reside and set up businesses in the city. 
But on closer questioning, by constantly asking whom in their industry were of original 
immigrant families, only six households could be dated with any degree of accuracy to 
have arrived in the first half of the eighteenth century. A seventh could date their 
residency from 1785, when they were invited to assay the then maharajah’s jewels; they 
possessed a deed to their haveli which was purchased from a dispossessed Rajput Thakur. 
Almost half the families originated from Delhi, the remainder from a diversity of 
locations: Bikaner, Jaisalmer, Ajmer, Lucknow, Haryana, Panjab and Calcutta.
Jaipuris’ references to ‘Baniyas’ are not without ambiguity: it can refer to anybody 
involved in trade and for non-Baniyas carries derogatory connotations of avarice and 
parsimony; Baniya references to themselves tend to refer to their nomothetic prakritisah 
(nature), their temperance and scrupulousness; but all trading caste members including 
Jains, regardless of their actual profession, all tend to fall under the rubric of ‘Baniya’.30 
In Jaipur, a Jain is seen as the archetypical Baniya. Jain Baniyas, as do their Hindu 
equivalents, claim an innate superiority in business matters, following a natural calling - 
their dharma - inherited from generations of traders that is fitting and relevant (cf. Fox 
1969:58). Jain tradition and scripture have sanctioned trade as the ethical occupation 
rather than other professions. Wealth is viewed as the result of achievement, integrity and
3<>The term is derived from the Sanskrit vanij, a merchant. From Fox’s data, all those 
engaged in trade, ‘sharp with money’ or lazy, irrespective of caste, were regarded as 
Baniyas (Fox 1969:39-40). Although less frequently heard in Jaipur, Cottam’s traders in 
an anonymous town in Jaipur district preferred to be called ‘Mahajan’ (‘lord’) rather than 
the more pejorative Baniya (Cottam 1980:331).
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right conduct, penury is implicitly the effect of pap (sin); and success in business can be 
utilised in the form of meritorious donations to Jain religious institutions conferring ritual 
status, social prestige and creditworthiness.
Of the ‘Jains* own attitude to caste’ in urban north-west India, Banks’ has cogently 
argued that the median range of the caste hierarchy has dissolved into competing 
communities. ‘That is to say, a hierarchy of jatis ranked according to notions of ritual 
purity has been replaced by a fluid set of endogamous status groups which provide an 
arena for individual or group action and competition’ (Banks 1992:52). Arguably, among 
the middle classes of Jaipur, this statement could be amended to embrace members and 
groups from all the twice-born castes. Banks’ concedes that concepts of purity remain but 
their persistence varies with individual experience and education. It has already been 
noted that Jains see their religion as morally superior to brahmanism, but Banks rightly 
claims that the Jains’ view Vaisnavite Baniyas as possessing a religion of ‘equivalent 
worth* perhaps due to their close interaction with them in commerce and with whom they 
may even share caste membership (Banks 1992:52-53).
iv/ Family. Residency and Marriage
The Jains, like their Hindu neighbours, have always regarded the joint/extended family 
as the norm. Family fission is of course nothing new: if two brothers or their wives, for 
example, residing in the same household continually disagreed, then one of them would 
eventually have the choice of leaving the family home. But in India, separation of the 
household can produce complex domestic patterns where typological labels such as
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‘nuclear* and ‘joint* prove inadequate (Shah 1974:143-45). Reynell has comprehensively 
shown how the household patterns of the Jaipuri Svetambar Jains is often cyclic, how the 
lineal extended family divides into separate family units but that one of the latter may 
evolve into a lineal extended family over time. And the property, commercial, and living 
arrangements that accompany these changes both within and outside the patrilocal home 
are extremely varied (Reynell 1985a: 88-94). Fission of the household may be caused by 
sheer weight of numbers. The havelis were often built piecemeal; this was to 
accommodate, as residence was overwhelmingly patrilocal, a son’s in-marrying wife and 
their later children. With the death of the oldest members of the family, hopefully a 
balance between family members and the space available could be arrived at. If not, one 
solution was to open a branch of the business in, say, Bombay or even overseas although 
such a move would have to have a primary commercial rationale. Also the family elders 
may well retain financial control, decision-making on marriages and major rituals for its 
expatriate members.
Earlier, in the absence of a male heir and probably reflecting their mythic Rajput 
ancestry, a nephew would have been adopted but that custom has lapsed since 
Independence. Later, the practice was to acquire an in-marrying son-in-law to be trained 
to continue the business. But this arrangement is never strictly uxorilocal; in the cases 
known to me, the son-in-law and his family never reside in his father-in-law’s household 
but maintain an independent residence. Nevertheless, there is a certain stigma, something 
ignominious about being in such a position. In another example, an in-marrying son-in- 
law was by-passed and his second son trained as a jeweller and eventually inherited his 
grandfather’s business to continue the family tradition. But they did not move into the
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latter* s residence until his demise. Another jeweller has four daughters; the two eldest 
daughters are already married to non-jewellers, in fact to non-Jains, both in ‘love* 
marriages. When I suggested to him that his next daughter, who is approaching 
marriageable age, be married to an in-marrying son-in-law lest the family business died 
out, he was not at all perturbed and unusually quite prepared for the inevitable to happen.
Marriage was traditionally intra-caste if not intra-sectarian; but the equivalence of Oswals 
and Srimals was explained as much in terms of identical business interests, sect affiliation 
as well as marriage, and probably follows the pattern of Oswal Baniya intra-caste 
marriage across sectarian lines. But in the last twenty-five years even these patterns of 
endogamous flexibility have been made even more pliable by Svetambar alliances to not 
only non-traditional Baniyas, such as Digambars, but also to Brahmans and Rajputs. And 
this changing marriage pattern is not only a matter of a business alliance but reflects a 
concern with wider class interests based on education, income and profession. Thus, 
informants may discuss the notion of ‘community* - particularly in regard to marriage - 
in terms of jati, gotra, sect, locality, Jainism, the gem trade and profession, singly, or 
in a confusing and even contradictory combination of several or all of these ingredients 
(see below).
The primary unalterable parameter of marriage is the exogamous gotra which is divided 
into any number of kuls, individual kuls share descent from a common ancestor but often 
ties between distant kuls are too peripheral to have any corporate identity.31 However,
31While gotra may be used as a synonym for ja ti, it is not to be confused with an 
exogamous biradari (*sub-caste*) (cf. Parry 1979:4-5 and Cohn 1987:167).
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there is an unambiguous stipulation that there are four gotras to be avoided in marriage, 
the pervasive ‘four gotra rule’: ego’s father’s, ego’s mother’s, father’s maternal and 
mother’s maternal gotras. The lineal extended family does have a shared corporate 
identity, usually occupying a rambling haveli or villa in the new city, overseen by the 
family malik (head) who is the final arbiter in familial and business decisions, and 
represents the integrity and status of the household. But although the lineal extended 
family may have a corporate business identity its members may not necessarily share 
residency. Family interests may be overwhelmingly business interests, and business may 
require a member of the family, typically a son, to reside outside the city or India.
To maintain the status of the patrilocal household, the in-marrying bride must be from 
a comparable household. As virtually all marriages were arranged, the respective parents 
of a prospective couple would probably have been known to one another as both parties 
were often resident in the city. The couple may have been matched when they were 
young children but my informants stressed that this practice was unheard of nowadays.32 
The father with a marriageable son or daughter would ask his relatives or colleagues to 
enquire and suggest possible matches. If the suggested party were an unknown quantity, 
he would discreetly investigate through the community grapevine the other’s reputation, 
finances and life-chances.
We have noted that some marriages were inter-sectarian and invariably the in-marrying 
bride adopted the sect and the religious practices of her affines (cf. Reynell 1991:50). But
32There is a widespread opprobrium of any suggestion that Jains may encourage any 
form of ‘child marriage* which is widespread, although outlawed, among the lower rural 
castes of Rajasthan.
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empirically this was not always the case: Apocryphally, there are stories of women who 
retained their sectarian beliefs after marriage and single women who changed their sect 
allegiance. Among one of my informant families, who are Svetambar non-image 
worshippers, was an in-marrying Digambar image worshipper who not only continued 
to visit temples but who also was accompanied by her children. Specifically, in this 
instance, I was told that it depends on the character and personality of the spouse; if she 
has the ‘independence of spirit* she will be able to retain her beliefs as long, of course, 
as this acceptable to her prospective in-laws.33
Nevertheless, the power and influence of Jain women in Jaipur is hard to assess and my 
interaction with them was strictly limited; most of the following is rather gleaned from 
male informants. Reynell sees women as significant in the ‘reproduction of the Jain 
community*, due to their participation in religious events (Reynell 1991:54-65). Beyond 
the religious domain, every household has a senior paternal woman member who has a 
sort of responsibility for ‘protocol*. She must be consulted in respect of prospective 
marriage partners, her views noted if not obeyed, and on certain familial rituals if these 
have been allowed to lapse or where guidance is needed. Formerly, older women had an 
important role in the transmission of folkloric moralizing Jain tales (kathas) about saints, 
sages, and preceptors to their progeny, although this is a declining tradition.
Women traditionally spend most of their time in the household or at the upasraya/sthanak 
But among the Svetambars in Jaipur, in addition, ‘household’ should be amended to
33From her study, Reynell found that out of 69 marriages, 18 were inter-sectarian 
alliances but only 12 brides converted to their affines* sect (Reynell 1985a: 82-83).
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include the wife’s natal home; as the wife’s family was often resident in the city there 
was considerable interaction between her adopted and former households. Vatuk observed 
from her study of middle class neighbourhoods in Meerut, contrary to the expectation that 
a wife should increasingly interact with her affines, that a significant number of married 
women interacted more frequently with their natal kin who were resident in Meerut, and 
these links maintain the continuity and solidarity with the natal kin group (Vatuk 
1972:140-41). But Vatuk presupposes an older traditional emphasis on patrilocal links, 
and the retained natal interaction was a comparatively recent juncture and the result of 
Meerut’s later ‘urbanization’. However, the situation in Jaipur, where marriage alliances 
within the city are commonplace, suggests a continuation of strong ties with both affinal 
and natal families - ‘bilocality* (Reynell 1985a:87), and this has always been the case. 
Unlike Vatuk’s conclusion, this is a familiar rather than a recent phenomenon.
Women are almost entirely economically dependent on their fathers or husbands. 
Widows’ directly inherit from their deceased husbands; in the rare event of their being 
childless they can donate the inheritance to a religious institution in the form of darn. 
Typically, however, a widow is neither young nor childless and they rather tend to devote 
themselves to religiosity, intensifying their undertaking of tapas in the form of fasts. 
Ultimately, the widow may forfeit her inheritance and become an ascetic.34 Either as 
pious widow or ascetic, senior women members of the community have considerable
34There was a widespread perception among my male informants that the majority of 
sadhvis were widows; however Reynell, from her observations in Jaipur and parts of 
rural Rajasthan, argues that this may have been the norm but the majority were under 40 
years of age and there were few widows. She also suggests that some girls were 
becoming ascetics as they were ‘ unmanageable* - from large families and poor rural 
backgrounds (Reynell 1985a:248-49,264).
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status. If they are still young there is the possibility to remarry, previously there was a 
prohibition on widow re-marriage but it is latterly much more acceptable. In a city like 
Jaipur with its relatively large Jain population, such sentiments among its more tolerant 
enlightened members were always likely to be acceptable. As Reynell has noted, 
westernized Jain families allow women greater autonomy, higher status, and even the 
right to work. ‘[But] women from such families owe their elevated position more to the 
changing values within the Indian middle class as a whole rather than to Jain religious 
beliefs of female equality* (Reynell 1987:53).
Thus in respect of marriage, decisions pertaining to a marriage partner involve a complex 
of factors which were weighed one against the other. Outside of gotra proscriptions, 
concerns of sect, caste, profession, and class can be relativized to produce the perfect 
match. If sect affiliation was paramount, piety and religious observance particularly 
among women were highly esteemed; the emphasis may be on an intra-caste alliance 
which may include Vaisnava Baniyas as they share a similar lifestyle, importantly dietary 
restrictions; many Jains still think of their ancestral town or region as their ‘home*, and 
a minority may opt for an alliance with their place of origin as well as taking into account 
caste and/or sect considerations.
Of marriage prescriptions revolving around a caste/sect axis, attempting to unravel this 
nexus often produced contradictory responses among my informants about which factor 
was uppermost. There are always exceptions: for example, one Oswal whose preference 
was for an intra-sect/intra-caste marriage for his children, however, offered as a caveat 
that his daughter had married a Srimal; another Oswal claimed that a potential alliance
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should only be with the same ja ti, then later offered the proviso that they must be ‘Jain*. 
Preference does not always reflect the reality. The situation is compounded by the fact 
that Srimals and Oswals are seen as one caste, but this view is not shared by all and their 
identification may vary on context. As one informant explained, ‘sanskar’ is more 
important for some Jains than for others, and this designation is probably the best 
description for a cultural matrix that provides the bases for decision-making. He added 
that many would prefer an inter-yori alliance but if they marry, say, their first-born 
outside the ja ti, they fear they may not be able to marry other children within the ja ti if 
they so desired. They are afraid of acquiring a reputation as people who ‘marry-out’.35
Out of forty Svetambar Jain households, in marriages over the last twenty years, 24 
strictly followed the intra-caste/intra-sect mode - this includes all age gradations: 
brothers, sisters, sons, grandchildren, etc.; nine others had engaged in some form of 
inter-caste or inter-sect marriage. All these were considered ‘orthodox* and involved only 
Srimals, Oswals, Kharataragaccha and Sthanakvasi. There were no Oswal marriages 
between Jains and Vaisnavas, and only six households had entered into Srimal/Oswal 
alliances - which is probably less than informants imagined had occurred. Out of this 33, 
nine of this number insisted that both identical caste and sect would be their criterion for 
any future alliances; a further twelve claimed that either sect or ja ti would be their 
primary consideration; the remaining twelve gave a variety of responses: ‘Svetambar’, 
‘Jain’, ‘Baniya*, ‘to** (any). Thus, we can see the possibility of a widening of the choice 
of potential marriage partners. Seven of the original forty households had already
3SReynell claims that it is the first and last marriages of a family’s children that are 
noted by the community, as it is these that establish or maintain the family’s status 
(Reynell 1985a:79).
179
contracted at least one alliance that was outside the normative caste/sect ambit. And these 
‘mixed’ marriages are not the prerogative of the lakhpatis; in fact, only two alliances, 
between a Srimal and a Vaisnava Agarwal and a Srimal and a Digambar, were 
collectively considered as belonging to the wealthiest families.
Although still a minority, there were an increasing number of what are called ‘love 
marriages’ among the Svetambar jewellers, but this does not imply that the match was 
not arranged. What it did imply is that the match was initiated by the couple - who had 
met at, for example, university - whereby they approached their parents and asked 
permission to marry.36 However, parental consideration of the proposed alliance would 
follow the weighing of the various factors as outlined above; elopement was unheard of. 
Cormack sees this situation as one where young Indians are increasingly allowed the 
right of decision in marital choices but are without the means to make that decision 
(Cormack 1961:101). Ascertaining who initiated a marital choice again can lead to 
contradictory responses: for example, one man told me his bride had been chosen by his 
father, but his uncle informed me that the bride had been suggested by her spouse, and 
the latter*s disclaimer was probably due to ‘some marital problem*. Also it is impossible 
to quantify how well a marriage couple knew one another or how much ‘in love* they 
were.
Equally unfruitful was attempting to compile the number of abortive alliances; it was not 
something many informants were prepared to discuss. One example, which was openly
“ This pattern has been also been observed by Ross among Hindu upper class families 
in Bangalore (Ross 1961:253), but her interpretation is not supported by Vatuk who is 
critical of Ross* data (Vatuk 1972:87).
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discussed in one household, was that a potential bride who herself had suggested an 
arranged marriage, rejected her proposed suitor - even though he was an M.A. from 
Calcutta - because he spoke poor English and English was her ‘first’ language.
The choice of a twenty year time-span is not arbitrary as the number of marriageable 
Jains is declining. It was not uncommon to find in the generation who are now in their 
forties and fifties, five or six siblings spread over a 15 to 20 year period. Usually, it is 
rare to find more than 2 or 3 children per nucleated segment within the extended Jain 
household. This was either a response to government propaganda or more likely an image 
of the ideal responsible middle class family as having only one son and one daughter.
But many if not all of these arrangements had some form of class interest even if they 
were framed in a caste/sect idiom. As Reynell has noted, ‘Within the parameters set by 
caste and gotra it is considered essential to marry one’s son or daughter into a family of 
suitable wealth and status.’ But, ‘Although marriages are set within a hypergamous idiom 
it is common in practice for marriages to take place between a couple from families of 
equal wealth or status’ (Reynell 1991:48 - emphasis added). She also adds that this idiom 
has not led to the emergence of either collectively defined superior or inferior divisions. 
My informants pay lip-service to this idiom but rather this artificially creates the 
difference between wife-givers and wife-takers (cf. Parry 1986:462). The emphasis is 
very much on the comparability and equality of marriage partners - of ‘like marrying 
like’ - although it may be expressed in the form of hypergamy.37
37The phrase is Stirrat’s who found the same contradiction in a Roman Catholic 
fishing village in Sri Lanka (Stirrat 1989:106) (cf.Pocock 1972:106).
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For Cottam’s Rajasthani Baniyas, Hindu and Jain, ‘Marriage dominates the conversation 
of the Mahajans of Mandi - when they are not talking about making money’, and, ‘To 
a very great extent, the one process is dependent upon the other relationship’ (Cottam 
1980:340). This was certainly not the situation among the Jain jewellers of Jaipur 
although more recently, for some of the most affluent families, financial interests 
including even dowry payments may be the prime motive for a particular alliance.38 
Even so, with the rare exception, these alliances were never merely business deals.
Although the Srimals and Oswals have traditionally had a near monopoly on the gem 
trade in Jaipur, over the last quarter of a century many other jatis, Baniya and otherwise, 
have entered the business. Now there are considerable numbers of Agarwals and 
Khandelwals - both Digambar and Vaisnava - plus Maheswaris, Brahmans, Rajputs, 
Sindhis, Panjabis and Muslims. But there is a general conservative estimation among both 
Jains and non-Jains that Oswals and Srimals still control approximately two-thirds of the 
gem trade. Social and economic ties within and between the two jatis are reinforced by 
affinal linkages. Thereafter, these affinal links constituted a serried network along which 
economic activity could flow (cf. Reynell 1991:53). However, Reynell’s hypothetical 
contention that religious affiliation may act as a source of exclusion towards other 
religious groupings - for example, Jains against non-Jains or Svetambars against 
Digambars - of this, I could find no evidence (Reynell 1991:52-53). As one jeweller 
informed me, such exclusivity may have been practised in the past but they were
38Some of the wealthier families have recently embraced large dowry payments, 
although it was only admitted to by one informant, and its discussion was largely one of 
anecdote and gossip. This practice was generally deplored by my informants and was 
expressly forbidden to Srimals; see, Chapter 7: Cultural Capital and Conspicuous 
Consumption.
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prepared to transact with anybody as long as the terms were right. And, he added, there 
were a minority of important non-Svetambars, non-Jains and non-Indians involved in the 
business that such restrictions would be counter-productive. Exclusion was practised 
against individuals and families, Jain or otherwise, with whom the jeweller has had 
negative commercial dealings.39
By implication, an individual jeweller’s resource group will include inputs and outlets 
whether of Jain provenance or not, thus the wider gem business community transcends 
narrower Jain interests. Two of my informants maintained that they only did business 
with fellow Svetambars; however, the remainder argued that this may be the ‘ideal’, part 
of a commercial tradition, but in practice it was impossible to achieve, unnecessary and 
undesirable.40 Many older jewellers were ambivalent about the influx of non-Svetambars 
into the industry, they decried the loss of their monopoly which they perceived had 
resulted in ‘sharp practices* by their non-Svetambar competitors, but at the same time 
they conceded and welcomed the fact that the business had been ‘opened up*, particularly 
in respect of exports.
Two of the most important constituents of the Svetambar Jain community were the 
parameters of sect and caste, and their juxtaposition is particularly pronounced in the 
choice of marriage partners. But these distinctions have been correlatively relativized to
39‘While we can often find out what people believe to be the case, it is usually much 
more difficult to decide to what extent beliefs correspond to actual states of affairs’ 
(Molund 1988:18).
4(>This exclusivity discounts the Muslim lapidarists who are the manufacturing 
backbone of the industry.
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those of income, occupation and education - i.e. to class - and the emphasis is on 
equivalence of status. There was a certain flexibility in the marital choices of a minority 
of informants and a possibility of widening the scope of marriage partners, although half 
of the household heads expressed the view that caste and/or sect affiliation would remain 
their primary criteria. Within these limitations there is a degree of choice for 
marriageable Jains who may in fact may initiate the match. However, the overwhelming 
majority of marriages are between members of lapidary industry and ultimately there is 
a potential commercial element in virtually every alliance.
v/ Jains in a Hindu World
The core distinction between Jains and their Hindu neighbours is primarily a religious 
one. It is the clear institutionalized interaction between the minority of ascetics and the 
majority of the laity that distinguishes Jains from Hindus; this is most evident during the 
monsoon months when the symbiosis between the two halves of the community are at 
their most intense, and is an annual event that is quite unknown to Hindu sects. 
Theologically, like Buddhists, Jains revere an exemplary human being - Mahavira - as 
being superior to any God or gods and, like Theravada Buddhism, Jainism holds the 
wandering mendicant to be the exemplar of the true path of renunciation. Consequently, 
a distinct literature has evolved over the centuries which reflects a Jain scriptural 
discourse about its particularistic theological interests - for example, the rigorous primacy 
of ahimsa and the shortcomings of Hindu practices such as sacrifice. According to 
Carrithers and Humphrey, even in the Deccan where Hindu influence has arguably been 
greater, Jain temple organization is quite distinct from that of Hindus (Carrithers and
Humphrey 1991:10). Besides their own pilgrimage centres, Svetambars have the 
institution of the meeting halls where ascetics and laity can interact and where, besides 
the Sunday preaching, the initiation of ascetics and group fasts take place. This last venue 
gives Jainism a ‘congregationalist’ dimension. But all of the above give Jains a self- 
awareness of a distinct identity, to be differentiated from the Hindus, which establishes 
them as an independent community.
The distinctiveness of Jainism does not imply that there has not been any interchange of 
ideas and practices between Jains and Hindus over the last two and half millennia, or 
even longer: Many of the materials used in Jain puja are also used in Hindu ritual; both 
share a cult of the gurulascetic with its attendant austerities; the Digambar Jains of 
southern India have their own ‘Jain Brahman’ priests who both wear the ‘sacred 
thread*;41 the idiom of caste is pervasive among Jain communities; the quasi-ascetic 
bhattaraks and yatis, the custodians of religious property of the Digambars and some 
Svetambar sub-sects, are not unlike their Hindu equivalents; and although Jains have their 
own calendars, both communities share some of the same festivals. But these practices 
have a logic that is peculiar to Jain observance and are imbued with resonances of an 
alternative belief system.
For my Jain informants who were cognizant with the similarities between the two faiths, 
they perhaps understandably stressed that the transmission of religious ideals and practice 
was exclusively one way. For them, Jainism represents an older Sramanic pan-Indian
41On Jain Brahmans and the sacred thread see, Sangave (1980:98-99 and 251-52 
respectively).
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tradition which has bequeathed the cult of the guru, asceticism, meditation, 
vegetarianism, and particularly ahimsa, to the sub-continent. This ongoing influence was 
best exemplified by the much-cited devout Jain jeweller Raycandrabhai Mehta’s influence 
on Mahatma Gandhi.42 Indeed, the corollary of this attitude was that many of my 
informants’ expressed the superiority of Jainism to Hindu practices not only in respect 
of historical precedence but in terms of their adherence to ahimsa, particularly their 
fastidious preparation of food and drinking water. But this superiority is expressed in 
purely religious terms and not in the idiom of caste with its concomitant associations of 
hierarchy, purity and pollution. They even chide Hindus for their cult of the cow (‘why 
only the cow?’), their sacred bathing ghats and their plethora of deities.43
Thapar’s claim that historically one of Jainism’ initial social attractions was its non-caste 
or cross-caste nature may be correct, but eventually Jainism inevitably accommodated 
itself to this pervasive form of social organization. Similarly, from the ninth century a 
number of Hindu kriyas and samskaras (life-cycle rituals) were adopted to mark rites of 
passage through the secular life (see, Williams 1963:275) and, with the exception of 
antyesti (funeral ritual), clearly have a brahmanical model in mind (see, Jaini 1979:293- 
94).“  However, the Jains’ adoption of these life-cycle rituals was either not universal
42Raycandbhai Mehta (1868 - 1901) also known as Srimad Rajacandra. Without 
acknowledging he was a Jain, Gandhi claims he was the most impressive individual he 
ever met (M. K. Gandhi 1976:64-65).
43This superiority hides the fact that some deities are shared between the two religions 
(for e.g. Laksmi - see below), Jains also have their own sacred pilgrimage sites, have 
funded cow sanctuaries (see, Lodrick 1981) and, arguably, Jains’ concern with even 
microscopic life forms borders on the obsessional.
“ For a comparison of Hindu and Jain attitudes to death, karma and rebirth see, Jaini 
(1980).
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or has been subsequently abandoned. With the exception of marriage, none of the life­
cycle rituals were undertaken by my informants; in fact, they were unaware of most of 
them and those which they were aware of were considered Hindu practices.
Where the Hindu world does most obviously impinge is with respect of pan-Indian annual 
festivities, Holi, Raksa-bandhan, and particularly Diwali which also has a commercial 
resonance. Dvwali is the north Indian Hindu new year on the new moon of Kartik 
(October/ November); it is was traditionally a time for house cleaning, finalizing the 
annual accounts, and the occasion is observed in the hope of obtaining the favour of 
Laksmi, the goddess of wealth. But the closure of the old year’s account books and the 
inauguration of a new set is more symbolic than real, as debts are often carried over from 
one year to the next, and the Indian tax year begins in April. This ritual of Laksmi-puja 
is not dissimilar from that performed by Vaisnava Baniyas, but for Svetambars, Diwali 
also involves a second and much more significant rite, the 7adu puja,’ which 
commemorates Mahavira’s realisation of moksa (liberation). The two rites combine to 
celebrate through the figure of Gautamaswami the secular and religious, the worldly and 
ascetic modalities of Jainism.
In one example, the Jain Diwali ritual involved the erection of an informal altar in the 
haveli’s office, this comprised a large round tray full of dried fruit and nuts in front of 
three garlanded coloured pictures of Gautamswami, the foremost disciple of Mahavira, 
Rsabhadev, the first Hirthankara, and Jinchandrasoori, the last Dada of the 
Kharataragaccha Sangha. I was informed that the tray also had an invisible medallion of 
Laksmi lying under the fruit and flowers. The altar was completed by two three metre
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long sugar canes overarching it.
With the whole family in attendance, the eldest brother of the household pressed a red 
tilak to the forehead of every member with the addition of a few grains of rice, and the 
second brother tied a mauli (amulet) of thin red and yellow cord around the right wrist 
of the men and the left of the women. Then with a fine brush, the elder brother 
methodically inscribed 4arham* (arhat, kevalin - omniscient), and an equilateral triangle 
of the word 'Sri' (Laksmi) forty-five times across the top quarter of the first page of 
seven new account books in yellow keasacandar (saffron and sandalwood paste). Beneath 
the base of the triangle he drew a swastika, on the left side of this he wrote 'Sri Subha’ 
(auspiciousness) and 'Sri Labha' (profit) on the right, then the time and date. After this 
he listed six ideal characteristics associated with historical and mythical Jain figures that 
the householder should emulate: a/ the labdhi (miraculous powers) of Gautamswami, b/ 
the padvi (office, cakravartin i.e. universal ruler) of Bharat, c/ the riddhi (prosperity) of 
Dhanna, d/ the buddhi (intelligence) of Abhaykumar, d  the bal (strength) of Bahubali, 
f/ the dana vrari (the pledge of charity) of Sreyam.
When all seven were completed, he arranged them in two rows of four and three in front 
of the altar for a blessing from the three Jain saints and, of course, the goddess Laksmi 
for a prosperous new year.45 Like the dried fruit and nuts, more auspicious substances 
were laid on top of the books: a betel nut and a betel leaf, three marigold malas 
(garlands), some of the kesacandar paste was flicked over the books, finally small
45Parry is surely wrong when he claims that the Indian merchant ‘worships his 
account books’ (Parry 1989:82).
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amounts of rice. The last action was repeated by everyone present in turn kneeling in 
front of the altar, firstly, the men followed by the women and children. Then a tray with 
a flaming lamp (dipa) appeared and arti which ‘cleanses’ the air and summons the ‘good 
spirits* was performed by all those present.
After the ritual, the household head as breadwinner and patron gave everybody present 
a brand new Rs.5 note - odd denominatation brand-new notes are also auspicious. The 
women went from man to man, the younger men to the older men touching their feet as 
a sign of respect, wishing each other 'khus (happy) Diwali \  The women reappeared with 
large quantities of ladus (sweets) to be consumed, the celebrations were then interrupted 
by the cacophony of fireworks being ignited by the children in the courtyard of the 
haveli. But for its few Jain touches, I am informed that this event would not differ from 
that taking place in a Hindu Baniya household. But the following day is one of the most 
important comemmorations in the Jain calendar, the death and nirvana of Mahavira and 
is celebrated not in the home but in the temple.
The typical Jain temple, whether Svetambar or Digambar, is basically a large central 
domed chamber with a number of annexes adjacent to it; these tend to highly decorated 
in the style not unlike a mosque with an opulent display of floral designs and 
arabesques.46 The garbha griha (sanctum sanctorum) is an enclosed shrine often with 
solid silver gates, which can be locked, usually opposite the entrance in the central 
chamber; around it is a passageway for the thrice-performed parikrama
^Levi-Strauss (1976:522) rather flippantly compares a Jain temple in Calcutta to a 
‘high-class bordello’!
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(circumambulation). The shrine, the chamber and annexes are filled with a confusing 
number of munis (statues) in the padma asana (lotus position) occupying niches in the 
walls; except for a number of collection boxes and a low cabutra (rostrum) for the 
presentation of offerings, the chamber and annexes are largely empty and are reserved 
for devotees. Also mounted on the walls are saffron stone configurations (bhomias) and 
oleographs, stylized depictions of pilgrimage sites, scenes from Jain mythology and 
diagrams of the concentric Jain cosmos. The plethora of seemingly identical marble 
images represent primarily Mahavira and some or all of the other twenty-three 
Tinhankaras. Images of Tirthankaras only occupy the garbha griha, but they are also 
dispersed around the temple, and may or may not have their name on their base in ‘Nagri 
script, alongside other Jain divines and yaksas (tutelary demi-gods).47
A large crowd of devotees had gathered in the Pancayati Mandir at dawn to perform the 
ladu-puja. As in the Laksmi-pw/fl, Gautamaswami has an important secondary role, but 
on this occasion it is as the acolyte of the last Tinhankara and the link between the latter 
and the later ascetic tradition.48 The congregation assembled in front of the open garbha 
griha with trays and dishes of ladus, which appear to have no ritual significance but 
rather ostentation and auspiciousness.49 The centrepiece of the ritual was the collective
47Svetambar images are sculptured with folded drapery and have crystal quartz 
inserted into the eyes; Digambar images have no drapery or decoration.
48Gautama holds a comparable position to the Buddha’s first disciple, Ananda, as the 
founder of the Jain ascetic order; he is also a Jain equivalent to the Hindu deity Ganesa, 
a symbol of good fortune, a miracle worker and a remover of obstacles in both the 
material and spiritual realms.
A9Ladus are large round white-coloured sweets and soaked in rose water originally 
from Bengal.
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singing of the Nivana Stava (praise of liberation) which celebrates the attainment of 
Mahavira’s moksa. The assembly then moved to the left of main shrine to the image of 
Gautamaswami and sang a stava which celebrates his detachment from his mentor, his 
omniscience, and the establishment of Mahavira’s dharma through his disciple. The ritual 
ended with a boli (auction) for who would be first to perform arti before the main shrine.
Thus in these two ritual scenarios Gautama performs a twofold linkage, firstly between 
the secular and the spiritual realms, and secondly between Mahavira and the dharmic 
succession. Diwali is firstly a festival of material wealth and also a solemnization of the 
Jain dharma, but it also represents the overlapping problematical nature of the Jain 
community. In a pan-Indian context they adhered to the celebration of a major Hindu 
festival and at the same time they sanctify a peculiarly Jain event. To some of my more 
theologically-minded informants even the ladu-puja> like other temple-centred and 
piously-attended rituals, was considered part of an institutionalized ‘social* sanskar and 
not ‘real Jainism*.
vi/ A Jain Community?
Carrithers’ and Humphrey’s have established an ideal-typical criteria for a Jain 
community: aJ a common culture, belief, and practice as well as some common interests; 
b/ and these can be distinguished from the surrounding society; c/ consciousness of a Jain 
identity; d/ effectiveness as a collectivity in social, political and/or economic life; e/ and 
an ability to reproduce itself (Carrithers and Humphrey 1991:6-7). But noting that 
community, ‘points to a reality which is complex, multivalent, [and] subject to many
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historical contingencies'. ‘Nevertheless, there are distinct sections of Indian society, made 
up of Jains, which cannot be adequately defined in terms of other concepts, such as 
"caste", "sect", "class", or "political group"’ (Carrithers and Humphrey 1991:287). In 
reference to their criteria, they all are applicable to the Jaipuri Svetambar Jain gem 
traders. I would emphasize that the most compelling factor would be a core religious 
identity, but is a collectivity of Jain religious identities enough to establish a Jain 
community?
Difficulties arise in the occupational/economic domain: From the collection by Carrithers 
and Humphrey, the papers by Cottam Ellis and Singhi on smaller towns in Rajasthan, 
Jains comprised 14% and nearly 20% of their total respective populations, far higher than 
in Jaipur, yet they did not form a community - in the sense of taking a dominant identity 
from being Jain. In a socio-economic context, they blend into the general Baniya 
community rather than have an exclusive social identity or form a separate economic 
interest group; being Jain was perceived as purely a religious and not their primary 
identity.
An important cleavage that emerges from Carrithers' and Humphrey’s volume is the role 
of men and women: the above two studies concentrating on the male economic domain 
concluded a distinctive lack of a Jain community; on the other hand, the studies by 
Reynell of Svetambar women in Jaipur and, by incorporation, Carrithers of Digambars 
in rural Maharasthra show the importance of women in the reproduction of the Jain 
community, both the role of female purity and women’s participation in religious 
activities are essential for the maintenance of group identity. But Humphrey's study of
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pilgrimage sites in Rajasthan and Banks' of Gujarati Jains in Leicester, where there are 
no ascetics, show the importance of sectarian divisions as markers of the community. 
From my own observations, I would concur with this last statement with the rider that 
sectarianism was initiated and is abetted by the ascetics.
But some Jain groups and individuals have little or no sense of a Jain identity as being 
differentiated from Hindu society, a point the editors' concede (Carrithers and Humphrey 
1991:6), which may explain the discrepancy between the Census* total of Jains in Jaipur 
District and my informants' estimate; in this exercise many Jains simply designate 
themselves as ‘Hindu*.
All my informants all claimed that their primary identity was Jain. Paradoxically, the 
explanation for the discrepancy between Cottam Ellis' and Singhi's data and my own can 
probably be explained in the form of an occupational rather than a religious bias. By 
concentrating exclusively on the lapidary industry which has historically been dominated 
by Svetambar sub-sects and two castes, which constantly intermix, will almost inevitably 
form a coherent ‘community' - and probably an imagined community as there are a 
minority of important non-Svetambars involved in the industry. The simultaneous 
religious, social and economic interests of sect, caste and business, and to a certain extent 
class, all etched on a cultural template of Jain sanskar, have formed a collectivity which 
is perceived as primarily ‘Jain*. However, this community is flexible enough to be 
divided by its constituents to form micro-communities of caste, sect, etc.; conversely, it 
can be expanded to incorporate professional and class interests to form a macro- 
community of wider business concerns. All these ingredients singularly or in varying
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combinations are potential communities.
Many older Svetambars complain that what was originally a homogeneous and primarily 
a religious community is now a heterogeneous and principally a business community. 
Arguably, it was always a business community embedded in a cultural tradition - M. M. 
Weber’s ‘community of interests’ - and this appellation best describes the Jain jewellers 
of Jaipur. Their identity is multiply constituted by religious and socio-economic interests 
of caste, sect, occupation and class, and yet simultaneously tends to be articulated 
publicly as a predominantly religious identity, even though religion itself is only one 
element and may not always be the most important in organizational terms.
The last two chapters have examined the economic and cultural structures of the 
Svetambar Jains of Jaipur, and it has been noted that religious organizations play a role 
in defining that community. The next chapter will focus on the important area of religious 
gifting and philanthropy where economic and socio-cultural strands of the community are 
interwoven in a religious arena.
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CHAPTER 6: GIFTS AND CHARITY
if Introduction
In this chapter, I want to examine the constituents of Svetambar Jain gift-giving and 
philanthropy in Jaipur. I will concentrate mainly on one sub-sect of the ‘image 
worshipping’ Svetambar Jains, the Kharataragaccha Sangha. The Jain religious precepts 
of charity will be examined, and this will be followed by examples of the types of gifts 
or rather the occasions for gift-giving, in particular, the temple ritual, alms-giving during 
the intense interaction between ascetics and laity during the monsoon season, the 
installation of new images, fasts, and pilgrimage. With the exception of the first two, 
these events are sponsored by individual Jains; and the majority of these events have as 
an important constituent charitable auctions, which act as a competitive alternative means 
of making religious donations. The Sthanakvasi sect, in the absence of temples and 
images, direct their philanthropy towards more secular goals; however, this charitable 
approach will be considered in the context of religious merit-making. Requests to divine 
intermediaries and demi-gods in Jainism are theoretically non-orthodox and, in respect 
of intercession and the important principle of karma, the dual nature of religious belief 
will also be examined. Finally, the motivation and rationalization for charitable donations, 
particularly the legitimization of black money and status enhancement in a religious arena 
will conclude the chapter.
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ii/ The Jain Gift
There are confusing number of taxonomies in regard to Jain dam .1 The nature of Jain 
gift-giving and philanthropy has its origins in the division of the Jain sangha (community) 
into its ascetic and lay aspects. Williams has argued that from medieval times, darn came 
to imply the making of considerable bequests to the Jain church and dana-wata (a vow 
of charity) became the laity’s central expression of its faith (Williams 1963:149). The 
highly influential twelfth century Gujarati Jain scholar and sage, Hemchandra, in his 
Yogasastras describes compassion as, materially, the desire to remove suffering from the 
world; spiritually, it is the following of the correct dharma. Hemchandra then goes on 
to list the *panca-alankar* (five ornaments) of a devotee: 1/ sthairya (steadfastness in the 
faith); 2 /prabhava (influence i.e proselytising the faith); 3/ bhakti (devotion to the faith); 
4/ kausal (proficiency in the scriptures); 51 tirtha seva (serving the Jain divines i.e. 
performing ritual, undertaking pilgrimages, fasts, etc.) (Bothara 1988:33-34).
A venerable informant claimed that numbers 2 and 5 can have what he called ‘social’ 
interpretations, they can both be seen as dam. The second ornament can be construed 
as dam  as the public act of charity is an advertisement for the faith, it inspires others to 
do likewise and it is meritorious. The fifth also implies giving dana to temples and 
ascetics, and sponsoring pilgrimages and fasts not just participating in them. Moreover, 
in the texts surveyed by Williams, puja (worship) is considered to be dam  in the widest 
sense, and the giving dam  to ascetics is regarded as puja to the ascetic (Williams
lrThe nature of these taxonomies are examined in Williams (1963:148-53) and Laidlaw 
(1990:138-42).
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1963:119,216).
Another area of symbiosis between ascetics and the laity revolves around the five vratas 
(vows) that they should both undertake. These vows are the second part of the eleven 
spiritual pratimas (stages) prescribed for the Jain laymen.2 The vrata-pratima consists 
of five anuwats (lesser vows): ahimsa (non-injury to all living creatures), satya (truth- 
telling), asteya (not stealing), brahmacarya (sexual abstinence), and aparigraha (limiting 
one’s possessions). The ascetics also take the same five vows, formally, at their diksa 
(initiation) as an anchorite, but in this case they are the mahavratas (great vows). The 
difference between the two sets of vows is one of degree; for example, for the ascetic 
brahmacarya involves complete sexual abstinence, but for the layman it is be interpreted 
as non-adultery - with the exception of his own wife, he regards all women as if they 
were his sisters.
But in respect of the fifth vow, the difference between the ascetic’s and the layman’s 
vows is not one of degree but of kind. As Williams has noted, the whole interpretation 
of aparigraha must be fundamentally different for the two groups as, for them to be 
identical, would completely undermine the infrastructure of the ascetic community with 
its material reliance on the laity (Williams 1963:93). The ascetic has renounced 
possessions; but if the layman has no possessions how can he donate to the ascetics and 
the broader Jain church? Norman has rightly argued that there are pitfalls here for the 
unwary reader (cf. Reynell 1985b:21), and that the lay canon is largely a medieval 
invention. Quoting from an earlier Prakrit text, Norman lists the considerable possessions
2For a complete list see, Jaini (1979:186-87).
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of a convert to lay Jainism not its asceticism.
‘It is clear that as far as his money, estates and herds are concerned, he was merely 
limiting himself to his present holdings and undertaking not to increase them....In this 
sense aparigraha is interpreted as the layman donating his excess wealth’ (Norman 
1991:32-33 - emphasis added).
The same informant added that aparigraha can also be interpreted as dana - having less 
by giving more. There is no doubt that all my informants were familiar with the concept 
of the anuvratas and its centrality to the layman’s adherence to the faith. However, their 
commitment to the vows was negligible: half of my informants claimed they didn’t adhere 
to them at all, one claimed that it was not possible to strictly follow the vows as it was 
incompatible with being in business; the remainder gave replies such as ‘Yes, but not 
strictly’, ‘Yes, moderately’, or ‘I try*.
There is a tendency among some older jewellers to take a much deeper interest in Jainism 
to the point where they will hand over the daily running of the firm to their eldest sons, 
and in India this retiring religious preoccupation is not peculiar in Jainism. This interest 
may take the form of creating a meditation room in the home; performing yogic exercises 
and undertaking fasts; the study of numerous Jain texts, perhaps involving more than 
competence in Sanskrit and Prakrit, sometimes even producing tracts and panegyrics 
themselves; more visits to sadhus and acaryas\ visiting pilgrimage sites outside Rajasthan 
such as Palitana in Gujarat or those in Bihar. This is an almost full-time preoccupation 
with the faith or as much time as the business will allow. And although these 
‘theologians* as opposed to mere followers are well-known members of the Svetambar 
community, they tend to lead a more private meditative existence and have a lower public
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profile. Interestingly, although five of my older informants devoted themselves almost 
exclusively to religious pursuits, only one claimed to be a strict conformist to the 
anuvratas. From this I conclude that lay adherence to the vows is virtually non-existent.
As Jaini has noted, adherence to the anuvratas and pratimas, ‘while theoretically set 
down for all laymen, tend to constitute an ideal path followed only by a select few’ (Jaini 
1979:188); when a layman has reached the ninth stage of the eleven pratimas he formally 
disposes of his property and prepares to become a mendicant. But such application is 
extremely rare.3 The widespread daily practices, the recitation of the panca-namaskara 
mantra, samayika (meditation) and the mulagunas (dietary restraints) are both a social 
convention and a religious undertaking. For the overwhelming majority of Jains, their 
public spiritual practice consists of a round of once or twice-daily temple attendance and 
periodic ceremonies.4 ‘These rituals serve not merely to bring members of a family or 
community together.... but they also provide a sense of group identity - that is, the 
particular ritual forms adopted by members of a given community clearly distinguish 
them from their Hindu neighbours and from rival Jaina sects as well’ (Jaini 1979:188-89).
There are seven forms of punya-ksetras (fields of merit) selected by the medieval Jain
3In fact very few do: According to a census conducted in 1977 there were 
approximately 1500 Svetambar sadhus and 4000 sadvis, and only 65 Digambar munis 
plus another 60 junior sadhus - i.e. still wearing some form of clothing (Jaini:246 n.8). 
Cort estimates that in 1986, there were only 19 Kharataragaccha sadhus and 193 sadhvis 
nearly all in Rajasthan; respectively, the Tapagaccha had 1179 and 3680 (Cort, quoted 
in Dundas 1992:124). Carrithers estimated there were about 100 Digambar naked munis 
in the 1980’s (Carrithers 1990:148).
4Pious members of the Svetambar Sthanakvasi and Terapanth which eschew ‘image 
worship’ completely, nevertheless, make frequent visits to their meeting halls to fast and 
visit ascetics.
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preceptors as acts of charity: 1/ Jina-bimba (commissioning images of the Tirthankaras); 
2/ Jina-bhavana (building temples to house the images); 3/ Jina-agama (creating 
circumstances for the copying and circulation of Jain scriptures); the remaining four come 
under the rubric Atithi-sambvibhaga (sharing with guests): 4/ giving alms to sadhus; 5/ 
giving alms to sadhvis; 6/ providing spiritual assistance to spiritually advanced male 
members of the lay community, encouraging various religious activities, building schools, 
and distributing clothes to the poor; 7/ ditto, with respect to women (Williams 1963:165) 
(cf Jaini 1979:220, Reynell 1985a:56). All these donations are seen as meritorious and 
will gain the layman rebirth in a heaven or a bhoga-bhumi (place of enjoyment).
According to the last available statistics, there were thirty-one registered Svetambar Jain 
charities in Jaipur in 1984; these include hospitals, clinics, animal refuges, schools, 
libraries and publishers.5 Traditionally, charities were divided by the Jains themselves 
into ‘temple’ and all other types of donation, but more recently there has been a blurring 
of the distinction as to make it meaningless.
Temple charity not only involves the renovation of temples and the commissioning of new 
images but sponsoring, often at considerable expense, the often substantial ceremonial 
that accompanies the pratistha (consecration and installation of a new image), diksa (the 
initiation of an ascetic), major upvasa (fasts), yatras (pilgrimage); and the mahapujas 
(major rituals) that accompany the annual commemoration of the installation, the 
birthdays and other parvans (holy days) of the Tirthanakaras and other Jain saints. And 
many of these events have as an essential ingredient bolis (bids), quite literally auctions,
5Supplied by the secretary of the Svetambar Jain Kharataragaccha Mandir Sangha.
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whereby elements of the ritual are undertaken by the highest bidder. Again, this is 
another avenue of donation available to the faithful and another source of revenue for the 
temple organisation. And typically, the average temple of any sect contains anything from 
a dozen to a score of large metal collecting boxes, and these are often donated by laymen 
and bear their names.
The erection of temples and images and the propagation - publishing - of the scriptures 
by and large tend to be the preserve of the very richest members of the community, 
although I know of an example where the publishing of religious literature, not 
necessarily canonic scripture, was a modest collective charitable effort. The last four 
avenues of meritorious donating - atithi-samvibhaga - are the giving of alms to ascetics 
and to members of the laity who are spiritually advanced, and it was particularly 
baharana (alms to ascetics) and devadraya (offerings to the Tirthankaras) that provide 
the less affluent with an opportunity for meritorious gifting. I know of no examples of 
dona to the laity, but the giving of alms to ascetics is commonplace especially during the 
monsoon. The ascetics will only accept food from Jain households who are known to be 
suddh (pure) i.e. strictly vegetarian.
iii/ Gifts and Ritual
a) Devapuja
‘The Jaina temple is perhaps most accurately viewed as a replica of the samavasarana 
(holy assembly of the Hrthankara). The layman comes near as though he were actually 
approaching the spot where a living Jina sits immobile, bathed in omniscient glory,
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"preaching" by means of the miraculous sound emanating from his body.6 The Jina- 
image itself is used as a tangible aid to visualization of such a sacred being; thereby one 
can hope to awaken his soul*s potential for samyak-darsana [true spiritual insight], as so 
often supposedly happened to those fortunate enough to have encountered a real Jina in 
ancient times* (Jaini 19*79:196).
Besides the daily household samayika which virtually all my informants - both 
Kharataragaccha and Sthanakvasi - undertook, 70% of the former households had 
members who made daily or twice-daily visits - early morning and at dusk - to a local 
Kharataragaccha temple. This may have involved a simple darsana (view) of the images 
and a recitation of the panca-namaskara mantra to the more elaborate eightfold worship 
devapuja - astprakari-puja - or the snatra-puja (bathing ritual), the latter performed by 
small groups of devotees, both of which are usually undertaken in the early morning. The 
former ritual has been accurately described by Humphrey (1987) and Babb (1988) and 
it is not my intention to duplicate their accounts, but the ritual has important implications 
for the study of dana in South Asia.
The Jain devapuja (worship of the lord) involves many borrowings and ingredients from 
Hinduism, but unlike Hindu puja where the devotees enter into a direct relationship with 
the deity via their offerings, the Jain object of worship - the Tirthankaras - are totally 
liberated from worldly affairs, cannot receive the offerings and thus cannot enter into a 
transactional relationship with the worshipper, and there is no prasada (the distribution 
of sanctified offerings, usually food).7 Although some Tirthankaras images are imbued
6This is a Digambar interpretation, Svetambars view the Jina in his kevalinship 
(omniscience) as walking, talking, etc.; see, Dundas (1987).
7This is not the case with Jain tutelary deities and offerings to Jain saints.
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with magical powers and the worship of all such icons is meritorious, Jains should never 
approach the image with a view to pursuing worldly ends as this is strictly forbidden by 
Jain dogma. Nevertheless, it is a truism among temple-going Jains of Jaipur that puja is 
a begetter of prosperity.
Babb argues that with the impossibility of reciprocity, the symbolism of the ritual is 
‘reflexive’ and is concerned not with the relationship between devotee and image but 
rather the connection between ‘offerer and offering*. And in respect of offerings of food 
this is less a gift but represents a renunciation of eating; food and fasting is a major 
preoccupation of all South Asian religions, but arguably none more so than Jainism where 
a minimal intake of food, fasting and the cessation from eating are synonymous with 
spiritual progress.®
‘The worshipper is therefore "giving to" but symbolically modifying his or her own 
condition by "giving up". In this sense the offering is not only a giving up of food but 
a relinquishment of the body itself, bodily existence being profoundly associated with 
eating. To be an eater is to be imprisoned in a "filthy body", and it is also to be 
implicated, at whatever practical remove, in the life-destroying sinfulness of food 
production and preparation’ (Babb 1988:75).
This terminology is reminiscent of Parry’s studies of Brahman priests in Benares who are 
the recipients of dana which is perceived as an instrument for the transference of their 
donors* sins, ‘they liken themselves to a sewer through which the moral filth of their 
patrons is passed’ (Parry 1986:460). This conception derives from Vedic sacrifice, the
®Jains can take the renunciation of food to its logical conclusion in the form of 
sallekhana, a ritual fasting until death. It is seen as the ideal mode of death and is not 
considered suicide, as the latter involves ‘the passions’, and should be supervised by a 
preceptor. ‘Pious lay people, when advanced in years and encouraged by ascetics, will 
occasionally decrease their food intake with a view to bringing about a religious death* 
(Dundas 1992:156). On the ascetic sallekhana see, Jaini (1979:1,227-33).
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identification of donor and victim which resonates in the correlation of donor and darn, 
the transmission of sin through a gift. Raheja has observed the pervasiveness of the 
‘poison in the gift’ in rural northern India, where ‘inauspiciousness’ is transferred to 
other castes and affines in the form of dam . And deities can be the recipients of 
inauspicious dana, from whence the inauspiciousness derived, before it is re-transmitted 
to a third party (Raheja 1988:117-39).
Thus the Jain gift to a non-receiving Tirthankara would appear to make any connection 
with similar Hindu practices at best tenuous. But Babb has argued that the efficacy of the 
gift is dependent on the moral character of donor and separation from the material world. 
It has been noted that the image should not be worshipped for worldly ends (but 
paradoxically these will materialize when this is the case). The negation of karmic 
material and merit that accrues from the ritual involves the ‘emulation of [the 
Tirthankara*s\ ascetic virtues, the rite induces and maintains spiritually valuable attitudes 
and dispositions in the performer’ (Babb 1988:81). The total ritual symbolizes the 
separation of the soul from the material world, renunciation, the shedding of the body 
and earthly attachments - i.e. eating - which are the means towards realizing the goal of 
liberation.
But the nature of Jain dana to a Tirthankara has striking parallels to the gifts to the 
Buddha in Theravada Buddhism. As in Jainism, the Buddha having achieved liberation 
is technically non-existent, but the Sinhalese tradition has a similar notion of ‘presence’,
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the Buddha is ‘cognitively absent’ but ‘affectively present’ (Gombrich 1971:142).9 
Obeyesekere suggests that the ontological status of arhants (omniscient beings) is 
ambiguous, and their presence is facilitated by relics of the Buddha incarnate in Sinhalese 
temples (Obeyesekere 1966:8). Ames has observed that Buddha worship is both reverence 
for the sacred teachings of a great man and the presentation of material gifts as an act of 
renunciation. ‘In both cases the purpose is not to influence the recipient but to improve 
one’s own virtues, to become self-perfected in mind and deed as the first step towards 
liberation’. Offerings to the Buddha are ‘non-reciprocal’ and he ‘can neither be influenced 
by the offering nor reward the donor’ (Ames 1966:31). Of food offerings to the Buddha, 
‘no self-respecting Buddhist would touch it’ and they are given to beggars and animals 
(Gombrich 1971:119).
My informants considered the most meritorious forms of dana are those to the 
Tirthankaras and to ascetics. As Parry has observed the merit from the gift is contingent 
on a worthy recipient, ‘And who should this be but the one who is most unwilling to 
receive it?’ (Parry 1986:460). Indeed, who could be more unwilling than the Tirthankara 
who neither receives nor consumes. Hence the offering is separated from the donor, not 
accepted by the putative recipient, cannot be reciprocated, and cannot be retrieved by the 
devotee. As in Sri Lanka, the problem is ‘resolved’ by removing the gift from the Jain 
ambience by giving it to a non-Jain, usually a temple attendant. The gift is consigned to 
a temporary oblivion, its return is deferred and, hopefully for the donor, to be realized 
in a meritoriously achieved future existence.
9Babb suggests that this is probably the case for some worshippers in Jain devotion 
to the Tirthankara, the adoration of an ‘affective other’ (Babb 1988:74) (cf. Humphrey 
1987).
205
‘An ethicised salvation religion, in which rewards are contingent on conduct, is clearly 
likely to have the effect of orientating the ideal goals of social action towards a future 
existence. Those whose horizons are limited by the rewards of this world will not gather 
the ‘unseen fruits’ of the next; and the ethic of intention requires that the expectation of 
a return in the here and now should be denied. Moreover, the notion of salvation itself 
devalues this profane world of suffering. The unreciprocated gift becomes a liberation 
from bondage to it, a denial of the profane self, an atonement of sin, and hence a means 
of salvation.
‘The more radical the opposition between this world and a world free from suffering 
to come, the more inevitable is the development of a contemptus mundi which culminates 
in the institution of renunciation, but of which the charitable gift - as a kind of lay 
exercise in asceticism - is also often an expression’ (Parry 1985:467-68).
b) Paryusana-parva
When the annual monsoon rains begin, in Jaipur about mid-July, all Jain ascetics must 
stop their wanderings and reside where they find themselves for the rest of caturmas 
(four months).10 In fact, it is often a prior arrangement whereby particular ascetics are 
requested to be in a particular place when the rains commence. These are the months of 
the most intense contact between the ascetics and the laity, and a number of rites are 
performed combining both halves of the sangha. The rites reach their apogee after about 
a month, the event is astronomically calculated, with Paryusana-parva (‘abiding’ holy 
days), eight days of fasting, confession, recitations and a celebration of the birth of 
Mahavira.11
To a greater extent the upasrayas will be centre of activities during caturmas, and to a
1(Thus, it could be argued that Jain ascetics* subscribe to Dutt’s ‘water theory’, and 
perhaps be best described as ‘semi-domesticated* (Strenski 1983:467).
“There is disagreement between Svetambars and Digambars over the calendrical 
calculations for this event, and for the latter it is ten rather than eight days.
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lesser extent the temples. Although the most intensive participation will be during the 
holy days, the upasrayas will also be the arenas for ascetic/lay contact in respect of the 
personal following of many ascetics and acaryas. Adepts* visit their mentors in search 
of spiritual guidance; acaryas have only this extended period of the year when they can 
guide potential novitiates who may be preparing for mendicancy; and they can also advise 
their devotees into where to donate their charitable gifts. But because of the extended 
contact between ascetics and laity, and thus to avoid any attempt at exclusive patronage 
by an individual lay member of an individual ascetic, no gifts - such as clothing or 
begging bowls - other than food may be offered to the ascetics.
Due to the nature of their vows, the ascetics are materially dependent on the laity. The 
Svetambar Jain ascetics possess their clothing, which is three pieces of unstitched cloth, 
a begging bowl, a blanket, a wooden stave and a rajoharana, a brush made of woollen 
tufts to sweep away potential insects when they sit down, volumes of scripture and 
perhaps a notebook which they carry in a shoulder bag; it is these accoutrements mark 
the identity of the ascetic.12 In addition, Sthanakvasi and Terapanthi ascetics wear a 
muh-patti, a mask over the mouth to prevent the accidental ingestion of insects. The 
sadhvis of all Svetambar sects wear a form of cowl.13 Money in any form is strictly 
forbidden. They can beg for their two or three daily meals at any household, but at a
12For a list of the belongings of an ascetic see, Reynell (1985a:37).
13Digambar Jain munis are completely naked and possess a wooden waterpot, they 
eat one meal a day out of their hands while standing; they also carry a pinchi, a peacock- 
feather whisk, which ‘is necessary to the observance of ahimsa, [and] is not considered 
a "possession*” (Jaini 1979:184n.55).
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different household each time; to visit a particular household regularly would create a 
bond between the ascetic and its family, when the ideal is to break any ties with the 
world, and it also deprives other households of giving alms.
But the Sthanakvasi sadhvis I consulted did not see this as ‘dana*, rather they described 
this receiving of alms as ‘uphar’ or ‘bhent’ (gifts), but receive it they do even if it is 
under another name. In Rajasthan, dana has ambiguous connotations: the ascetics and 
informants insisted that ‘dana' is ‘charity for the poor’ and the word is rarely used, 
instead they use the above terms or usually baharana, a vernacular expression for alms 
to an ascetic. It seems that it is one thing for an individual to offer dana but quite another 
for a Jain to receive it.14 With the exception of giving food, clothing and anything else 
the ascetics may carry, gifts are largely cash and given by the laity to impersonal 
institutions and/or religious events. For the same reason, Jain welfare organizations often 
have difficulty in ‘finding’ poor Jains - they do exist - as pride will not allow the poor 
to admit to their impecunious position and accept charity.
Along with devadraya (‘goods for the lord’) puja, another meritorious form of dana is 
giving food to ascetics, and can be regarded as a form of puja to the atithi (the ascetic 
guest). Again the moral problematics attached to the giving of food apply: it is the duty
14 This may be because of the low status of the indigenous ritual Brahmans in 
Rajasthan who are referred to as *mang khani ja t' (those who beg for food). Non-ritual 
Brahmans would be excluded from this derogation as they are largely high-status 
bureaucrats, etc., originally from outside Rajasthan. Also there is an ancient Jain tradition 
of anti-Brahmanism, and a favouring of Ksatriyas; And,‘The Jainas have traditionally 
believed that only a mendicant may beg for his alms; a householder’s position is to give, 
not receive, charity. The Brahman, by remaining a householder, violates the law when 
he accepts the gifts given by others, and is thus looked down upon by the Jainas in the 
same way as they might regard an apostate monk* (Jaini 1985:86-87).
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of the Jain householder to give generously, but a donation which represents bondage to 
earthly existence plus all the sin that is associated with its preparation, arguably more so 
than its presentation to a disembodied image, clashes with the ascetic’s spiritual 
advancement which is predicated on non-attachment, a diminution of food intake so the 
ascetic can remain a ‘minimal transactor* (Marriott 1976:122). Technically, the ascetics 
do not beg. Rather it is designated gocari (cow grazing), ‘By never actually asking for 
food and by never taking food prepared on his behalf (he is said to move 
randomly....from house to house), the ascetic recipient minimizes the effects on himself 
of worldly and morally problematic activities; they were not done at his instigation’ 
(Babb 1988:80).15 The ascetics do not consume the food in the donor households and 
must never be seen eating, but return to the upasraya to distribute it to their fellow 
ascetics and ruminate away from the gaze of the laity.
In the month prior to ‘holy week* there was a gradual intensification in ritual 
performance: no Kharataragaccha sadhus were in Jaipur but three sadhvis were residing 
in one of the upasraya, and were the constant beneficiaries of the almost exclusive 
attentions of female devotees. There was a noticeable increase in the number of women 
undertaking fasts. In the week preceding Paryusana-parva, in the presence of the three 
ascetics, there was a mahapuja everyday in one of the Kharataragaccha temples which 
was overwhelmingly attended by women.16 Each mahapuja was sponsored for by an 
individual donor.
15For a discussion of the ascetics* ‘grazing’ see, Laidlaw (1990:145-56)
16In Reynell’s study, the ratio of men to women was 10:200 (Reynell 1985a:52).
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During the week of Paryusana-parva, there was a jncma-puja (‘knowledge* worship) at 
the upasraya in which the ascetics in turn gave a daily yyakhyan (lecture), which were 
in fact a recitation of the complete Kalpasutra, a paradigmatic text of the Svetambar 
canon, a copy of which is housed in the library of every Svetambar temple. This early 
text consists of hagiographies of Tirthankaras largely elided to give prominence to roles 
of the first, Rsabha, and Mahavira, the ascetic lineage he established - the sthaviras (the 
elders) - and a set of injunctions on the behaviour of mendicants. Along with the 
recitation which was in Prakrit was a commentary in Rajasthani, but the commentary 
seemed often abstruse and difficult to follow and not all those assembled were attentive 
to the recitation. Nevertheless, being in the ‘presence’ of the text and viewing its rich 
illustrations, which are periodically displayed to the congregation, is perceived as an act 
of ritual and the manuscript as an object of worship.17
The congregations were largely made up of women, similarly for the evening 
pratikramana (ritual confession). This is one of the most important events in the Jain year 
whereby conscientious members of the laity publicly confess to the ascetics for sins over 
the past year, and attendance in itself is an act of repentance. However, this is not a 
personal confession of sins committed but the invocation of an impersonal formulaic 
apology to all beings and creatures and a request for ksama (forgiveness). Similarly, 
formal cards are sent to friends and relatives who are not present bearing the same 
request. The confession also involves a resolve not to repeat past sins and to undertake 
a vow often in the form of fasting.
17For a Gujarati example of the recitation see, Dundas (1992:57-59).
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But what of the laymen? The jewellery market, dominated as it is by Jains, had largely 
closed down for the week; but the above events in the most important week in the Jain 
year were very largely attended by women. No laymen that I observed confessed to the 
ascetics, and this is because the sadhus and sadvis tend to have a same-sex following; 
while some sadhus and, of course, acaryas -there is no female equivalent - have female 
followers, I was told that it was rare for a sadhvis to have male devotees. Instead, the 
laymen would be able to perform pratikramana when their preceptor next visited the 
city.18
Relations between individual ascetics and their lay followers can from the latters’ 
accounts appear knowing and verge on adoration. How the ascetics* view their individual 
followers is difficult to say, nevertheless, there must be circumspection; the former are 
after all the spiritual preceptors of the laity who in return revere their mentors. It is also 
difficult to judge the ascetics, particularly the acaryas, involvement in the material world 
in respect of their advice to donors on where to target their charitable donations. But the 
ascetics are expected to follow the highest standards of behaviour and not to involve 
themselves in the worldly ways of their followers.19
On the fifth day of Paryusana-parva Mahavira’s birthday is celebrated. Being one of the
18Pratikramana in its complete form is extremely complex and is performed by a few 
lay initiates as often as every lunar fortnight. The position of the ascetic in Jain 
confession is anyway optional: pratikramana can be undertaken by an individual and an 
ascetic, by a group of laity selecting an initiate as a confessor, or a larger group in the 
presence of an ascetic (cf. Laidlaw 1990:ch.5).
19But Reynell noted the ‘rotund figures* of the acaryas and that there was a certain 
laxity in regard of ascetic vows (Reynell 1985a:38-40).
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most auspicious days of the Jain year, a large number of Jains, even if they only fast one 
day a year will have chosen this particular day.20 The first floor of the Kharataragaccha 
upasraya was filled to capacity to celebrate the jamna (birth); strictly divided with men 
seated on one side of the hall with women and children on the other, the men in their 
best safari suits and the women in their most ostentatious saris and jewellery. At one end 
of the hall, suspended from the ceiling, hung a cradle in which sat a young boy. At the 
opposite end of the hall was a low platform on which sat the three sadhvis who were 
temporarily resident in Jaipur, and from where they gave the recitation.
The upasraya is not a temple but a meeting hall, thus there are no images installed in the 
hall; but only on this day, the Kharataragaccha Sangha had put on display the fourteen 
sapnas (dreams) of Mahavira’s mother, Trisala, which she experienced at his garbha 
(conception). These dreams are recalled in the mahapuja of the panca-kalyanaka (five 
auspicious events) of the Tirthankara*s life (see below), but only on this day are they 
actually physically produced from the sangha*s coffers in the form of solid-silver bas- 
reliefs, each relief resembles a medallion and is about 15 cm. in diameter representing 
one of the dreams.21
20This is only a ritual enactment of Mahavira’s birth, his actual birthday is on the 
13th. of the bright half of Chaitra in April.
21The fourteen dreams were: 1/ a white elephant, 2/ a white bull, 3/ a lion, 4/ Sri, 
the goddess of beauty (i.e. Laksmi, the goddess of wealth), 5/ garlands of mandara 
flowers, 6/ the full moon, 7/ the rising sun, 8/ a large and beautiful flag, 9/ a bowl of 
costly metal filed with water, 10/ a lake adorned with lotuses, 11/ an ocean of milk, 12/ 
a celestial abode, 13/ an enormous heap of jewels, 14/ a blazing fire. This is a Svetambar 
list, the Digambars would add 15/ a lofty throne and 16/ a pair of fish swimming in a 
lake (Jaini 1979:7).
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For the privilege of ‘possessing’ these images, they were to be auctioned to the highest 
bidder. There were two roving ‘auctioneers’, one of which was the sangha secretary, 
who harried and cajoled the male members of the audience to outbid one another. But 
those bids were not in rupees, they are measured in man or maunds which approximates 
37 kg. of ghi (clarified butter) valued at Rs.3.25 per man.22 I was forewarned that 
Laksmi (Sri), the goddess of wealth, was a particular favourite and usually realized the 
highest price of all the fourteen dreams; and she was duly to sold to a prosperous jeweller 
for 14,001 man (Rs.45,500).23 On this occasion, appropriately, the highest bid of all 
went for ‘an enormous heap of jewels’ at 16,001 man - again, to another jeweller. The 
final boli was for a miniature silver swing which represents the birth of Mahavira - a new 
bom baby is first put in a palna (cradle), hence the boy in the swing at one end of the 
hall. All the successful bids were recorded in an account book for later collection. 
Although women can bid, none did on that occasion - their husbands, of course, would 
foot the bill. The peripatetic secretary carried a microphone into which he repeated the 
bids and the names of the successful donors. These were relayed through a public address 
system into the street outside, thus the neighbourhood could identify the sangha’s 
benefactors and their donations.
At the conclusion of the final boli, the congregation rose to its feet and the participants 
tore open their soft coconuts - a symbol of auspiciousness - which they had brought with
^This figure was fixed over a hundred years ago and bears absolutely no relation to 
contemporary prices of ghi. Bids are always in odd numbers - for example 14,001 - as 
these are considered auspicious.
^ w o  years later in 1992, the final bid was Rs. 125,000! (Surendra Bothara - personal 
communication).
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them, and threw a piece towards the sadhvis on the platform, and shouted in one voice:
‘Mahavira swami Ja jaV  (praise Lord Mahavira). Everybody queued in front of the 
platform to collect a handful of auspicious rice from the sadhvis; a little was to be taken 
home, the remainder deposited on the overflowing silver swing as the devotee made a 
wish. The swing along with the fourteen garlanded reliefs was exhibited on a table 
opposite the platform. This was as close as the successful bidder would get to his 
‘purchase’ as the medallions never leave the premises of the sangha. Meanwhile, the 
devotees were greeting each other and flicking small pieces of coconut into each others’ 
mouths.
c) Pratistha
The biography of the Mahavira in the Kalpasutra revolves around five idealized stages 
of a Tirthankara’s life, and his spiritual career is the rationalization for the re-enactment 
of the panca-katyanaka: garbha (conception) i jamna (birth), vairagya (renunciation) or 
diksa (initiation), kevaljnana (omniscience), and moksa/nirvana (final liberation or death). 
This forms a mahapuja, which unlike the daily ritual, is only performed on important 
ritual occasions, for example, on the consecration of a new temple image, pratistha.74
A pratistha may involve a dozen new murtis (images), but not all the images would to 
be installed in one of the local Jaipur temples; because a consecration is only organized 
every one or two years, members of the sub-sect assemble from all over N. W. India
^It is assumed that all new images are of Mahavira, when historically there have 
always been more images of the penultimate Tirthankara, Parsva (see Jaini 1981:194); 
and Parsva is often depicted as being hooded by the snake deity/guardian Dharanendra.
214
with their new images to be consecrated at the same time. The number of people 
participating and the amount of organizing this *mahotsav’ (festival) involved, makes the 
paucity of these ceremonies understandable. An estimated 3-4 lakhs of participants from 
Rajasthan, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra were housed in a purpose-built tent 
city for a week at Jaipur’s large sports stadium - the largest in the region - which, 
according to the nephew of the organizer, cost Rs.5 lakhs but that Rs.12 lakhs was 
collected in donations.25 The organizer, as opposed to the sponsor, was an esteemed 
scholar and sangha-pati (community leader) of Jaipur’s Kharataragaccha. The organizer’s 
nephew argued that the justification for these ceremonies being held on a large almost 
regional basis, instead of as a localized single temple event as in the past, was because 
they were too expensive for a single community.
The stadium was dominated by an enormous marquee, at the far end casually leaning 
against one side of the stage were the dozen future images of various sizes, from less 
than a metre to one and a half metres high; they were merely stone statuary without any 
intrinsic divinity until consecrated. The rest of the space was thronged with devotees, the 
overwhelming majority of men were dressed in formal suits and the women in expensive 
saris and jewellery. There was an equal number of participants outside, plus the elephants 
that transported the successful donors. Between the main marquee and the main entrance 
were a score of smaller marquees and stalls, kitchens, dispensing food, drink and 
religious literature. There was a definite festive mood, but not everybody present would
25 Both figures were a gross underestimate as Singhi in c. 1985 witnessed a pratistha 
that involved approximately 10,000 people, and he estimated that around Rs.40 lakhs 
were collected from the auctions alone and the expenditure was estimated to be Rs.20 
lakhs (Singhi 1991:149). Here we are dealing with from thirty to forty times that number 
of Jains.
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participate or observe every ritual or event. The ritual was, of course, the centrepiece of 
the occasion, but there were also vyakhyans, bhajans, and plays or rather playlets 
illustrating excerpts from the life of Mahavira.
The ritual had a distinct dramaturgical character: The sponsor of the event, who was 
from Ajmer, played the part of Sakra (Indra), king of the gods, his wife played the role 
of Sakra*s consort, Indrani, who descend to earth at the birth of every Tirthankara. Other 
members of his family played the ‘parents* and ‘relatives’ of the future divine. For 
Svetambars, the Tirthankaras are always bom to Ksatriyas, Mahavira’s embryo was 
‘transferred’ from a Brahman to a Ksatriya womb by Sakra who found its original 
destination unacceptable. Thus, the ‘parents* were an appropriately dressed raja (king) 
and a rani (queen) and were congratulated with songs and dances. They were also shown 
pictures representing the fourteen dreams of the expectant mother that always accompany 
the miraculous conception of either a cakravartin (universal monarch) or a Tirthankara. 
The transfer of the nascent Mahavira to a Ksatriya womb,26 and the equating of a 
Tirthankara with a cakravartin, signify for the Svetambar tradition the mythical origins 
of both Jains and the faith’s founders as belonging to the Ksatriya vama, and Jainism’s 
implicit anti-Brahmanism (see, Babb 1993).
For the second ritual, the birth, the images were placed atop individual samosaranas, 
metre high five-tiered silver pedestals which on this occasion symbolised Mount Meru, 
the axis mundi or centre of the Jain cosmos; in the case of the larger images, these were
“ This tradition is unknown to Digambar Jains; Svetambar*s sometimes suggest that 
the embryo transfer is the sixth auspicious event in Mahavira’s life (Babb 1993:5). On 
this controversy and the parallels with the Buddha’s birth see, Jaini (1979:7-9).
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substituted by smaller versions. Women relatives of the sponsor performed the abhiseka 
(anointment) of the infant with holy water representing the cosmic oceans. This ceremony 
was followed by a striking stately procession with most of the women from the 
congregation carrying silver waterpots on their heads around the nearby streets. The third 
ritual saw the murtis as an adult prince and dressed in expensive garments and jewels, 
and various ‘deities* and ‘kings’ payed homage as it was the eve of his diksa (initiation). 
As a kevalin (omniscient), the fourth ritual was performed behind a screen of white 
cotton, hiding the images and the lone ritual pandit (specialist) from the devotees. The 
adornments were removed for further anointing with the eight sacred offerings of Jain 
worship: jala  (holy water), candana (sandalwood and/or saffron paste), puspa (flowers), 
dhupa (burning incense), dipa (a flame), aksata (uncooked rice), naivedya (sweets) and 
phala (dried fruit).
Only then were the images ready to be worshipped as a Tirthankara; the removal of the 
screen and the showing of their realised divinity was greeted with extravagant cheering 
and singing. The last ritual, moksa, was later celebrated after the images had been 
installed in situ in a temple. The sequence of rituals at every stage was highly complex 
and the various participants were guided throughout, verbally and by example, by lay 
ritual specialists. The penultimate rite was performed in secret due to the sacred mantras 
that accompanied the ritual, and these are reserved for a few initiates.
At the end of each ritual the organizers held bolis for either the privilege of carrying a 
set of smaller images, representing, in some cases, the larger consecrated ones on 
specially-constructed motorized raths (chariots), or to participate in a hathi (elephant)
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yatra sitting precariously atop a swaying elephant dressed as a raja interspersed amidst 
the procession. The names of the successful bidders were recorded in an account book 
for the amounts to be collected later, their names and their donations were broadcast 
throughout the stadium.
The highest bid of Rs. 1 lakh was paid in the final auction, which preceded rather than 
followed the ritual. This was for the privilege of carrying one of three smaller images 
into the nearby temple. It was the final procession and the most popular, and it provided 
the one of the few occasions during the consecration to formally visit a temple. The 
average Jain temple can only comfortably accommodate 2 - 300 worshippers, so by the 
time the images arrived for their installation there was an excited and swelling throng 
blocking the road outside the temple. And as a final flourish, the three images were 
carried into the temple on the devotees heads. The temple was already packed with 
devotees and it would be several hours before all those outside managed to take darsana 
of the newly consecrated images. Eventually, a small plaque with the sponsor’s name 
would be inserted into either a wall or the floor of the temple where the images were 
installed, alongside the other donors to the temple.
c) Upavasa
It has already been noted that the life of a Jain layman revolves around dana and that of 
the lay women tapas (austerities), but they can be combined in the most usual form of 
austerity, upavasa (fasts). The majority of my male informants claimed to fast once or 
twice a year on one of Mahavira’s two ‘birthdays’; fasting was seen as very much a
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woman’s, and a married woman’s, activity.
Of the Svetambar Jain laity of Jaipur, the impression from Reynell’s study 
(1985a, 1985b, 1987,1991) is that her largely female Jaipuri informants are pious and 
conscientious to the extent of temple attendance, following dietary rules, fasting, their 
receptivity to the influence of the sadhvis, but adds that her study was of an ‘orthodox 
community’ (Reynell 1985a:284). The responses from my male informants in respect to 
religious observance were more varied; and in the area of attendance and fasting - the 
latter is prescribed for both sexes - they would invariably reply: ‘No, but my wife 
does’.27
Fasting is an ancient and traditional Indian practice and seen as contributing directly to 
the devotees spiritual welfare by encouraging non-attachment to the body, and is of 
course practised by Jain ascetics. Jains are instructed to abstain from eating and drinking 
on the five auspicious days of the lunar fortnight - the second, fifth, eighth, eleventh, and 
fourteenth. In Jaipur, many Svetambar Jain women fasted on the eighth and fourteenth 
days with additional fasting of between one and eight days during Paryusana-parva. Jain 
fasting is a complex affair and can involve prohibitions on certain foods to complete 
abstinence, and from only one meal in 24 hours to cycles of fasting that can take upto 14 
years to complete. Under the rubric of posadha (sinlessness), there are three major ways 
to undertake a fast: upavasa, a complete fast for 24 hours, anupavasa, where only water
^With regard to attendance at various religious rituals, commemorations, etc., men 
would claim that unless it coincided with a weekend or a public holiday they could not 
always participate as it was detrimental to their business.
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is permitted, and akasana, to eat only one meal a day.28 Fasts involving dietary 
prohibitions and some 24 hour fasts take place in the private confines of the home, others 
and longer fasts are concluded in the public arena of the upasraya.
The longer fasts, because the women have to refrain from all domestic activity and live 
like a sadhvi, are completed at the upasraya and are often undertaken communally. That 
is, a group of like-minded women, perhaps upto fifty or more, will perform a group fast 
whereby the women will spend the final three days (tehla) or eight days («athai) together 
in the upasraya meditating, singing bhajans, and studying Jain scriptures - often the fast 
is concluded in the presence of ascetics. Such fasts are commonplace, but for the 
assiduous devotee there is a thirty-one day marathon fast, the masa-khamana. On 
completion of the fast, the woman in whose name the fast is being sponsored, will usually 
hold a bhoj (feast) at her, or rather her husbands, expense. It is also usual for her to buy 
gifts for her co-tapasvis, usually this takes the form of stainless steel utensils and saris. 
On one occasion, besides the feast, they were each presented with thalis (trays) and saris. 
The total cost was estimated to have been in the region of Rs. 5,000. When completing 
a long cycle of fasts, the devotee will donate a set of perhaps several hundred utensils to 
the sangha to be used in one of its dharmasalas. Longer fasts are often concluded with 
a procession of the tapasvis through the streets of the neighbourhood.
Fasting has an obvious cachet as well; particular women, often aged, have a reputation 
for piety which was largely achieved through years of fasting and this reflects on the
28For classifications of fasts and variants see, Williams (1963:142-49), Reynell 
(1985b:27-28) and Singhi (1991:143-45).
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religious status of other members of the family. Reynell notes that only one member of 
the family - usually the senior woman - needs to be involved in religious activity. And 
although ‘merit transfer' is theoretically untenable in Jainism, there is a widely held 
perception that the whole family shares the woman’s meritoriousness, and this militates 
against ‘bad karma' for the whole family (Reynell 1985a:59-60,134-40). But, as Singhi 
has noted, a regimen of fasting may signify a less than harmonious relationship between 
mother-in-law and daughter-in-law, and it allows the former to escape the household. 
Singhi claims that in this situation, the religious status achieved through fasting has an 
ambivalence. ‘Thus, despite the limited amount of prestige which does accrue to the 
performer, social prestige tends to follow a reverse pattern: people tend to think that 
participation in these tapas is an indication of family problems which require the 
performer to retire for a time from the family scene. Thus the "part-prestige" (religious) 
gained is also a "part-prestige" (social) lost' (Singhi 1991:144). My male informants 
consistently denied such a scenario, and implied that the result was always beneficial 
regardless of the familial circumstances.
For Reynell, women resolve a contradiction inherent in Jainism: The religion emphasizes 
non-attachment and non-possession but these ideals are embraced by a business 
community. This is only partly resolved by the layman's dana and can be only fully 
resolved by the laywoman’s religiosity, inner spirituality and morality to counteract male 
materialism (Reynell 1985a: 196-97).
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d) Yatra
The Kharataragaccha has two unusual features which distinguish it from other Jain sub­
sects either Svetambar or Digambar. One is the reverence for four historical 
Dadagurudevas of the gaccha.79 These Dadas (acarya-saints) are commemorated in 
Dadabaris all over northern India, and there is one dedicated to the last Dada, 
Jincandrasuri, in Jaipur. But over the centuries these Dadas have tended to be conflated 
into one, a singular 'the Dada’. The buildings of the Dadabari are set in several acres 
of gardens, a sea of tranquillity in the noisy bustling city that is Jaipur. All Dadabaris 
have a temple, although not all temples have memorials to the Dada, and a dharmasala 
which act as venues for socio-religious events.
The other unusual feature of the Kharataragaccha is the institution of the Mohanbari, a 
similar complex of temple, dharmasala, garden and memorials to highly revered sadhus 
and sadhvis. The Jaipur Mohanbari is now dedicated to two recently deceased 
pravartinis, Sajjan Sri and Vicaksan Sri, who were both cremated within its precincts and 
whose memorials are still under construction (1990). The former, the preceptor of the 
second, is especially venerated for her piety and as an inspiration particularly by women. 
Interestingly, she was bom into a ‘non-image worshipping’ sect, the Terapanth. Both the 
Dadas and the revered ascetics are usually represented by a caran (feet), a simple
29Jindattsuri (1075-1154), ‘Manidhari’ Jincandrasuri (1139-1165), Jinkusalsuri (1279- 
1331), and Jincandrasuri n  (1537-1612) (Dundas 1992:122). The second was so 
precocious that he became a sadhu at the age of six and an acarya at the age of nine! The 
last was distinguished for his participation in the ecumenical debates of the Moghul 
emperor Akbar, although this is contested by the Tapagaccha who claim it was one of 
their ascetics, Hiravijaysuri.
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unadorned pedestal with an impression of two feet;30 but elsewhere in the complex there 
will be a more elaborate stylized bust, statue, or bas-relief of the virtuosi.
Another avenue for donation either through sponsorship and/or participation is yatra 
(pilgrimage). In this case a pilgrimage to the Dadabari of the third of the Dadas, 
Jinkusalsuri; the pilgrimage was the annual commemoration of the originalpratistha. The 
Dadabari is situated at Malpura 95 kms. south west of Jaipur, a typical dusty Rajasthan 
market town usually referred to as mofussil (provincial). The story of the founding of the 
shrine is that in 1331 a devotee of the guru refused to believe that the latter had died at 
Multan in Sind. A few days later he saw an apparition of the guru which ‘proved* to him 
that he was in fact dead! Simultaneously, the caran of the Dada miraculously appeared 
in a stone on the ground. Thus this was the site for the memorial erected by the initially 
sceptical devotee.31
The provenance of the Malpura shrine follows a familiar Jain folkloric matrix. It is not 
unknown for ancient Jain images to be uncovered by farmers while ploughing their land, 
and in northern India the farmers are always non-Jains. Try as they might, and no matter 
how many they are, they cannot extricate the stone from the ground. But on hearing of 
the find, the arrival on the site of a Jain from a nearby town or village miraculously 
facilitates the recovery of the image. The image will eventually be re-installed in an
3(vThis is a familiar pan-Indian representation for the ‘footprints* of a deity or 
religious virtuosi.
31Jain divines, of whatever degree of spirituality, and like all Jains, are consistently 
cremated. Unlike Buddhism and Hinduism, there are no reliquaries or samadhis 
(sepulchres); neither are there beliefs in manes, thus no sraddha (reverence) rites as the 
soul goes instantly to its next incarnation at the moment of death (see, Jaini 1980).
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extant or purpose-built temple.
Over the centuries, the Malpura shrine has been rebuilt several times and the current 
structure is about 150 years old. It is the familiar pan-Indian dharmasala, a walled 
building, a temple with the ubiquitous brass rod in the centre of a denuded desertified 
‘garden*. Around the edges of the structure are a continuous line of bare concrete rooms 
for the devotees, interrupted by several bathrooms, a dining room, and administrative 
offices by the main gate. Attached to the walls outside these offices are a series of 
plaques on which are written the names, domicile and amounts of all donations to the 
Dadabari. Many of them are from Jaipur but also from other urban centres in N. W. 
India. One prominent donor, for example, a Delhi jeweller, visits the shrine with his son 
at least once a month and makes an average donation of Rs. 10,000. The reason for the 
shrine’s popularity is the fact that since Independence in 1947, the Dada’s primordial 
shrine at Multan is now in Pakistan and, due to the enmity between the two countries, 
has been virtually inaccessible to pilgrims; instead, Malpura has become his principal 
shrine.
Over a hundred - mainly women - pilgrims from Jaipur decided to walk the whole 
distance; it took a week, they spent each night at a dharmasala along the way, and their 
meals were paid for by a donation from a major Jaipuri jeweller. He also provided funds 
for the majority of the pilgrims to be transported to Malpura by hired buses, the 
remainder travelled by private car or taxi.
The first observance was a parikrama (circumambulation) around the town and visits to
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four Jain temples, three Svetambar and one Digambar, and there are no prohibitions on 
devotees of either sect visiting each others temples. At each temple, darsana was taken 
of the images. The return to the Dadabari, about two hours later, coincided with the 
arrival of the Jaipuri sponsor and another 2-300 people.
The mandir-margi sects each have their own sets of ritual, and there are several forms 
Kharataragaccha puja: Daily routine devapuja and snatra-puja, and forms of mahapuja 
such as those that describe the five stages of a Tirthankaras life as in the panca- 
kalyanaka, the Dadaguru Iktisa, an optional panegyric to accompany darsana of the 
Dada, and the more complex Dadaguru bari puja (the great puja to the Dada).
The Dadaguru bari puja is performed at Dadabaris on, for example, the commemoration 
of a temple or an anniversary of an event in a Jain saint's spiritual career. It consists of 
eleven specific ritual acts interspersed with a cycle of bhajans which dictate the length 
of the puja - about four hours; the text was composed by a yati in Bikaner at the 
beginning of the century (Babb 1993:16). The text is mainly a celebration of a number 
of miraculous deeds performed by the Dada such as magically halting epidemics, curing 
illnesses, overcoming sorceresses and so on; and in the process he gained numerous 
Hindu converts to the Kharataragaccha sangha. After each set of bhajans a rite is 
performed, and like the eightfold devapuja, the ritual revolves around bathing the images, 
abhiseka, and offering the eight sacred substances. The majority of the devotees sit on 
the floor around the image and sing the bhajans, but a minority of the participants, the 
pujaks, will perform the ritual.
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To participate the pujak must be in a state of ritual suddhta (purity), and conform to a 
ritual code of dressing. First, the devotee must bathe, as any Jain should before 
performing any puja, and then the men dress with two pieces of plain white cotton 
without any stitching. One piece, a dhoti y is wrapped around the lower half of the body, 
the other is draped around the torso and tied only over the left shoulder, women can wear 
only a white unstitched sari; finally, as they are to approach the images, both must wear 
a mask in the form of a piece of cotton over the lower half of the face, as the devotees’ 
breath may pollute the images.
Officially Jainism has no priesthood, the devotees perform their own ritual, nevertheless 
this has not stopped the formation of ‘pujaris* (temple priests) in both major sects. In 
south India, the Digambars have developed a priestly caste of ‘Jain Brahmans’; however, 
the Digambars in the north and the Svetambars have been reluctant to permit the 
formation of a separate priesthood. Nevertheless, they employ certain individuals to 
prepare and maintain the temples, even acting as guides to the uninitiated in the 
performance of rituals. But even though they are often referred to as *pujaris’, they are 
not considered priests although they in fact perform that role. These sevaraks (attendants) 
in the Svetambar temples of Jaipur and its environs are Bhojak Brahmans.3,2 In respect 
of worship to the Tmhankarast the Jains have no concept of prasada, whereby the 
devotee can eat the offerings to the image after they have been blessed by the deity. 
Instead, the offerings go to the attendants and their families, but offerings to the Dada 
and yaksas (demi-gods) can be eaten by the devotee as prasada.
32According to Babb, in Gujarat the majority of sevaraks in Svetambar temples are 
from the Sudra mali (gardener) caste, others are Brahmans and Rajputs (Babb 
1988:84n.8).
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At the beginning of puja, outside on the steps of the temple, the secretary of the sangha 
held the auctions for whom would perform the eleven rituals, beginning with holy water 
that first washes the image - in this case a car an, as it was the image of the Dada; the 
winning bid of 301 man was the equivalent of Rs.978.25. In another boli, the Jaipuri 
sponsor paid 441 man (Rs. 1433.25) for the privilege of offering the sweets. The average 
winning bid was about Rs. 1200.
The most striking aspect of the ceremony was the fervour and energy unleashed, the 
pratistha had a festive character but was quite unlike the intensity engendered by the 
devotion to the Dada. And devotion seems to be the key word here. It is perhaps no 
coincidence that the cult of the living Dadas - a northern phenomenon - stretches from 
the twelfth to the seventeenth centuries, while the Hindu bhakti (devotion) cults were in 
the ascendant in the northern half of the sub-continent.33
Although by no means comprehensive, the above ceremonials outline some of the variety 
of religious events in which the members of sangha participate, and often make 
considerable financial contributions either directly, as in the boli, or indirectly through 
sponsorship of an event. But, like a summary appearance at a wedding, attendance also 
has a social dimension: for example, at the lengthy mahapujas - particularly if they are 
on a working weekday - there are a host of arrivals during the last fifteen or twenty 
minutes. The jewellers appear and participate in the last three or four bhajans, perform
33See, section m l Yaksas, Supplication and Merit below.
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arti and then depart.34 It shows respect for the members of one’s community and its 
traditions. One prominent jeweller, who sponsored the yatra to Malpura rarely missed 
a major ceremonial, a condolence or a wedding, even if he was present for only a matter 
of minutes - thus he is seen as a major pillar of the Kharataragaccha community.
Historically, the Jain jewellers of Jaipur gave half of one anna (about 3%) to Jain 
charities for the upkeep of their temples and their attached libraries. Jains recognized 
charity as being either ‘temple’ i.e. religious institutions or welfare, but each sect had its 
own charitable trust and engaged in a variety of philanthropic activities. Annual donations 
to charity among my informants ranged from Rs.1000 to ‘several lakhs'\ typically, their 
annual donations were about Rs. 10,000. One donor, gave an average of Rs. 10-15,000 
every year, but he gave an additional Rs.4 lakhs to the Kharataragaccha Sangha in 1989. 
He dismisses the distinction between religious and secular donations - its simply ‘Jain*. 
Out of forty, only six householders insisted on their donations going only to religious 
institutions, and they made arrangements that it only went on the upkeep of, say, the 
Dadabari.
The Jaipuri Svetambar Jain Kharataragaccha Mandir Sangha (SJKMS) was responsible 
for thirteen religious institutions in Amber, Chaksu, Malpura and Sanganer - temples, 
upasrayaSj Dadabaris and a Mohanbari. The registered membership of the sangha was 
2010, the working committee had 31 members and 11 office-bearers, including one 
woman. Its official total income for the year 1989/90 was Rs.678,000 as against a total
34Arti is circulating a flame in front of holy image at the beginning and end of a ritual 
to ‘cleanse’ the atmosphere and invoke the ‘good spirits’; like much of Jain ritual it is a 
borrowing from Hinduism.
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expenditure of Rs.422,600, which realized a profit of Rs.255,400 - or does it?35 This 
is only the income for one year; the interest on bank deposits (Rs.27,000) could represent 
as much as Rs.500,000 plus already on account, and there is no indication of any other 
informal donations which were also given to the SJKMS, for example, the additional 4 
lakhs as noted above. There must be other monies involved as the sangha is building a 
dharmasala, for the dependents of hospitalized patients visiting Jaipur, which is generally 
estimated will cost Rs.50 lakhs (5 million). In Sirohi, the committee ‘who keep accounts, 
it is alleged, give receipts which do not mention the actual money given and thus help 
the donors in converting "black" money into "white"’ (Singhi 1991:149). And in respect 
of expenditure, neither is there is any mention of wages/salaries for the sevaraks, 
gardeners, clerks, etc. Cottam Ellis notes that the finances of the sangha are ultimately 
confidential as its funds are ‘must be quite considerable*, and secret donations are a form 
of tax avoidance (Cottam Ellis 1991:96-97).
e) Sthanakvasi charity
There are two important Jain charities in Jaipur which were specifically founded for the 
benefit of non-Jains, the Santokba Durlabhji Trust and the Bhagwan Mahavira Viklang 
Sahayata Samiti (BMVSS - Lord Mahavira handicap aid society). These were both the 
philanthropic work of Sthanakvasis who, because they possess no temples and have less 
religious infrastructure to maintain, have donated instead to ‘secular’ charities. But a
35Total income, in rupees: 126,000 donated for renovation of an upas ray a, 164,000 
donated for renovation of temples, 262,000 from all collection boxes, 12,000 donated for 
animal charities, 28,000 ‘general contributions’, 34,000 rents from property, 27,000 bank 
interest, and 25,000 from dining halls (supplied by the secretary of the SJKMS, 
17/12/1990).
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Sthanakvasi informant told me that charity per se was an end in itself that transcended 
religiosity or sectarianism. Another argued that charity to non-Jains was just as 
meritorious as dam  to a sthanak or ascetics and, anyway, all dam  was ‘good karma*.
The Durlabhji family is one of the largest and most important gem businesses in India, 
and in Jaipur their name is synonymous with emeralds. The Santokba Durlabhji Trust was 
founded in 1958; by 1963 it had established a modest diagnostic clinic, in 1969 a 
maternity home which eventually expanded into the 250 bed Santokba Durlabhji 
Memorial Hospital with seventeen specialities including open-heart surgery. It is the 
largest private medical institution in Rajasthan. Fees are based on the principle of those 
who can afford to should pay. The hospital has the reputation of being the ‘best’ - i.e. 
the cleanest and most efficient - among several both public and private in the city. The 
hospital is administered as a private family trust, and its records were not available for 
inspection.
The BMVSS was founded in 1975 in honour of the 2500th. anniversary of Mahavira*s 
nirvam. It was founded to fund a revolutionary prosthetic limb - ‘Jaipur foot* - developed 
by an orthopaedic surgeon at a local hospital. The technique has been so successful that 
nearly 60,000 have been fitted, in the fourteen years up to 1989, in eight centres in 
Rajasthan, and the technique has spread to other parts of India and around the world. The 
service, dealing as it does with the poorest strata of Indian society, is free and uniquely 
the charity offers economic rehabilitation whereby the handicapped are given an average 
Rs.1000. The total expenditure for 1989/90 was estimated to be Rs.8.3 million, of this 
Rs.3 million comes from the Indian government which matches the same amount raised
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in donations from the state government, private patrons, and national and international 
agencies such as Oxfam. The limb centre hoped the remainder would be realized by fund 
raising.36
The BMVSS is one of four interlinked charities: besides the limb centre, there is a 
leprosy centre at Amber, a pinjarapole (animal sanctuary) at the local veterinary hospital 
and a publishing imprint, Prakrit Bharati Academy, and each is independently financed. 
But all four are managed by one man, the secretary. In fact, the BMVSS is seen as his 
‘obsession* even though he is a gazetted IAS officer now based in Delhi. Charities in 
general are widely perceived as being a lone operation; a charity may have twenty five 
committee members but the day to day organization and decision-making is usually in the 
hands of one official. One informant, who had earlier sat on many charity committees, 
said the main aim was to get as many prominent names from the Jain community on the 
letterhead as possible. He had sat on many committees where attendance was nominal 
and, on some, which had never met at all. And, he claimed, such arrangements had led 
to abuses: In one incident, and he suspected there were other examples, the controlling 
interest had used charitable funds to invest in their own family business; of course, for 
the funds of a registered charity to be so invested, without the consent of all the 
members, was illegal. When apprehended, the offender had claimed it was for the benefit 
of the charity; no legal action was taken and the member simply resigned.
^Data supplied by the BMVSS Administrative Officer, Jaipur, 1990.
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iv/ Yaks as. Supplication and Merit
By the twelfth century, Jainism was on the defensive in both north and south India, but 
particularly in the Deccan. The wave of Hindu devotionalism from the south and Islam 
from the north squeezed the Jains out of there loci of political power, and many of their 
temples and religious centres were lost (Jaini 1979:194). Due to the impact of Hindu 
devotionalism in the medieval centuries, images of Hindu deities and yaksas (tutelary 
gods) began to appear in Jain temples. As an example, the snake god Dharanendra, and 
his consort Padmavati, became the protectors of the penultimate Tirthankara, Parsva. 
Many of these were female, and today many of them have their own adjoining 
independent shrine within the Jain temple. A popular devi (goddess), particularly among 
the women of Jaipur is Cakresvari, the sasana-devita (guardian spirit) of the first 
Tirthankara, Rsabha (cf.Reynell 1985a:58).
Such deities, ‘are considered able to fulfil mundane wishes; they may be often be 
appealed to on this level by "weaker" segments of the Jaina community. Even so, they 
have never been allowed to usurp the primary position occupied by the Jina himself, 
despite the fact that Jina-worship promises no reward whatsoever save the turning of 
one’s mind towards the goal of moksa' (Jaini 1979:194 - original emphasis). What a 
contemptuous scholar such as Jaini considers ‘spiritual decay’ is perhaps understandable 
in face of the combined impact of ongoing Hindu devotionalism and the extreme austerity 
demanded of the ‘weaker’ followers of Jainism who have always formed the 
overwhelming majority of the faithful. The appeal of the Dada can be seen as falling 
under the rubric of secondary or subsidiary deities who hold such an appeal for the
mandir-margi Svetambar Jain laity. The Dada offers a similar attraction as the yaksas, 
which are the Jain equivalent of the most important north Indian devotional cults, Rama 
and Krishna both avatars of Visnu, and which have historically been prominent in the 
Jaipur region.
It is interesting to compare contemporary Jainism to its nearest co-Sramanic tradition in 
neighbouring Sri Lanka.37 In the modem Sinhalese Theravada Buddhist tradition, two 
of the most important deities are Kataragama, a variant of Siva’s son Kumara Kartikeya, 
and Visnu, who has been elevated to the status of a ‘Bodhisattva’.38 Neither was allowed 
to usurp the primary position of the Buddha, but Kataragama is regarded as the protector 
of both Buddhism and the island. Further, Buddhist monks participate in popular death 
rituals, the worship of relics, the cult of a future Buddha (Maitreya), and developed the 
doctrine of merit transference. Whereas, Jaini claims, the Jains, fewer in number and 
small islands in a Hindu ocean, successfully suppressed any such ’heterodoxies’.
Yaksas and other demi-gods were common to the traditions of both Sramanic religions, 
and both had their origins in the Gangetic valley, in what is now Bihar. These deities 
were incorporated into Buddhist theology and iconography relatively early, for example, 
the serpentine Mucalindanaga Buddha. With the exception of Parsva, whose images bear 
an uncanny resemblance to the serpentine Buddhist image (Zimmer 1969:205-8,pi.iv-v), 
icons of the Tirthankara with their guardian deities are not found until the post-Gupta
37The following comparison is condensed largely from Jaini (1991).
38Perhaps to complement the Vaisnavite ‘re-incorporation’ of the Buddha as an avatar 
of Visnu. This is not to be confused with the Bodhisattvas of Mahayana Buddhism.
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period, after 700 A.D. But even as late as the thirteenth century, the Jain acaryas were 
castigating the laity against worshipping the deities as separate entities as there was a 
danger of them of usurping the Tirthankaras* role.
However, over the succeeding centuries separate deistic worship did become acceptable, 
as long as the Tirthankaras * retained their primary position at the apex of the Jain 
cosmos. This combined with the adoption of many Hindu kriyas (customs) and Jainized 
versions of the Ramayana, Mahabharata and other Pur anas, leads Jaini to conclude that 
such accommodations saved Jainism from depletion by the bhakti cults. And in a 
questionable attempt to claim the moral high ground for the integrity of Jainism, as 
against the wholesale incorporation of heterodox practices that befell the Theravadins, 
Jaini asserts that:
‘By making such concessions to the popular belief that Hindu gods were efficacious in 
world affairs, the Buddhist Sangha allowed a form of popular Buddhism to arise. The fact 
that shrines to these gods were erected on temple grounds proves that the Sangha 
officially supported "Buddhist" cults that worshipped Hindu gods39....Such legitimization 
of yafafl-worship within the Jain faith may have helped to prevent the influence of 
Vaisnava and Saiva bhakti movements on the Jaina laity. All doctrinal compromises have 
their price, and Jaina lay-people, who previously had only worshipped the Jinas, were 
increasingly attracted to the worldly benefits available from tht  yaksas' (Jaini 1991:191- 
96).
Eventually, however, there was a reaction against any form of idolatry. In the middle of 
the fifteenth century, a reform movement led by a devout Gujarati layman, Lonka Shah, 
established the Sthanakvasi sect; he decried all forms of ‘image worship’ as heretical and
39This simplistic view of Sinhalese Buddhism conflicts with the comprehensive 
account offered by Gombrich and Obeyesekere: ‘[The] new ecstatic religiosity need not 
of itself pose a threat to the leadership of the [Buddhist] Sangha and the continuation of 
the tradition it represents. It can be compartmentalized, both within society - being left 
to the laity - and, within individual lives* (Gombrich and Obeyesekere 1988:462).
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unsupported by canonical scripture.40 The sect attempted to emphasize the meditative 
aspects of the faith and negate all temple-oriented practices completely.41
What Jaini neglects to mention is that a religious system that has a transcendent deity that 
can interfere in the world, can have no place in either Jainism or Buddhism as it 
undermines the absolutist aetiology of the doctrine of karma. But we can look at the ways 
that ‘worldly benefits’ and merit-making co-exist for ‘lesser mortals’ even though 
doctrinally they would appear to contradict one another.
When we consider the austere examples of the Buddha and the Tirthahkara, the almost 
impossible quest for salvation available only to the rarest of supermen, it is 
understandable that Jains and Buddhists needed some hope of salvation if not in this life 
at least in the next. And worldly success is more desirable and easier to conceptualize 
than nebulous moksa (cf. Gombrich 1971:17). The aloof austere enlightened ones are 
literally above and out of this world, and although their worship or rather specific images 
are often credited with magical powers, there is little consolation for the devotee in 
search of rewards in the here and now or a guarantee of a place in heaven.
Even the fourteen stages of the fourteen gunasthanas (stages of purification) of the ascetic 
ends with ayooga-kevalin (the activity of omniscience), and is attained in the instant
Nevertheless, there is archaeological evidence that the fourteenth Tirthankara - 
Ananta Jina - was worshipped in Mahavira’s time, and that the latter was subject to 
image-worship in his own lifetime (Jaini 1979:191-92).
41Hinduism underwent a similar iconoclasm in the nineteenth century with, for 
example, the Brahmo Samaj and the Arya Samaj (see, Zaehner 1966:150-61).
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before death. Of final spiritual liberation, ‘This state, characteristic of the siddha 
(perfected being), involves total freedom from embodiment and thus is not included 
among the gunasthanas’ - and is thus not even available for the most proficient ascetic 
(Jaini 1979:273). Ultimately, Jainism denies any theistic or fatalistic solution, the 
emphasis instead is on total self-reliance. But there is a theological snag: there is a quasi- 
fatalistic belief that some souls are designated abhavya (incapable of liberation); this 
probably comes from the observation that some individuals have not the slightest interest 
in their own salvation. They can be reborn in heaven but are incapable of final moksa; 
there is a possibility of deliverance but only under a nebulous set of external 
circumstances when the bhavya soul, the potential for liberation, is ‘aroused* (Jaini 
1979:140).
Jaini sees the demi-gods as intercessors and the Tirthankaras ‘are above granting boons* 
(Jaini 1991:194-95). The appeal of the yaksas and the Dada is that they are seen as 
directly granting favours; without that, attending and giving dona to the temples and 
dadabaris is another avenue of acquiring punya (merit). Either way the devotee gains. 
Thus if your boon is not granted there is nevertheless the consolation of incremental 
merit, and merit cancels pap (sin), good karma negates bad. All temple activity is seen 
as meritorious and the aim is to acquire as much merit in this life as possible.
There is a distinct overtone of transactionalism in Jain views of ritual and danat that it 
is causal, that merit is always accrued (cf. Wadley 1975:86, Furer-Haimendorf 
1967:193). Spiro’s description of kammatic as opposed to nibbanic merit has an exact 
parallel in Jainism: The soteriological aim being next to impossible, Jainism like
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Theravada Buddhism, ‘Is a means not so much for the extinction of desire as for its 
satisfaction; not so much for the cessation of rebirth as for a better rebirth; not so much 
for some kind of absolute Deliverance....as for the persistence of the individuated ego 
in a state of sensate happiness* (Spiro 1982:67).42
But there should be a fundamental problem: temple going, performing ritual and giving 
dana are seen as meritorious, that through the workings of karma the devotees will 
achieve a better gad (birth/destiny) in their next incarnation. However, such an all- 
embracing belief is incompatible with veneration of a deity who in effect is interfering 
in the workings of karma. But not if the two beliefs are kept separate and 
compartmentalized.
The Jaipur Dadabari is dedicated to the fourth Dada, Jincandrasuri, and like the major 
Hindu deities he has his own ‘day’ - Monday and full-moon days. The most popular 
times of the day to visit the shrine are either early Monday morning or evening when the 
devotees can perform puja. This is one day when male devotees outnumber females, but 
most come only for darsana of the Dada. In fact they spend more time, and are more 
likely to make a donation, at the shrine of the Dada than at that of the Tirthankaras. And 
the majority are likely to make a request for good health or a good journey, or success 
in an examination for themselves or a relative, but usually it is for straightforward wealth
42Strenski argues that merit is not a ‘thing*, ‘karma is also similarly not a thing’ 
(Strenski 1983:476n.4); but Jains do view karma as a physical material substance and 
theoretically quantifiable (see, Jaini 1979:112).
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(cf. Laidlaw 1985).43
The Dada’s shrine is intimately connected with the Jain business community and success 
in business; success in business is explicitly the result of religious observance. Religious 
observance, being synonymous with meritorious behaviour, manifests itself with success 
in business. And Reynell claims that for her informants, ‘religious action always results 
in worldly good fortune’ (Reynell 1985a:56). The Dada is perceived as a particularly 
potent source of intervention in the world and for answering requests. The epithet most 
often associated with the Dada is ‘adhyatmik shaktV (spiritual power). With the exception 
of the more orthodox elders, all my informants had an anecdote, either personal or 
concerning a friend or relative, convincing them that the Dada had intervened on their 
behalf. When I suggested that the consequences would have happened anyway - such as, 
a recovery from illness, a successful business deal - this was always discounted. This 
conviction is reinforced by the fact that many of Dada’s devotees are non- 
Kharataragaccha; the four historical Dadas are recognized by all sects but only the 
Kharataragaccha venerate them as saints - or rather ‘the saint’. Their appeal is pan-Jain, 
particularly among young people, ‘non-image worshippers’, and even Digambar Jains.
But could the devotees reconcile their requests to the Dada with his miraculous powers 
to the fundamental tenets of karmal Did they understand the karmic principle? They saw 
merit and ‘shedding karmas' as synonymous, thus darsana of the Dada is karmic (cf. 
Banks 1992:202n.4); and whether it was worship to the Dadas or the Tirthankaras, it was
43Reynell*s female informants believe that the Dada protects Jains from Muslims, and 
they offer prayers to the Dada for their childrens’ health (Reynell 1985a:59,130).
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all ‘Jain’. However, when pressed, several of my informants recognized that there was 
a discontinuity here, but it was not a problem if the two sets of beliefs were kept strictly 
compartmentalized. They all recognized that, as Jains, the doctrine of karma was 
primary, but they also acknowledged that the cult of the Dada was equally traditional. 
For the devotees, the crux of the matter was the fact that requests to the Dada worked, 
not one had any doubts as to the effectiveness of supplication.
As the devotees of the Dada saw their cult as ‘equally traditional’, this implies that we 
have to regard it as a parallel tradition to scriptural Jainism, the ‘great and little 
traditions’, where the latter vernacular strand is as ancient or predates the former. 
According to Jaini, the cults of Dada and yaksas are by Jain criteria a relatively recent 
medieval phenomena and not a reversion or a substitution to an older Jain custom but the 
creation of a parallel tradition, mainly borrowings and influences from Hinduism. But, 
arguably, there was always an theistic undercurrent in Jainism if for no other reason than, 
as we have seen, it satisfies profound emotional needs (cf.Banks 1992:203-5).
Gombrich and Obeyesekere have argued that the great classical religions of India - 
Brahmanism, Buddhism and Jainism - ‘censored out* the folk religion, which was 
considered a ‘vulgar affair’ where emotionalism and possession were important 
ingredients; but they could not suppress it and this led to a compartmentalization of 
divine experience. Brahmanism came to an accommodation with bhakti cults; however 
like Jains, Buddhists believe that the gods are inferior to the supreme being and only the 
latter can guide the way to salvation, but he is inadequate for emotional exigencies.
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(Gombrich and Obeyesekere 1988:455-57).“  To borrow a Sinhalese saying, to contrast 
the worldly and the supramundane, ‘The Buddha for refiige, the gods for help’ 
(Gombrich and Obeyesekere 1988:56). They cite Wilson’s distinction between ‘higher’ 
and ‘practical’ religion:
‘Whilst the higher religions at their most elevated and philosophical levels may provide 
a set of intellectual propositions that answer...."ultimate questions", practical religion, 
religion at the everyday level, has been preoccupied with other issues....[These] ultimate 
concerns may be of limited consequence in the everyday life circumstances of those who, 
nominally, embrace the teachings of one of the higher religions. The social significance 
of religion has rather lain in the provision of categories and symbols that facilitate 
simultaneously man’s comprehension of his circumstances and his capacity to evaluate 
them and to cope with them emotionally’ (Wilson 1982:10) (cf. Mandelbaum 1966).
‘[Most] Jains would on reflection be happy to subscribe to two cosmographical systems,
one relating to the everyday, transactional world, the other to the more profound
symbolic realm* (Dundas 1992:80).
v/ Black Money. Legitimacy and Status
The Jain jewellers of Jaipur are by Indian standards an affluent community, and within 
that community there are some extremely wealthy business families. In respect of the 
Kharataragaccha sangha, a familiar handful or so names constantly recur when 
individuals are asked to compile a league table of their wealthiest members. And the 
same names appear whether the criteria is a ritual or a purely business context. As other 
scholars have noted (Reynell 1985b:24, Norman 1991:32), wealth has had a 
thoroughgoing impact on ritual practices to the point where a handful of competing 
families monopolize major ritual activity; dana divides the community (Reynell
“ However, in Leicester, ‘certain Jains believed in a controlling, creating deity 
beyond the tirthankaras* (Banks 1992:205).
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1985a:278), and a member could not fully participate unless they were inordinately 
wealthy. Inflationary donations to religious events were not without controversy. For the 
less affluent, it was scandalous that so much could 'bekar ho jana' (run to waste) and 
should have been spent in other more creditable philanthropic ways (cf. Cottam Ellis 
1991:97,105). Even the temples’ portray this opulence, some of which date back to the 
foundation of the city, thus it is not a recent phenomenon; of comparable appearance 
would perhaps be the gold-plated Buddhas and stupas of Thailand and Burma.
It is generally accepted by all my informants that the bulk, if not all, this expense is 
financed by black money. Nevertheless, it could be argued that the rewards of economic 
activity are utilized for the greater moral order. This has been characterized by Bloch and 
Parry as, ‘On the one hand transactions concerned with the reproduction of the long-term 
social or cosmic order; on the other, a "sphere" of short-term transactions concerned with 
the arena of individual competition.’ And,
‘It is not that what is obtained in the short-term cycle is a kind of ill-gotten gain which 
can be "laundered" by being converted into socially approved channels of expenditure and 
consumption. It is rather that the two cycles are represented as organically essential to 
each other. This is because their relationship forms the basis for a symbolic resolution 
of the problem posed by the fact that transcendental social and symbolic structures must 
both depend on, and negate, the transient individual’ (Bloch and Parry 1989:24-25).
But profit - ill-gotten or otherwise - is legitimized in a religious arena as dana (cf.
Reynell 1985a: 172). Millman has cynically argued of Marwari philanthropy, ‘Every one
of their religious deeds has a price tag on it and is based on the ideas of assets and
liabilities’ (Millman, quoted in Cottam Ellis 1991:105).45
45Bayly has also suggested how religious donations were judged in terms of 
creditworthiness which was essential for the survival of a business (Bayly 1983:389).
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We have already noted that from the medieval period, dana was seen as the central 
preoccupation of the faith. The literature is full of threats and promises to the laity in 
respect of good and bad practices. Citing one example, Williams paraphrases one sage 
as advocating, rather than the ascetic goal of moksa, ‘that the masses must be coerced by 
the fear of punishment and the hope of material reward* (Williams 1963:252). For the 
layman, dana was an important mode of interaction with religious institutions and a 
vehicle for meritoriousness and shedding karma, and these activities became associated 
with secondary cults such as the Dada. The ritual arena acted as a means of making 
public and competitive donations to the sangha. Dundas* reading of a famous Gujarati 
dana story shows that dana is ‘a potent force within an individual’s financial and spiritual 
destiny*. He concludes that, ‘there was general acknowledgement that commerce and 
Jainism alike would only flourish if money was used for religious purposes and be thus 
transformed into social and spiritual credit* (Dundas 1992:170). Donating had a double 
rationale, it established an individual layman’s reputation in respect of both piety and 
financial status.
As Reynell has rightly argued, among the Svetambar Jain jewellers of Jaipur, dam  was 
instrumentally both prestigious and - echoing Millman - a business strategy (Reynell 
1985a: 169-71). The religious arena was one of the major areas in which status was 
modulated, and religious activity was utilized as part of a wider status seeking. For 
Reynell, one of the most significant latent functions of the Jain religion was its input into 
a ‘prestige system’, although ‘not necessarily articulated by the actors* (Reynell 
1985a:277). ‘Thus we see that symbolic capital, which in the form of the prestige and 
renown attached to a family and a name...., is perhaps the most valuable form o f
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accumulation’. Or potentially, ‘a conversion of material capital into symbolic capital itself 
reconvertible into material capital* (Bourdieu 1977:179-80 - original emphasis). In Bloch 
and Parry’s Durkheimian model, the conversions between their two spheres are morally 
evaluated: When the gains of the short-term cycle are converted into reproducing the 
long-term sphere, then they become morally sanctioned. ‘But equally there is always the 
opposite possibility - and this evokes the strongest censure - the possibility that individual 
involvement in the shot-term cycle will become an end in itself which is no longer 
subordinated to the reproduction of the larger cycle; or, more horrifying still, that 
grasping individuals will divert resources of the long-term cycle for their own short-term 
transactions* (Bloch and Parry 1989:26-27).
Finally, with reference to how in the preceding chapter the identity of the Svetambar Jain
community is articulated between its secular and religious aspects:
‘An important part of the Jain prestige system is due to the centrally significant role 
played by religion as the basis of identity for both the religious, economic and social 
group. Consequently, secular values are articulated in religious terms and male socio­
economic standing is transformed into religious prestige* (Reynell 1985a:278).
I would only add that one of its most fundamental ingredients and raison d'etre for
establishing and maintaining status is creditworthiness which is the prerequisite and
principle generator of commercial activity among the Jain jewellers of Jaipur, and this
is reflected in the layman’s religious activities most specifically in the offering of dana.
Having explored some of the roles of religious activity in the community and its function
in enhancing status, the next chapter goes on to explore other forms of cultural capital
with regard to education, consumer goods and expenditure on weddings, and Jaipur’s
middle class milieu.
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CHAPTER 7: CULTURAL CAPITAL AND CONSPICUOUS CONSUMPTION 
i/ Introduction
We have noted in Chapter 2, via Beteille and Molund, that Indian society has been 
delineated as a combination of parameters, an explanatory model that would combine both 
the concepts of status group and class. This presupposes that often complex concepts of 
caste have far from disappeared and are contiguous with an incipient class structure; and 
in an Indian context, this model assumes a variability in the relationship between caste 
and class. Empirically, at one extreme, in an Indian rural community, the correlation 
between caste and class may well show a discontinuity where a Sudra caste had a low 
ritual status but possessing economic and political power and were ‘dominant* over all 
other castes (see, Srinivas 1959). Arguably, to oversimplify, in India’s major cities this 
was less likely to be the case as these cities often possessed a large minority of higher 
castes - mainly Brahmans and Baniyas - who as businessmen, administrators and 
politicians had a decisive influence on the political economy of the metropolis.
Mukheijee’s study of Calcutta in the early nineteenth century demonstrates how class was 
an already an important dimension of social stratification. The Indian urban society was 
dominated by the abhijat bhadralok, an ‘aristocratic’ middle class comprising of important 
zamindars (landowners), merchants and senior administrators who owned land and capital 
(Mukheijee 1970:52-53). In the Bombay of the mid-nineteenth century there was already 
an influential capitalist class of Parsis and Baniyas which, when combined with a 
Brahman ‘intelligentsia’, formed a composite bourgeoisie identifiable by shared political
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attitudes and lifestyle (Guha 1984:141). In Calcutta at the turn of century, Marwari 
commercial dominance was strengthened by ties of caste, kinship, religion and a common 
Rajasthani origin (Timberg 1973). These groupings were to have an important influence, 
not least financial, in moulding the nascent nationalist movement.
After Independence, when the Indian government became an important initiator of 
change, the bureaucracy and the administrator - the ‘file’ and ‘file-keeper’ - became an 
important ally of the capitalist class (Chibar 1968:137). The link between commerce and 
government has been systematically explored in an important study by Kochanek. He 
shows how the business community established a continuous and calculated ‘industrial 
embassy* based on family and kinship structures. A highly personalized system of liaison 
and lobbying developed to influence the political elite largely for individual gain; 
secondly, chambers of commerce, employers* federations and trade and industry 
associations function primarily to achieve collective rather than individual goals 
(Kochanek 1989:95-96).
‘However diverse the social bases of the capitalist class - Marwaris, Parsis, Jains, 
Gujarati Banias, Chettiars, Khatris - this diversity has counted for little when they have 
attempted concerted action in advancing the collective class interests....What comes 
through is the quiet dominance of the capitalist class in Indian public life - urban life, if 
you prefer - although some of the quietude is now being dropped’ (Saberwal 1977:13-14).
A number of formal and informal institutions mesh the commercial class with the 
bureaucracy, politics and the professions as has been well illustrated by Caplan’s Madrasi 
Protestants and ‘clubbism* (Caplan 1987:104-07). This group also has the resources to
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cultivate important informal networks,1 and this is reflected in the two upper strata of 
Faridabad’s four entrepreneurial ‘styles* as described by Panini. For the ‘executives’ and 
‘industrial leaders’, powerful and extensive networks - ‘the cocktail culture’ - contribute 
to the growth of the firm with profitable contracts, draw the entrepreneurs into public life 
through their appointment to important government committees and access to political 
leaders, and add to their status in the wider society. He sees success in entrepreneurship 
as synonymous with social status. ‘The style that succeeds is one which lays stress on 
building and articulating powerful networks*. However,* One’s resources include not 
merely material ones, but also the social background which influences the reach of one’s 
network, and education which provides the know-how for entrepreneurial activity’ (Panini 
1977:114).
ii/ The Consumption of Education
Another important direction for the varying resources of the urban middle classes is 
securing employment, which may include a strong element of occupational inheritance, * 
but importantly education for their children.
Focusing on the occupational patterns of the modem Indian city, Beteille argues that in 
the nineteenth century, the three Presidency towns, which were the principal centres of 
higher education, produced a western educated class characterized by ‘moderate wealth, 
high or moderately high ritual status’ but closely correlated to education and literacy in
!An important formal institution are the caste associations which the Rudolphs* 
describe as ‘para-communities’ that enable caste members to pursue social mobility, 
political power and economic advantage (Rudolph and Rudolph 1972:29) (cf.Khare 1970).
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the traditional caste structure: Bombay’s and Madras’s higher education was monopolized 
by Brahmans, Calcutta by Brahmans and Kayasthas. Beteille finds that although 
historically there was a close association between the upper castes and higher education, 
this initial control has been dissipated and its growth gradually led to the formation of the 
heterogeneous ‘urban middle classes*. (Beteille 1969b:65-67).2
On the formal system of western education, Rao maintains that the educational 
opportunities helped one acquire the necessary skills outside the caste structure. An 
English education qualified individuals for the professions of law, medicine, engineering, 
etc., and these professional groups are differentiated on the basis of income and the status 
of the profession. The development of the professions along with salaried occupations, 
led to the growth of the middle classes and the newly educated middle classes cut across 
caste lines (Rao 1972:134-35). But what Rao omits is the fact that these castes are by and 
large higher castes, education is a scarce good, expensive, and reflects the advantages of 
wealth and social origin. In a country where almost 60 % of the population is illiterate 
(UNESCO 1992,pt. 1:12), since Macaulay’s ‘Minute’ of 1835, and with the exception of 
Kerala, there never has been a successful programme of mass education. Rather a 
disproportionate share of available funding, due to the political influence of the middle 
classes, has been spent on costly higher education (Singh 1988:102,106).
The Government of India estimates that in 1980 the ‘Forward Castes and Communities’, 
both urban and rural, comprise 17.58 % of the population. This designates Brahmans
2The plural ‘classes’ reflects its differentiation, and while it may be possible although 
questionable to define their lower limit by some economic criteria, at the higher level 
they ambiguously blend into an equally equivocal ‘elite’.
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(including Bhumihars), Rajputs, Marathas, Jats, Baniyas and Kayasthas, and unspecified 
‘Others’ as thus forming one sixth - about 136 million - of a total population of 820 
million (Report of the Backward Classes Commission 1980, quoted in Choudhary 
1990:1934, table 3).3 Co-incidendy, journalistic estimates of the Indian middle classes 
both urban and rural, there are no official statistics, average at 150 million plus 5 - 1 0  
million ‘millionaires’ (Business and Political Observer 1/12/1990). These caste and class 
classification criteria are not identical, there are poor Brahmans and upwardly mobile 
lower caste members, but there are contiguities and parallels. In varying permutations, 
it is the combined clout of those at the apex of both these schemes that form the dominant 
status classes; and it is this group that tends to monopolize the country’s costly higher 
educational facilities (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987:296-97).4
The conclusion of Bourdieu’s Outline of a Theory of Practice is devoted to the ways 
economic power conceals its nature in the guise of other forms, as ‘symbolic* or ‘cultural 
capital’. The function of cultural capital is to sustain economic dominance by enabling 
it to present itself as something economically neutral, ‘to prevent the economy from being 
grasped as an economy, i.e. as a system governed by the laws of interested calculation, 
competition or exploitation* (Bourdieu 1977:172, original emphasis). Knowledge of 
cultural capital provides the link between the objective economy and the socio-cultural
3The report was largely concerned with identifying ‘Other Backward Classes* and not 
to be confused with the vama scheme. Also, Scheduled Castes and Tribes form 22.56 %, 
‘Backward Hindu Castes and Communities’ - i.e. largely Sudra castes - 43.7 % and non- 
Hindu communities 16.6 % of the total population.
4The numbers in full-time education for 1978-79, 72.4 million in primary, 27.1 
million in secondary, and 5 million in higher education (Rudolph and Rudolph 
1987:298,table 32).
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behaviour of individuals; it is the realm of status, prestige, qualifications, speech, dress 
and so on. But the relationship between cultural capital and material capital is not a 
simple correlation, rather it is complex and often ambiguous. Cultural capital is a vital 
ingredient in the establishment of domination; for Bourdieu, symbolic domination in the 
accumulation of cultural capital helps explain the non-violent reproduction of classes.
But individuals must not appear to be dominated, to be subordinate and exploited, but 
rather to dispose themselves to subjugation. Bourdieu argues that in capitalist societies 
this is produced by the mistakenly perceived institutional separation of the processes in 
the acquisition of ‘habitus’, the interaction between conscious and unconscious practices, 
between interests and ethos, from the economy. And particularly the institution of formal 
education he sees as the primary area where the exercise of domination guarantees habitus 
conducive to the creation of the necessary disposition within individuals, and hence the 
reproduction of the capitalist system and its structure of class relations. With formal 
education, ‘academic qualifications are to cultural capital what money is economic 
capital’; they further separate power relations from individual interaction, ‘relations of 
power and domination no longer exist between individuals; they are set up in pure 
objectivity between institutions, i.e. between socially guaranteed qualifications and 
socially defined positions’ (Bourdieu 1977:187).
‘The educational system helps to provide the dominant class with what Max Weber terms 
"a theodicy of its own privilege’’,.... through the practical justification of the established 
order which it achieves by using the overt connection between qualifications and jobs as 
a smoke-screen for the connection ....between the qualifications people obtain and the 
cultural capital they have inherited - in other words through the legitimacy it confers on 
the transmission of this form of heritage’ (Bourdieu 1977:188).
The book ends with a precursor to his epic study of ‘distinctions’:
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‘[It] is through legitimacy-giving redistribution, public ("social" policies) and private 
(financing of "disinterested" foundations, grants to hospitals and to academic and cultural 
institutions)....[that] the dominant groups or classes secure a capital of "credit" which 
seems to owe nothing to the logic of exploitation....[To this] must be added another form 
of accumulation of symbolic capital, the collection of luxury goods attesting the taste and 
distinction of their owner. The denial of economy and of economic interests....thus finds 
its favourite refuge in the domain....of pure consumption’ (Bourdieu 1977:196-97).
Following Bourdieu, Beteille has described the ways an Indian middle class family has 
adapted to retain control over a changing social environment, and one of the major 
mechanisms in this process is through education. He emphasises the necessity of taking 
the broadest view of familial resources rather than the narrow criteria of purely economic 
resources in the reproduction of inequality in India:
‘[Each] family has a stock of cultural capital, comprising its command over knowledge, 
skills, taste, etc., that are a part of a distinctive way of life. It has its own social capital 
in the form of networks of relationships, partly acquired from the past and partly 
constructed through the initiative of its members....I would like to stress the active role 
of the family in transmitting to its younger members all the advantages it has at its 
command’ (Beteille 1991:16-17).
And for the Indian middle classes, education has replaced caste when it comes to 
planning their childrens* future (Beteille 1992:17). He adds that ‘parents do not simply 
wait for their children to soak up the cultural capital* of the domestic environment, but 
take an active part in their education (Beteille 1991:17). For these families, education and 
employment are intensely competitive and they expect their children to take advantage 
of all the benefits they can provide.
My informant Svetambar Jain jeweller families can be divided into two groups: the 
larger, where all the male members and most of the females had an fee-paying English- 
medium education, and the other smaller in number where only the sons but neither their
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fathers nor their womenfolk had cognizance of the English language. Why the junior male 
members of this latter group had comparatively recently changed to an English-medium 
education was that, not only was it the de rigueur sign of status in India but, just as 
importantly, it was essential for dealing with foreign buyers and extending one’s export 
potential. To a large extent, an important ingredient of the lingua franca of the gem trade 
was English.5
There was a clear distinction between the two groups in respect of costly tertiary 
education. In the majority of households there was an incidence of one or more sons, and 
a few daughters, who were graduates usually in commerce or business studies. There was 
one example of a Jaipuri daughter who held a Bachelor of Commerce degree and acted 
as bookkeeper to her husband’s business in Bombay. The latest educational distinction 
was a postgraduate Master’s degree in Business Administration (M.B.A.), preferably 
from the Indian Institute of Management at Ahmedabad which has the highest reputation 
for the course in India. Better still, money and qualifications permitting, was a place at 
the Harvard Business School - the ultimate accolade. One of my informants was sending 
a son to Ahmedabad, another was hopeful of Harvard; but they and many others would 
prefer their children to be educated abroad as they were distrustful of Indian degrees in 
general. This was due to widely-reported flagrant cheating in examinations and the 
commonplace bribing of examiners, a ‘paper chase* that was diluting the quality of results
^ e  lingua franca is a broadly a mixture of Hindustani (Hindi and Urdu) and 
English, plus a sprinkling of local Rajasthani dialects and Marwari, which constantly 
shifts depending on the linguistic strengths and weaknesses of the speakers concerned. 
Of course, these shifts can also be utilized to exclude: for example, Svetambar Jain 
jewellers who were fluent in English or Bengali and Gujarati - as many of them were - 
can converse freely in the presence of largely Hindustani-speaking Muslims.
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and bringing the whole university system into disrepute, not to mention high graduate 
unemployment. In the minority of households, whose first generation had or were 
completing an English-medium education, there were no graduates nor any members 
preparing for university entrance.
Jaipur’s schools and colleges are of varying quality and are ranked according to both 
results and fees; the best schools can afford to offer the best salaries and attract the best 
teachers. The total number of schools in the city is unknown as the local gazetteer lists 
the types of schools, student populations, teacher-pupil ratios, educational standards and 
literacy rates for the district, and there are reputedly a number of unregistered private 
schools. The oldest, the Maharaja’s College which despite its name was in fact 
established as a secondary school, was founded by the British in 1844 but is now part of 
the University of Rajasthan; the first girl’s school was established in 1866 (Gupta 
1987:683,689). The major distinction is between a small number of fee-paying expensive 
English-medium schools and a large number of government-funded Hindi-medium schools 
with nominal fees. Entrance to the best and most expensive schools is fiercely competitive 
and depends more on the parents* ability to pay than the capabilities of the pupils. Of 
course, the English-medium schools teach some Hindi language and literature, whereas 
the government schools’ teaching of English is minimal if at all.
A number of the better secondary schools in Jaipur were originally founded as Digambar 
Jain charitable institutions, and were and are strictly non-denominational - open to all 
religions; but these schools are not free, and as one informant remarked, they rely more 
on fee-paying parents than philanthropy for their current existence.
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One of my informant families felt that not only was the English language a prerequisite 
for their children’s education, and essential for higher education,6 but that it should be 
practised in the home as much as possible - although its use was somewhat erratic. This 
was part of their belief that educational success cannot be left entirely to the schools. One 
member, a science graduate and something of a pedagogue, regularly helped his teenage 
niece and nephew with their English language homework and bought them English books; 
he saw his role as supplying additional stimulation to the children through the interest he 
took in their studies. Here the cultural capital of family was employed to pay for an 
advantageous education, transmit skills and motivation to the next generation.
The higher education of women is ambivalent: more girls are going on to higher 
education but they simultaneously are being prepared for marriage and motherhood. One 
of my informant families had a married daughter who uniquely was a hospital physician 
and a mother of two young children, another family an unmarried journalist. In a third 
example, an unmarried graduate in her early twenties was anxious to leave India, and 
undertake a postgraduate degree in America where she already had a married elder sister; 
her father thought she should be married, and she feared her family were already 
evaluating prospective husbands. But with the above exception, married women were 
largely confined to the affinal or natal home and religious institutions such as the meeting 
halls and religious events.
An English-medium education among the Indian middle classes is a marker of status and,
6A number of higher education courses in Indian universities are conducted in 
English, particularly science and the social sciences, the exceptions would be Indian 
languages, literatures, religions, etc.
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as Saberwal has noted, ‘higher education is a mechanism more for retaining and 
transmitting status than for social mobility’ (Saberwal 1977:14 - emphasis added). 
Caplan characterises the middle classes as consumers of invisible ‘information’ goods, 
besides visible consumer goods, of which education is a prime example; expenditure is 
directed towards ‘developing wide-ranging social contacts by means of which they obtain 
their privileges and preferments’ (Caplan 1987:115). Plus, for the next generation of 
Jaipuri gem traders there is an additional advantage of an almost identical occupational 
inheritance: all have parents and relatives in the industry and they can rely on the latter’s 
position in advancing their own careers. An academic qualification is not in any way a 
requirement for entry into the lapidary market, but parents are quick to point out that 
their son - or, in one case, even a daughter - has an additional vocational aptitude for 
commerce which in turn reflects on the standing of the business family.
iii/ Patterns of Consumption
Residentially, the Svetambar Jain jewellers of Jaipur are divided into those who live in 
the old walled city and those who have moved to the new suburbs. But residences in the 
old city can be seen as reflecting a continuum along which at one extremity are those 
basically unchanged from the eighteenth century, with just minor or no modifications; at 
the other extreme, are those which have been completely refurbished internally. The 
homes in the new city largely reflect the latter polarity; and I emphasize that the 
following descriptions empirically delineate the polarities of jewellers’ residences. The 
appearance of particularly the interior of the residences provides a ‘register’ of the
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lifestyles and consumption patterns;7 the justification for this is that the Jain homes’ 
provide the most visible signs of consumption. However, this approach is at best a 
descriptive compendium rather than analytical for as Beteille has noted, although 
Bourdieu has popularized the concept of cultural capital, unlike economic capital, ‘it is 
difficult to extract from his work any clear procedure for measuring it* (Beteille 
1991:16 - emphasis added).
The havelis in the side streets and alleyways off Jauhri Bazaar are multi-storey structures, 
often built piecemeal, surrounding a central courtyard, some of the courtyards have been 
enclosed others remain open. Each storey, connected by dark steep stairways, has 
balconies opening onto the central courtyard. The inner walls are usually whitewashed, 
the outer stuccoed street-facing walls are more likely to be yellow rather than pink, and 
many of them have faded examples of traditional Rajasthani wall-paintings: dancing girls, 
rajas, elephants, etc. As in images of medieval Europe, many of the upper stories 
protrude out into the street and, in the narrower lanes, often give the impression of 
touching their opposite number. Due to the piecemeal construction of the buildings, the 
skyline is irregular and a haveli can be anything from two to six storeys high.
The majority of an old haveli’s rooms are bedrooms, a living room (for dining), kitchen, 
bathroom, etc., for the extended family. But at least one or two rooms are occupied 
during the day by the sub-contracted artisans and their grinding-wheels, often this is on
7The term is Appadurai’s and it signifies five attributes of a commodity: 1/ 
‘restriction’, by price or by law; 2/ ‘complexity of acquisition*; 3/ ‘semiotic virtuosity’, 
has the capacity to signal fairly complex social messages; 4/ ‘specialized knowledge’, as 
a prerequisite for its consumption; 5/ ‘a high degree of linkage’, consumption is linked 
to the body, person or personality (Appadurai 1986:38).
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the ground floor or the roof, and another one or two rooms are reserved for the 
jewellers* business transactions - the ‘office*. The older most modest havelis’ have a 
minimum of modem furniture, ‘desert coolers’ for the hot summer months, squat toilets, 
the exceptions might be a t.v. set, a refrigerator and a telephone. The furnishings are 
usually in the form of gaddis, a series of utilitarian mattresses spread over the floor, 
which act as seats during the day and may double as beds at night. The interior of the 
building is rarely if ever decorated, and peeling paintwork and plaster are commonplace.
Although looking deceptively similar externally, some havelis* have been extensively 
renovated, the interior gutted and completely rebuilt with enlarged rooms, large windows, 
air-conditioning, fitted and traditional carpets, modem elegant furniture, an array of video 
recorders, hi-fi equipment, often concentrated in one room;8 a kitchen with modem 
conveniences, pressure-cookers, micro-wave ovens and other gadgetry, westem-style 
bathrooms, and so on. The homes in the new city follow a similar pattern except they are 
even more commodious and palatial, individually purpose-built in pink stone with 
extensive gardens and garages. But the family havelis in the old city have been retained, 
they are now quite literally offices or rather offices and workshops where the daily 
business is conducted, and it can act as a larger work-space for the sub-contracted 
artisans and/or employees. Interestingly, at Diwali when the new year’s account books 
are inaugurated, the ritual is still held in the original family haveli with the family in 
attendance; an example of maintaining the link between the business and the former 
patrilocal home.
8Cf. Khare (1970:140) on the Kanya Kubja Brahmans displays in ‘public’ rooms of 
the household, and also U. Sharma (1986:183).
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These refurbishments represent an extreme and reflect a minority of informant 
households, the majority are often variations on a combination of both the modest and 
the ostentatious. But the majority’s orientation is towards the conspicuous rather than the 
abstemious pattern, as if consumption is incremental or a slippery slope towards more 
and more accumulation. But the pattern is individual and variable. For example, one 
shabby haveli was packed with gadgetry and possessed a car, but its householder claimed 
that decorating the building was a waste of money; instead, as a keen amateur 
photographer, he preferred to spare no expense on enlarging his collection of expensive 
Japanese photographic equipment. One large new house in the new town was bereft of 
all but the basic modem conveniences, and several of its large rooms were completely 
empty and unused as if waiting to be filled.
Even the most modest household had a minimum of one servant, the maximum was five, 
they are always non-Jain males and are usually, like the employed lapidarists, Sudras 
from Bihar and U.P. At least one will live in the household, and their often longevity as 
domestic servants gives them the status of valued and trusted family retainers. 
Commonly, they perform domestic duties: cleaning, running errands, preparing food but 
rarely cooking. In the larger households with several servants they act as gardeners and 
drivers.
The mode of transport is indicative of the household. The modest homes have one or 
more scooters; and although the narrow streets of the old city can be hazardous and 
difficult to negotiate, the refurbished residences have at least one car. The new town
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residences may have several cars, usually Ambassadors (basically a Morris Oxford 
c.1955, which for many years was the only indigenous car available in India), but these 
are being superseded by Contessas and smaller Suzukis.
English-language newspapers and magazines, the state-run t.v. service, even rented 
videos have commercial breaks, are full of advertisements offering a plethora of Indian- 
made luxury commodities. The indigenous advertising industry devotes considerable 
resources to publicising up-market ‘elite* products that will appeal to the middle classes. 
Although Indian-made video recorders, audio cassette players, pressure-cookers, cameras, 
and blenders were readily available, there was, however, a certain cachet to owning 
foreign-made consumer commodities.9 Not only was there a flourishing black market in 
Jaipur in both new and secondhand non-Indian goods, but no one came back from the U. 
S., Europe or Bangkok empty-handed, without some piece of gadgetry either for 
themselves or another member of the family; they may be later presented as a wedding 
gift. There was a fetish about brand names which were not readily available in India but 
which were better known more by reputation than anything else: Nikon, Sony, Levis, 
Rolex, et al; the biggest approbation was to own a foreign-made car, preferably a 
Mercedes Benz - although none of my informants* owned one, many would have liked 
to have to have done.
There is a further distinction that resonates through the consumption patterns of Jaipur’s 
middle classes, the use of the terms *desV (‘native’) and ‘vilayti' (‘English’). This
foreign  made consumer products can legally be imported into India but they can 
attract import duties, say, for a car of up to 300 %. Of course, there are corrupt means 
whereby importers can circumvent this and other obstacles.
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distinction refers to consumer goods as either Indian, indigenous and rustic on the one 
hand, and foreign, imported and exotic on the other. And these distinctions are not 
equivalent for vilayti has a sophistication and superiority over the inferior desi. It is a 
reflection of the orientation of the middle classes, an appropriation of exogenous cultural 
capital. But although these terms are opposed, this dichotomy can best be seen as a 
matter of a tendency or trend rather than as, again, a polarity, a tendency that manifests 
itself in coveting and accumulating preferably non-Indian consumable vilayti mal (goods).
But this pre-occupation with imported consumer goods has, as Appadurai has argued, a 
dual role: that consumption is both for sending and receiving social messages, it has a 
‘turnstile’ function, ‘selecting from exogenous possibilities and then providing 
models....for internal tastes and production’. The goods become the markers of fashion 
and good taste, and their promoters ‘are no less effective in limiting social mobility, 
marking social rank and discrimination, and placing consumers in a game whose ever- 
shifting rules are determined by "taste makers" and their affiliated experts’ (Appadurai 
1986:31-32).
Thus we have a small number, four of my forty informant households, of abstemious 
sumptuary Jain households who largely retain a modest lifestyle and spurn consumer 
goods, and the remainder who have to some degree abandoned the frugal patterns of 
consumption in favour of the comforts of consumerism. A comparable situation has been 
described by Hutson in a French Alpine village where she divides the inhabitants into the 
older abstemious 'non-evolues' and the younger ‘evolues* who have embraced modem 
consumer culture. But the difference is not just one of style but rather reference group
and geography; the evolues have economic and matrimonial contacts beyond the confines 
of the village, their social universe extends beyond the limited horizons of the commuiity 
(Hutson 1971).
Following Hutson’s example, we can make some generalizations about the two modes of 
expenditure and correlate them to socio-economic indices such as education, business 
practices and marriage patterns of Jaipur’s Svetambar Jains.
The abstemious Jains confined their economic and social activities to a narrow range of 
possibilities. They only recently embarked on giving their children an English-metium 
education and had no university graduates. In business, their activities were localised and 
restricted to Jaipur’s lapidary industry, they rarely left the city on business and never 
travelled abroad; had minimal or no contact with non-Indians, and their lack of English 
precluded direct contact with the lucrative export market. They bemoaned the loss the 
Srimal and Oswal monopoly of the gem trade and claimed a preference in dealing only 
with fellow Svetambars; some, that they only dealt with Svetambars although this was 
unlikely if not impossible. Their marriage alliances were often with residents withii the 
city or if not, they would insist on intm-jati and/or intra-sect affines - the known nther 
than the unknown.
But abstemiousness may not be a reflection of economic wealth, they rather adhered to 
older patterns of non-consumption, the image of the frugal and parsimonious Baniya; the 
older among them even eschewed western clothes and viewed expenditure on non- 
essential consumption as wasteful. The young and old among this group gave vent to their
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displeasure at the conspicuous expenditure by the nouveaux riche on weddings, the 
insidious practice of dowry (see below), and the monopolization of ritual dana. They 
were pious in religion, and professed a nostalgia for a Svetambar Jain community that 
they characterised as religious rather than economic, when there was an equality of 
lifestyle if not equality of income, honesty in business, and when everyone followed the 
sanskar. Reynell notes that a minority of laymen, from what she describes as an 
‘orthodox community’, ‘even take vows to restrict food and consumer goods* (Reynell 
1985a:282). Bayly claims that in the eighteenth century Gangetic Plain, Jain Baniyas 
restricted their expenditure to 10 % of annual income as this was considered morally and 
commercially ‘safe*. A merchant’s standing in the community was indivisible, profligacy 
damaged his business, his reputation and his moral being; but, ‘The ideal life-style of the 
Jain merchant householder was, of course, modified in practice* (Bayly 1983:385).
The perceived lack of morality in the Jaipur gem trade is universally blamed on the 
arrival of non-Svetambars in the industry, and the Oswals and Srimals have had to adopt 
the arrivistes* ‘sharp practices’ to keep ahead of the game; but it is doubtful whether 
sharp practices are anything new to the Jains. As Reynell noted of the image of the pious 
Jain jeweller, ‘[This] image may hide a rather different, more ruthless reality, and 
presumably the more skilfully a man conceals his real business practices from his 
potential competitors within the community, the better’ (Reynell 1985a: 172). Rather 
complaints about a lack of business ethics, whether true or not, are probably symptomatic 
of a ‘nostalgia*. Baudrillard has observed that ‘when the real is no longer what it used 
to be [sic] nostalgia assumes its full meaning. There is a proliferation of myths of origin 
and signs of reality; of second-hand truth, objectivity and authenticity* (Baudrillard
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1983:12-13).
The remaining jewellers had an opposing set of tendencies: as we have already seen they 
placed a great emphasis on proficiency in English for both secondary and tertiary 
education. This proficiency was carried over into the realm of business where commercial 
expansion is synonymous with exportation, and where the cultivation of both Indian and 
non-Indian business contacts at home and abroad is imperative. Many have established 
a relative in the lapidary business in Bombay, which is the major entrepot for the industry 
in India, or in the West or Bangkok, the major Asian centre. And they payed regular 
visits, probably once or twice a year, to their relatives and partners overseas; these 
business trips were, of course, a means for importing much-coveted consumer goods that 
were not readily available in India. The marriage pattern was more variable but, as we 
have already noted in Chapter 5, there was a greater predisposition for alliances that had 
even an implicit class element to be more likely to be inter-jati and inter-sect, and 
possibly an inter-city or vaiti-vama union. On consumption, there seemed to be no limit 
on expenditure, and among the most affluent families ostentatious displays of wealth had 
a highly competitive element. This was most evident at sumptuous weddings and in the 
liberality of religious donations, where the emphasis is as much as if not more on status, 
prestige and creditworthiness. As with Hutson’s evolues, the conspicuous consumers are 
concerned with contacts, largely economic, that extend beyond the Svetambar community; 
they do not see their interests as being confined to that arena but have city-wide, national 
and international implications.
Occasionally, one of the latter Jaipuri evolues would paradoxically complain about the
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loss of tradition and suggest that their lifestyle is undermining that tradition. The already- 
mentioned amateur photographer lamented the loss of equality of lifestyle, piety, honesty, 
that the community was ‘going down’, but showed no willingness to forego his expensive 
hobby; he felt the situation was so irredeemable that the Jains needed a reformer, ‘a new 
Mahavira’. As we shall see, the Srimals particularly did have sumptuary laws on 
marriage expenditure, although these have lapsed and the regulatory Srimal Sabha is 
moribund and powerless; and, as one informant remarked, even if it attempted to 
castigate the profligate, they would simply ignore it. The ostentatious weddings are even 
deprecated by their perpetrators; when asked why they spend so much, they say ‘we have 
to, it is expected’ - as if they are resigned to a compulsion by force of circumstance, that 
is their socio-economic position. To some extent, this reply was both true and self- 
reinforcing, as it could be potentially damaging if they did not disburse according to the 
necessary high levels of expenditure. These attitudes Appadurai has characterized in the 
form of a powerful tension between luxury goods and sumptuary regulation, they ‘are 
opposing poles in the social regulation of demand, particularly for goods with a high 
discriminatory value'. He adds, that this tension was present during colonial contact: 
‘Fashion, in these contexts, is the urge to imitate the new powers, and this urge is often 
integrated, for better or worse, with traditional sumptuary imperatives’ (Appadurai 
1986:38-39).
iv/ Weddings
One Jain rite of passage which my informants considered to be the most important, and 
on which Hindu influence has been overwhelming, is marriage. In fact, it was considered
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the only formal rite of passage.
Traditionally, when both families had agreed to the suitability of the match, there were 
two formal sagais (betrothals), firstly (vagdana) at the groom’s and subsequently 
(pradana) at the bride’s home. On both occasions there was an exchange of uphars (gifts) 
between affines, and an exchange of rings between the prospective couple. Among the 
Srimals, there was a strict limit on gifts to affines: At the betrothal only a Rs. 1 silver 
coin plus an auspicious coconut, fruit and sweets were given by the bride’s to the 
groom’s family - any other gifts were returned. At the vivah or sadi (marriage) twelve 
suits of clothing were given by the bride’s family to the groom’s. Dowry was not 
practised and derogated among many Jain jatis especially among the Srimals (see, 
Sangave 1980:328).
However, all gifts from the bride’s family Reynell designates as ‘dowry*. From the 
affinal gifts at the betrothal, the gifts to the bride from her family at time of her wedding, 
to the gifts to her later children she sees as actual or potential dowry payments. This is 
unproblematic and uncontroversial except where she suggests that the groom’s family 
may pressurise their affines for extra remuneration, and that a few girls may become 
sadhvis as they are for economic reasons - i.e. dowry - ‘unmanageable* (Reynell 
1985a: 104-6,264). But although the range and the value of the bride’s gifts have 
increased since the proscriptions noted above, my informants did not consider these 
uphars as dowry. Of course, as residence is overwhelmingly patrilocal, gifts to the bride 
may well be utilized by her affines, but my informants made a distinction between these 
gifts and the suspected large payments that the lakhpatis were offering or demanding as
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dowry.
Dowry, as my informants defined it, was perceived as a comparatively recent 
phenomenon and another outlet for black money; and among the abstemious and less 
affluent jewellers it was universally condemned, often vituperatively. For the abstemious, 
it was simply ‘anaitik' (immoral), wrong, again the influence of non-Svetambars, and a 
break with tradition; for the less affluent, it was probably a mixture of morality and 
envy. The lakhpatis, that is those from whom I managed to elicit an opinion, were as 
ambivalent about dowry as they were about conspicuous expenditure on weddings per se. 
Only one, a Srimal, openly approved of dowry, as it was simply a necessity; several 
more argued that it was practice ‘other people* undertook, but conceded that in respect 
of themselves it would probably become an inevitable part of every seth ’s marital 
arrangements.
In Jaipur, the relatives of the bride and groom are invited to balisi notna (join the 
marriage); this is a colloquial expression for thirty-two, literally thirty-two teeth i.e. a 
full set. The bride’s and groom’s parents ask their brothers to broadcast the coming 
event, to inform more distant kin of the marriage. Theoretically, members of the 
patrilineages of both bride and groom are automatically invited, but those of the maternal 
lineages have to be formally invited - to complete the ‘thirty-two’. Many of the traditional 
rituals, observances and receptions have been combined due to temporal and economic 
circumstances. Usually, excluding the betrothal, the marriage and its attendant ceremonies 
are squeezed ideally into one weekend. Formerly, every observance was auspiciously 
timed, now the entire wedding revolves around the auspicious timing of the phera
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(marriage ritual) on one of the auspicious days of the marriage year.10 The consequence 
of their being a finite number of auspicious days is that there may be several or many 
weddings on any one of them. There are no weddings during the monsoon season, July 
to October, which is considered an inauspicious period as the gods are Sleeping’ and 
therefore cannot witness the marriage.
Formerly, the wedding was a yari/community event with perhaps several thousand 
participants all taking food along to the dharmasalay where the event was usually held, 
and contributing to the cooking, serving, and so on; and everybody would give a token 
Rs. 1 to offset the cost to the bride’s parents who would ultimately have to pay for the 
wedding. In recent years, weddings always take place in one of the city’s many hotels 
with the food supplied by outside caterers; usually both parties will each hire a hotel, to 
maintain the fiction of the groom’s party proceeding from his ‘home* to the bride’s, and 
to accommodate visiting guests. Due to cost of a wedding, the groom’s family may be 
asked to share the expense or they may even offer, but these arrangements are negotiable 
between the two parties.
The criteria on whom to invite to the wedding are complex: Firstly, start with the total 
number: in the following example 700, 500 of the bride’s family’s relatives and friends, 
and the groom’s family said they would invite 200. On which of the bride’s kin will be 
invited were described by one informant as obligatory ‘circles of priority*. The first circle
lcThe astrologer initially offers a list of possible auspicious days, that specifically 
match the couple, for the couple’s parents to consider; the parents then negotiate a date 
suitable for both parties. But if required, the astrologer can calculate the auspicious 
day for the couple.
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is the bride’s father's cognates: brothers, sisters, their spouses and children, and his 
parents. The second circle is the bride's mother's immediate cognates: her brothers, 
sisters, their spouses and children, and her parents. As one moves to the outer reaches 
of the bilateral network, more of the bride's paternal kin would be invited at the expense 
of the maternal branch. For example, if the bride’s father’s third cousins were invited, 
the maternal equivalent would not. If the bride’s paternal grandfather were still alive, and 
thus is the head of the family, and some of his relatives - which otherwise could have 
been discounted - must also be invited, and would be included in the first circle. The 
circles go out to about five branches of the patrilineage, from where the excluding goes 
on in earnest; at that remove, those with whom familial links have been retained would 
be invited. Hence reciprocity is another criterion, if a distant cousin had a recent 
marriage and the current bride’s father was not invited, then the former will not receive 
an invitation.
Plus there were friends of both families. Many of the Jain jewellers’ have also business 
associates in the city, elsewhere in India and overseas. The most prominent of these 
would also be invited, some simply because they were the prominent jewellers in the city, 
others because of the degree of business the bride’s father maintains with them.
The day before the wedding the respective parties gathered at their hotels for mayra,n 
the presentation of gifts to the mothers' of the couple. Marriage was always considered 
expensive and the bride's family must make the bandobast (all the arrangements) and
11 This was translated by my informants as ‘the gifts to the bride’s mother by her 
brothers’; cf. muyyi in Kannada (Hanchett 1975:41).
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traditionally be responsible for the expenditure, although latterly the groom’s family may 
well contribute. The mother’s relatives will share the burden of the expense but 
particularly the mother’s brothers* (MBs) are expected to bear the brunt of the cost; the 
amount is open but the wealthier the MB is judged to be, the more that is expected. In 
the period when weddings were a collectivist community affair, among the Srimals, the 
MBs* contribution would have been a fixed amount, a tola (11.7 grams) of gold. But 
precedents can also create expectations: if the first daughter received for example Rs. 1 
lakh in gifts, then her sisters will expect at least the equivalent. The farther away in 
kinship terms a relative may be, the less that is expected, nevertheless, a similar gift or 
amount will be reciprocally expected when the roles are reversed.
The bandobast for the wedding was usually undertaken by the bride’s eldest brother. For 
the mayra, there would be significantly more women relatives present at the hotel than 
men, they had come to enjoy and share in the expense although their husbands and 
fathers would pay; also later there would be a pre-nuptial tamasa (entertainment) which 
is considered something of a ‘ladies* event. Before arriving at the bride’s ‘home’, the 
women would have first visited the homes of the MBs to pay their respects, then 
independently made their way to the hotel.
The bride’s parents stood on a low podium in the centre of the room, and the donors in 
strict order of familial precedence presented their gifts. Beginning with the bride’s 
mother’s oldest brother, the bride’s parents alternatively put a red tilak on each of the 
donors’ foreheads and then she accepted the gift. After her brothers, there followed her 
nephews and cousins, then her female consanguineals, and finally their spouses.
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According to one informant, all these gifts were to be seen as an undifferentiated totality, 
as *ek uphaf (one gift), as individual gifts would be interpreted as estrangement between 
the MBs. But this was contradicted by the fact that all the gifts, who gave what, were 
recorded in a red account book. One of the mother’s kinsman is responsible for all the 
marriage finances, the *lekhpaV (accountant) keeps a record of all gifts and monies. This 
tradition allows for the calculation of reciprocating wedding gifts in the future. This role 
may also be performed by a professional accountant should the bride’s father have one 
has an employee.
It is rather ambivalent about whom mayra is actually for: it is a gathering for the bride 
but it is at the same time, as another informant explained, a darsana of her mother’s 
family, part of the competitive ‘duel* between husband and wife that has been in 
existence since they were married. Thus on this occasion, the object being that the bride’s 
mother’s family is just as ‘good* - i.e. just as wealthy - if not better than her husband’s. 
The bride’s mother has a familial right to expect a great deal from her brothers and male 
kinsmen. Ostensibly, all gifts are for the bride’s mother to offset the cost of the marriage. 
Virtually all the gifts were saris, roles of suiting, and fabrics. But the suiting would go 
to her husband and some of the saris would be handed on to the bride.
However, the bride has her own separate trousseau: saris, cosmetics, kitchen utensils, 
ornaments, cash and jewellery. This was displayed a few days earlier at a ritual called 
pithi (pulses) at the bride’s home. The display was for kin invited by the bride’s family 
to make sure they didn’t duplicate the gifts already purchased, to see what was missing. 
The ritual was also to formally ghosna (announce) that the prospective couple are to be
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man and wife. But at this second engagement, the groom was absent as he was 
undergoing an identical ritual in his own home. The ritual is so-called as it formerly 
involved covering the bodies of the bride and groom with a paste made from oil and 
gram (chickpeas). Also dahi (curd) was rubbed on their feet and knees, thus the couple 
were made thoroughly sa f (clean) for the forthcoming marriage. But these rituals, like 
the wedding itself, were Rajasthani, or more likely specifically Rajput, rather than 
anything Jain.
There was a formal dinner in honour of all those who had presented mayra to the bride’s 
mother. 7; The evening ended with the tamasa, a sort of disco’ whereby the
young unmarried girls and women danced and mimed to ‘filmi’ songs, some individually 
and some in pairs and obviously rehearsed. This is seen as very much as a womens* 
affair and the older women and children sat in a semi-circle on the floor around the 
dancing area. For each performance, a seated woman would stand up, make her way 
towards the dancer and circulate a Rs.10 or 20 note thrice over the latter’s head, then 
return to her seat. The men were standing in the garden talking in small groups, but one 
would randomly enter the room and flourish another donation. I was told that the money 
would be distributed to the dancers but this was not always the case; earlier, Rajasthani 
folk dancers and singers would have been hired to entertain the guests and collected the 
donations.
The following day, at the bride’s hotel, the garden was largely filled with a L-shaped 
shamiana (marquee) which accommodate the wedding buffet. Behind the shamiana was 
a busy makeshift field kitchen of hyperactive cooks and bairas (waiters) amidst steaming
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pots, mountains of salad, sweets, and utensils. Outside in the garden there was the pan 
stall where the various cocktails of betel nut were being prepared, it is one of the few 
occasions women and children are publicly seen indulging in the substance. The bride 
was ensconced with her kinswomen in intensive preparation for the arrival of the groom; 
he was undergoing a similar preparation at his hotel.
About twenty minutes before his expected arrival, the first strains of the band that leads 
the barat (groom’s wedding procession) could be heard approaching the hotel. Virtually 
everybody decamped to the front of the hotel to welcome the groom’s party. Every 
twenty metres or so the band stopped and the festive men and boys, who were segregated 
from and in contrast to the more soberly behaved women in the procession, performed 
a dance in the road for a few minutes and then moved on. The groom was at the very 
back of the procession on a white horse and dressed as a raja.
The bride’s male relatives waited at the hotel entrance with the bride’s father at the head 
and two sets of floral malas (necklaces), red and white; the red were for male paternal 
and male maternal kinsmen of the groom, white was for the remainder. This reception 
is the m ini (meeting), and the bride’s father greets and garlands the groom’s father, 
similarly the bride’s eldest paternal uncle welcomes the groom’s eldest paternal uncle, 
and so on in strict male paternal precedence. This was followed by the presentation by 
the bride’s party of a token sum of Rs.500, divided so that each participant could give 
to his opposite number - the amount would have been agreed in advance - and each 
placed a tilak on the forehead of the other. Gold or silver coins and coconuts were 
formerly prescribed as auspicious gifts at the milni, but latterly it is usually paper money.
After these felicitations, the groom came to the front of the procession for the first time 
and approached the entrance. Above the doorway was a temporary installed plaque 
inscribed with an auspicious swastika, but the plaque was also the toran (arch) and a 
representation of Laksmi, the toran dwar (main gate) to the bride’s home. The groom, 
still on horseback, touched the toran with the tip of his unsheathed sword. This gesture 
derives from a more martial age when the requirements of Rajput chivalry may have 
precipitated rival suitors to fight one another for the right to capture the bride. But the 
Jain bride also had the right of swayvar, to choose her own husband, when her father 
would invite prospective husbands to be inspected and she would make her own 
choice.12 However, a rival suitor might challenge her choice and abduct her. Thus the 
sword touching the toran signified that he has claimed the bride and would challenge 
anyone for that right. Then the bride’s mother and kinswomen approached the groom and 
standing on a podium they each in turn put a tilak on the groom’s forehead; in addition, 
the bride’s mother passed a cloth over his head to signify protection.
Finally, the groom dismounted, and clutching his sword he made his way not into the 
building but around the side to the back of the hotel. At the back entrance of the hotel, 
outside the room where the previous evening’s mayra had taken place, two rajgaddis 
(thrones) had been placed at the top of the steps facing the garden. All the trappings are 
regal, besides the thrones, the groom’s horse, sword, tunic of gold thread, golden pagri 
(turban), his epithet is dulharaj (groom-prince) and today he and his bride will hold
12On the widespread historical prevalence of this custom among Jains before it was 
superseded by arranged marriages, see Sangave (1980:147-49).
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darbar (court). The groom sat down in the right-hand chair as the bride simultaneously 
appeared from out of the hotel behind the thrones with her female companions - her 
sisters and cousins. She sat down and the couple were garlanded with red malas by both 
fathers, mothers and paternal uncles. Finally, the couple garlanded each other; her 
garlanding of her spouse originates with swayvar, when the bride chose her spouse by 
indicating her choice. It was now the turn of the remaining relatives to approach and 
greet the couple, then the other guests. Afterwards, they drifted over towards the 
shamiana for the pristibhoj (wedding meal).
Orthodox Jain dining is like all Baniya food is strictly vegetarian and there is, of course, 
no alcohol; and following Jain prescriptions, neither are there any tubers. The majority 
of weddings take place in the evening, but if a guest wants to eat during daylight, and 
thus avoid the orthodox proscription against eating after dark, each written invitation has 
a proviso for the buffet being available before nightfall. But I never heard of any 
examples of the latter offer being accepted at a wedding.
Adjacent to the hotel steps, a small separate mandap (canopy) had been erected where 
the phera (ritual) was to be performed; and the only auspicious timing that is generally 
followed is for the performance of the phera. The Brahman pandit (scholar) who 
performed the ritual was assisted by his father and his son. They sat on a mat surrounded 
by their sacred accoutrements: a picture of Mahavira, flower petals, coconuts, betel nut, 
sandalwood paste, rupee notes, etc. The bride and groom sat opposite the pandit, the 
bride’s father next to the bride and his wife next to him; none of the groom’s kin 
participated. The pandit chanted Sanskrit mantras invoking agni (fire), which he kindled
with gobar (cow-dung), and invited the gods to witness the marriage. Throughout the 
ceremony, he often forgot his mantras and had to refer to a ritual text and/or was 
prompted by his father. The bride’s parents were tied together with red and yellow thread 
(;mauli), his dhoti and her sari. At the behest of the pandit, the bride’s father repeated 
the mantras and put a tilak on the bride and groom. The bride’s father made the ultimate 
donation - varana or kanyadana - the gift of a virgin from an inferior wife-giver to a 
superior wife-taker. Then the bride was tied to the groom by the bride’s father, and they 
performed panigranaha - the joining of hands by the pandit.
The climax of the ritual was the saptapadi (seven steps) whereby the young couple tied 
together circulate the sacred fire seven times.13 Until this circumambulation is performed 
the ceremony and the marriage cannot be considered complete. Both panigranaha and 
saptapadi are seen by Jains as the indispensable rites of the marriage ceremony. The 
newly married couple were expected to remain celibate for another seven days, although 
most were agreed that this observance had lapsed.
The ritual lasted about an hour; and on its completion, the married couple touched the 
feet of the bride’s parents and returned to their thrones. As the Brahmans were preparing 
to leave, the bride’s father appeared and handed over several hundred rupees. He later 
told me that when he had first approached the pandit, the latter had originally asked for 
Rs.5000 plus the bride’s father was expected to supply all the ritual ingredients. But after 
considerable haggling they agreed on Rs.800, Rs.300 was given in advance for his
13The rotations represent: i1 sajjatitva - good society, ii/ sadgrhastava - household 
state, iii/ sadhutva - ascetic state, iv/ Indratva - Indra state, v/ cakravaratitva - emperor 
state, vi/ Jinavaratva - Jina state, vii/ nirvana - salvation (Sangave 1980:160).
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materials and the balance of Rs.500 after the ceremony.
The final act was the bride’s departure, a sentimental leave-taking with mock weeping 
and the singing of lamentations by the women. Conversely, there was a joyful welcome 
at the groom’s hotel when the couple arrived by car; the groom’s parents, many relatives 
and friends had slightly earlier left the wedding in order to greet them. The young couple 
touched the feet of the older relatives, and in return received their final tilak of the day.
The above was a not untypical wedding of a middle ranking jeweller, and an example of 
what is called an ‘arranged love marriage’ whereby a couple want to get married, their 
respective parents then negotiate to see if they can come to some accommodation. This 
mode of matrimony is becoming more commonplace among the urban middle classes 
where social intercourse between young men and women is accepted. My informants 
denied that there was ever an example where a couple had been married under duress, 
the prospective bride and groom were always fully consulted. But purely arranged 
marriages still exist.
This is an example of one that was being avidly discussed for months as the ‘wedding of 
the year’ in Jaipur. It was to be an Oswal match between the son of one of the nouveau 
riche jewellers of Jaipur and the daughter of a ‘financial consultant’ who reside in 
Madras. The latter’s family were originally from Rajasthan and for that reason they 
preferred to have the wedding in Jaipur rather than Madras. The fact that it was arranged 
was made at the request of the groom, and the choice of bride may co-incidently have 
been one of those occasions when financial and commercial considerations were
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uppermost. This was certainly the main topic of the considerable gossip that surrounded 
the marriage, that should the groom’s father ever need a line of credit...., plus the 
rumour that a $1 million dowry had changed hands.
The main ostensible difference between this wedding and that described earlier was its 
cost and the numbers involved. The bride’s party had taken over one of the larger Jaipur 
hotels, but the groom’s family are utilising their second suburban house as a centre for 
their wedding party. Like many of the affluent of Jaipur, the groom’s father had built a 
sumptuous palatial house in the suburbs of the city. The intention was to move the family 
out of the haveli near Jauhri Bazaar in the old city and into the new home. But the 
paternal grandmother of the groom suffered a stroke, was paralysed, and refused to leave 
the haveli which nonetheless had been considerably renovated. Thus the new residence 
remained empty although extensively furnished and it was only used for family parties 
and private events, usually in its extensive gardens.
The first event of the wedding-day was lunch at the bride’s hotel with some guests from 
the groom’s party, but without the groom or his immediate kin. However, the object of 
the reception was to display the gifts from her family to the bride. One large room of the 
hotel had been turned into literally a showroom: it was a mass of gaddis and cushions 
strewn around the floor, and displayed on these were half unrolled lavish saris and gold 
necklaces, pendants, earrings, nose-rings. The overwhelming impression, including many 
of the saris, was simply one of gold. The male observers nodded knowingly, the women 
formed small groups to point out and discuss individual items. Then the bride appeared 
with even more jewels to be filmed by both video teams - one for each family. Equally,
no expense had been spared outside: two enormous mauve marquees filled the grounds 
of the hotel, one which was open to the garden and which would hold the buffet was over 
a hundred metres long, the other an enclosed rectangle would hold the darbar of the 
putative couple.
Back at the groom’s residence, the family were preparing for the evening wedding. The 
front drive of the house and the adjacent street was packed with Ambassadors and their 
drivers waiting to ferry guests to the wedding. The large garden was filled with guests 
of the groom’s family, a shamiana had been erected for the buffet; and there was a 
separate buffet in the first floor dining room serving less spicy food for the firangis 
(‘foreigners’) from Britain, France, Thailand and Japan. The guests’ milled around the 
garden plates in hand, the overwhelming majority of the men in formal suits and ties, and 
with the exception of the overseas guests, all the women were in saris or salwar kamiz.
Also in the garden, a second marquee had been erected for the mid-afternoon tamasa. 
Inside was a large stage with a group of folk musicians seated at its back; to the left and 
right were three rows of ornate armchairs, those on the left were occupied by the groom 
and his family, those on the right for the overseas guests - the remaining guests sat on 
the floor in front of the stage. The tamasa was a mixture of traditional Rajasthani songs 
and dances by professional musicians and women dancers, and the more familiar fare of 
‘filmi’ disco’ dancing performed by female members of the groom’s family.
In what may have been jajmani remnant of a bygone age, about twenty women led by the 
groom’s mother entered the lane at the side of the house where there was a potter selling
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earthenware pots. A few of the red pots with white geometric designs were purchased by 
five of the women; these they put on their heads, some had two - one on top of the other 
- and they danced or rather twirled with difficulty while the remainder sang a Rajasthani 
love song.
At dusk, eight hours before the phera, was the time of the groom’s departure. With 
considerable trepidation he mounted his white horse for the ubiquitous video cameras, 
then immediately dismounted. As the bride’s hotel was several kilometres away, the 
groom’s party were ferried to a hotel much nearer to it from where the wedding 
procession would depart; the groom’s horse would be taken there independently. Thus 
the guests were transferred to an intermediate hotel’s grounds by the fleet of 
Ambassadors, where more guests had already assembled. After some delay the barat 
departed headed by six elephants and a squad of Bengali-looking lancers surrounding the 
groom. The barat was over a kilometre long that when the elephants arrived at the 
bride’s hotel the groom still had not departed.
And there were even more guests inside. The hotel and its gardens were festooned with 
electric lights and extra generators had been installed. When the groom arrived at the 
hotel, there was an extravagant firework display in greeting. After the formal greeting 
of the groom by the bride’s relatives, and as he made his way towards his throne, the 
bride slipped out of the hotel to join him on the dais. There was still another five hours 
before the phera and this was largely taken up by the couple being congratulated by the 
one lakh plus guests. The great and the good of Jaipur society were present, and not just 
from the Jain or jeweller communities; the important guests included the Maharajah and
Maharani of Jaipur, the Governor of Rajasthan, a sprinkling of politicians and a 
‘Bollywood* starlet. All the male foreign guests of the groom’s party were given 
distinctive red speckled Rajasthani pagris to wear for the occasion, and they had their 
own spiceless buffet on a terrace overlooking the garden.
Also on the terrace was the mandap where the phera was held at the auspicious hour of 
1.30 am. After the phera the bride and groom retired to the hotel for more private family 
rituals. These concern a mutual exchange of vows to honour, loyalty, fidelity, and so on 
(see, Sangave 1980:161). Later the groom told me that the rituals were eventually 
completed at 6 am. He had asked to experience the full gamut of rituals and have an 
arranged marriage, rather than avoid many of them as is the usual current practice, as 
a kind of ‘examination*; he wanted to have a complete traditional marriage. Nevertheless, 
for the bulk of my informants the marriage ceremony is seen as a necessary if expensive 
formality.
From these two accounts it is possible to judge the economies of scale between a wedding 
of a middle ranking jeweller and one of the lakhpatis. The differences were largely one 
of expense, elaboration, and the numbers involved, and fact that one was a ‘love 
marriage’ and the other a ‘traditionally* arranged match, i.e. where the initial choice was 
made by the parents concerned, was coincidental. Both events were aimed at impressing 
the jewellers of Jaipur, Jain or otherwise; thus the core observers and assessors were the 
same in both cases. But the lakhpati's ostentatious wedding was also aimed at impressing 
both a wider supra-local lapidary market and the Jaipur elite.
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The middle classes are involved in what Hanchett has called a ‘competitive system of 
prestige ranking among either families or individual leaders* which is best manifested at 
weddings (Hanchett 1975:27). She has described Kamatic wedding expenditure as a 
‘potlatch* by which the bride’s family gain status within a highly competitive system of 
reciprocity. But instead of just impressing his caste fellows and neighbours, the bride’s 
father now uses the opportunity to reach a much wider audience. The guests may include 
government officials and civic dignitaries, and prestige may be gained from both the 
number and quality of the guests who attend. Hanchett’s crucial point is that life cycle 
rituals and weddings in particular are used to consolidate relations with, and hopefully 
impress, a wider range of people than those of the immediate vicinity or caste. What she 
observed of village weddings is likely to be even more accentuated in an urban setting 
where weddings are interpreted as public events, and the potentiality to exploit the 
possibilities of conspicuous consumption are even greater. An urban setting increases the 
scope of status seeking due to the wider range of people available, and the successful 
acceptance of invitations can be converted into information, access to resources and 
credit.
Among the affluent in Jaipur, Jain and non-Jain, a wedding is an exercise in competitive 
maximization: the maximum number of guests, a maximum amount of food, maximum 
spent on gifts for the bride,.... And it is inflationary, as if the last elite wedding was 
estimated to have cost Rs. 1 crore (10 million), then the holders of the next will out-spend 
that amount. For Oswals, the viewing of the bride’s gifts especially was formerly a 
private affair and only for her relatives, now it is publicly displayed, and rumours of the 
once forbidden dowry circulate. But conspicuous consumption at weddings was only the
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most prominent example from a whole gamut consumption patterns which are part of the 
competing families' search for commercial and prestigious advantages. For Hanchett, 
Kamatic society has a number of ceremonial occasions which have been turned into 
occasions of competitive hospitality, 'That is the purpose of facilitating communication 
and personal maneuvering [sic] necessary to a "modem" career’ (Hanchett 1975:44).
v/ The Jaipuri Middle Classes
Peace has undertaken a class analysis of contemporary Jaipur where he divides the 
population into two class blocs: a heterogeneous 'lower class' who reside in the old 
walled city, and an equally heterogeneous ‘middle class* who reside in the new town 
(Peace 1980,1984). The disadvantages of Peace's analysis are that he seems intent on 
designating Jaipur’s population by a purely geographical criteria, therefore the old city 
merchants - including the gem/jewellers - are an anomalous if ‘distinguishable economic 
stratum’ and ‘a local commercial bourgeoisie', but nevertheless lower class (Peace 
1980:250-51). Thus the Pink City’s merchants are left in some ‘liminal’ state betwixt and 
between the middle and the lower classes. 'Although they already experienced some 
social advancement it is not especially marked, and nor is it likely to become so’ (Peace 
1980:251).
I hope to have shown in this dissertation that with respect to the gem merchants this is 
far from the case; and the use of plural ‘middle classes’ needs to be reiterated. If for 
arguments' sake we accept Peace’s dual model as valid, then the old city jewellers share 
obvious corporate interests with their partners and kindred in the new city, and can be
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seen as intersecting and part of a wider heterogeneous pan-Jaipuri commercial class. He 
concedes that both classes are of heterogeneous origin, but his class analysis is predicated 
on the creation of two class blocs, anomalies or otherwise. This commercial class 
intersects with an equally heterogeneous middle class of administrators and professionals 
and can be identified with it in terms of wider class interests; for example, in their 
support for the B.J.P and particularly in their shared opposition to the expansion of 
reservation for government jobs - the implementation of the Mandal Report.
My informants were extremely circumspect in the use of the terms ‘caste’ and ‘class’; 
But they were not adverse to designating individual non-Jains as ‘Brahman’, ‘Rajput’, 
‘Muslim’, ‘Mali’ ‘Dhobi*, ‘Bihari’ ‘Marwari’ etc., and Jains as usually either ‘Oswal’, 
‘Srimal’ or ‘Digambar*. There were shared perceptions of identity that mixed varna, ja ti, 
religious, occupational and geographical categories or in combination - a ‘Delhi Digambar 
or ‘Bengali Oswal’ and so on. They did not use the term ‘vama’ nor, with the exception 
of Brahmans, the constituents of the four-fold scheme. Among Jains themselves their 
central social preoccupation was with ja ti, largely in the form of combined Srimals and 
Oswals and the earlier distinctions between the two castes. They were equally unhelpful 
about class, when questioned, they unhelpfully confused class with vama categories, jatis 
and communities, the exception was ‘O.B.C.s’ (‘Other Backward Classes* i.e. Sudras).
However, I am sure my informants would not have objected to being labelled ‘upper 
caste, middle class’, where not only caste - ja ti - and sect but considerations of income, 
occupation and education were increasingly important, and this is reflected in the choice 
of marriage partners. Beteille sees marriage among higher income groups as paradigmatic
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of a re-alignment between caste and class, as ‘horizontal expansion and vertical 
contraction*. And even outside the context of marriage, ‘particularly among the upper 
socio-economic strata, one sees again the emergence of overlapping social categories 
which do not have the rigid structure characteristic of status groups in traditional Indian 
society* (Beteille 1969b:73).
The conspicuous lifestyle of the Svetambar Jain jewellers blends comfortably into Jaipur’s
affluent middle classes of which they are an important constituent; an upper caste mix of
businessmen, administrators, professionals and politicians. They set the highest standards
of material affluence which those below aspire to and envy, and enjoy patterns of
consumption that are comparable to those in Bombay or Delhi. Caplan’s description of
the Protestant middle class of Madras is equally applicable to Jaipur:
‘The well-to-do thus convert income into consumer products which, not singly but in 
concert, make visible statements about their position in the urban hierarchy and the life­
styles to which they subscribe: in short, about the kind of social space they see 
themselves in and wish others to see them inhabiting. These communications are directed 
primarily at others of like station who understand and interpret the messages. One 
important effect of this kind of consumption, therefore,....is that it marks, by means of 
tangible symbols, the boundaries between the social classes’ (Caplan 1987:97).
And the reproduction of the class system requires the affluent to conspicuously consume
and ostentatiously display their wealth.
In the previous chapter, we noted that religious gifting for the Jain jewellers of Jaipur 
was a prestigious and commercial strategy. But fully interpreting the ramifications of 
accumulated cultural capital would be largely restricted to the ambit of Svetambar 
community. Gifts to religious institutions and philanthropy enhances both the donor’s 
financial and moral reputation, religiosity and financial worth being crucial markers of
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status and creditworthiness. Non-Jains in commerce would be cognizant with this 
reputation and are aware that there are divisions in the Jain community but, for example, 
would probably be unaware that one the major jeweller families, which bequeathed a 
major hospital to the city, was a Sthanakvasi and thus did not make endowments to 
temples.
More general conspicuous consumption in lifestyle and particularly at weddings have a 
wider appeal to Jaipur’s middle classes beyond the confines of Jain community. The 
various forms of expenditure whether on education, the home, numbers of cars, even the 
venue for the wedding, effectively advertise the status of business families. But as the 
wedding was ultimately organized and bankrolled by the bride’s family, it is they in 
demonstrating their wealth and status who were largely the focus of assessment and 
gossip. Bayly has argued that historically even those north Indian Baniyas who frugally 
restricted their expenditure could be profligate in anticipation of a prestigious marital 
alliance, and this could be seen as a form of ‘investment* in future social and potentially 
commercial relationships. And this anticipation may not have been rationalized purely in 
terms of future profits but may have been equally concerned with acquiring status through 
an appropriate marriage partner (Bayly 1983:376). Doubtless both factors were present 
in the jewellers’ decision-making where the emphasis was on the equality of marriage 
partners, and the alliance joins the two families in a potential commercial partnership.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION: THE JAIN ETHIC. EXPENDITURE AND
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR
‘It has often been suggested that the reason the tiny Jain community wielded and 
continues to wield so much economic power in India is that the religion it follows, rather 
like Protestant Christianity, naturally inculcates principles of self-reliance and 
responsibility which create an appropriate environment for commercial activity* (Dundas 
1992:169). One of the first to make the comparison between Jainism and ascetic 
Protestantism was Max Weber. He noted that Jainism had a positive relationship to 
economic motivation which he saw as quite alien to Hinduism (Weber 1958:193). He 
noted their severe asceticism, ‘that the individual’s state of grace in life requires proof 
through the endurance of hardship and pain’, and the laity also observed austerities and 
undertook ‘special vows’ that paralleled those of the ascetics (Weber 1958:196,198). 
Their similarity to the Jews who also adopted trade for ritualistic reasons is also noted,1 
but what is more striking is Weber’s comparison of the Svetambar Jain merchants with 
the Puritans.
After ahimsa, the Jains second most important commandment was limiting their 
possessions, but ‘It may be noted that the acquisition of considerable wealth was in no 
way forbidden, only the striving after wealth and the attachment to riches’. This was 
‘rather similar* to ascetic Protestantism, ‘"joy in possessions" ....was the objectionable
1 Weber never elaborates on this parallel; earlier in the text, he had claimed that 
Indian traders were ‘like the Jews, ritually exclusive toward one another and toward third 
parties, [and] were to follow their trades in one economic area*. ‘[The] Vania, have been 
called the "Jews of India", and, in this negative sense, rightly so. They were, in part, 
virtuosi in unscrupulous profiteering* (Weber 1958:112).
thing, but not possession or gain in itself. He wrongly adds that their famed honesty
precluded their participation in 'political capitalism’ (tax farming, etc.).
‘The compulsory "saving" of asceticism familiar from the economic history of Puritanism 
worked also among them toward the use of accumulated possessions, as investment 
capital rather than as funds for consumption and rent. That they remained confined to 
commercial capitalism and failed to create an industrial organization was again due to 
their ritualistically determined exclusion from industry and as with the Jews their 
ritualistic isolation in general....The commandment to retain no more than is 
"necessary"....provided but a very elastic restriction to their extensive accumulation of 
wealth. As with the Puritans the strict methodical nature of their prescribed way of life 
was favourable to accumulation. Abstinence from intoxicants and from the enjoyment of 
meat and honey, absolute avoidance of any sort of unchastity and strict loyalty in 
marriage, avoidance of status pride, of anger, and all passions are....self-evident 
commandments’ (Weber 1958:200-01).
Of their ‘social ethic’, Weber notes that the Jains are famous for their charitable 
institutions and their highly developed mutual solidarity: ‘To be sure, in essence this 
solidarity was....similar to the functional rationalism of Puritan welfare work, more in 
the nature of a discharge of good works than an expression of a religious "acosmic" love 
of which Jainism, indeed, knows nothing’ (Weber 1958:201-02).
What is equally striking is that having delineated some remarkable affinities between 
Jainism and Puritanism, Weber does not pursue his researches in respect of Jainism and 
its adherents. His exegesis lasts only eleven pages, although the Jains are cited in the 
extensive notes of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f Capitalism of twelve years 
earlier. Perhaps it was the paucity of sources available in 1916-17; Weber acknowledges 
the translations of Guerinot, Jacobi, Hoemle et al and a text ‘worth treasuring’ by Mrs. 
Sinclair Stevenson, an ethnography of sorts by a Christian missionary in Gujarat (Weber 
1958:363-66). This not unbiased tome, which for many years was the only non- 
indological source on Jainism and has been continually reprinted in India, concluded that 
‘the heart of Jainism is empty’ (Stevenson 1915:292). With further socio-economic data,
Weber may have been able to confirm his intuition that parallels between Jain and certain 
ascetic Protestant beliefs were correlated with parallels in their everyday practices; and 
to note that Jains entrepreneurs have been able to exploit ready-made resource groups, 
comprehensive networks predicated on family, caste, region and religion.
Weber was wrong when he claimed that ritualism excluded Jains from industry. It has 
already been noted that Jains entered the textile industry in Ahmedabad, in 1878, 
although there was initially some opposition within the Jain community. And this change 
in the economies of scale was not restricted to a few enterprising families. By a system 
of accepting deposits from the public, investment in the industry was ‘widely diffused 
throughout the upper and middle class people of the city*, Jain and Hindu (Gillion 
1968:86,92). Another shortcoming of Weber’s study is the failure to thoroughly analyze 
the relationship between Vaisnavism and Hindu Baniya economic behaviour; his negative 
comments on the Vallabhacarya sect, for example, to which many Baniyas of northwest 
India belong, derive from its perceived emotionalism, orgiasticism and the pre-eminence 
of the guru (Weber 1958:314-16). But several commentators - for example, Gillion and 
Timberg - have argued that there is little or no difference in the economic behaviour of 
Baniyas from differing religious cultures.2 The Hindu and Jain Baniyas of Gujarat and 
Rajasthan have had a decisive role in the formation of modem capitalism in India and
2But Dundas has argued that, ‘[It] has always been the Jains who enacted the 
requirements of [a] frugal and disciplined mode of life with the most assiduity, and 
religious giving has generally assumed for them a dimension of meaning lacking among 
their Hindu counterparts’ (Dundas 1992:170).
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were not impeded in this endeavour by their ritual practices.3
But by Weber’s own criteria, there are historically several analogies between the Jains 
and a number of ascetic Protestant sects: Commercial activity in an urban setting, 
particularly the retail trade, have supplied the principle means of livelihood consistent 
with religious precepts for both groups. The religious ethic, their reputed honesty in 
business, appears to have played a major role in their commercial success. There were 
sumptuary proscriptions on expenditure and the outward displays of wealth and, although 
there were exceptions, the norm was a frugality in lifestyle. Both were noted for their 
reinvestment in business and philanthropy, and neither were precluded from making the 
change from ‘commerce* to ‘industry*.4 In neither case can it be assumed that there was 
an exclusive causality between religious and economic practices; nevertheless, there was 
undoubtedly a link between the two modes of behaviour. The link may have been in the 
form a nexus of mutual reinforcement over time, a combination that enhanced the 
solidarity of both communities within their wider societies. As Weber himself said in The 
Protestant Ethic: ‘What....a really religious orientated rationalization of conduct looks 
like, may be seen, outside the Puritans of all denominations, in the cases of the Jains, the 
Jews, certain ascetic sects of the Middle Ages....however much all these may differ from 
each other.
3Other critics have argued that Weber failed to see the variegation of Hindu and Jain 
religious beliefs and practices; see, Singer (1972:278) Bayly (1983:425) and Munshi 
(1988). Ling argues that Weber grossly overestimated the influence of the minority of the 
population who were adherents to the Salvationist sects (Ling 1980:92).
4If the Jains are to be directly compared to the Quakers, who were an element in 
Weber’s Protestant Ethic hypothesis, then pacifism is also another important ingredient; 
see, Nevaskar (1971).
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The essential point of the difference is (to anticipate) that an ethic based on religion 
places certain psychological sanctions (not of an economic character) on the maintenance 
of the attitude prescribed by it, sanctions which, so long as the religious belief remains 
alive, are highly effective....Only in so far as these sanctions work, and, above all, in 
the direction in which they work, which is often very different from the doctrine of the 
theologians, does such an ethic gain an independent influence on the conduct of life and 
thus on the economic order. This is, to speak frankly, the point of this whole essay....’ 
(Weber 1976:197n.l2).
But a comprehensive re-appraisal of Weber’s writings on the Protestant ethic vis-a-vis 
India is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Rather, as Buss has suggested, ‘Many facts 
and details which have been made available by modem research, obviously were 
unknown in Weber’s time and, as far as these new findings are concerned, Weber must 
be corrected’ (Buss 1985:5). And this ongoing revision, part of what Buss classifies as 
the ‘second critique* of Weber, has been one of the objectives of this dissertation: Weber 
overestimated the role of other-worldly asceticism and ritualism as an obstacle to the 
Baniyas’ participation in modem industry, and as I have particularly shown 
underestimated the Jains* role in the political economy and how their cultural tradition, 
religious ethic, practices and organization could facilitate the shift, in his terms, from 
commerce to industry.
From a recent study of Nagarattars or Naattukoottai Chettiars, a mercantile caste in Tamil 
Nadu, it is clear that Weber’s ‘Protestant’ qualities are not peculiar to only Jains and 
north Indian Hindu Baniyas. Nishimura has successfully argued that the Nagarattars’ 
habitus ‘exactly fits into Weber’s idea of relating religious discipline with an organized 
lifestyle’. She notes their, ‘spiritual training’, ‘God-fearing character*, ‘work ethic’, 
‘correct’ behaviour, planning, and highly-regulated marriage alliances; the acquisition of 
wealth is not at all inimical to their religiosity, and religious donations are ‘the equivalent
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of accumulating wealth in heaven* (Nishimura 1993:420-21). The Nagarattars are 
intimately associated with their temples and religious institutions, and their religiosity and 
charity as a source of meritoriousness is echoed in the philanthropy of the Jains.
Among the Svetambar Jains of Jaipur religious merit-making was enhanced by wealth 
creation, and distribution of that wealth was indirect, voluntaristic and philanthropic. 
Haynes has argued that among the seths of Surat, Hindu and Jain, gifts for the 
construction of temples, wells, guesthouses, etc. and the sponsorship of festivals were 
historically viewed as acts of propitiation to deities and meritorious deeds. ‘The notion 
of humanitarian service, so intrinsic to the concept of philanthropy as understood in 
Western cultures, was at best muted in the conceptual systems of Indian businessmen* 
(Haynes 1987:340). But at the beginning of the nineteenth century, as they adjusted to 
the impact and ideology of their new British rulers, a number of merchants began to 
contribute to public works and causes. In Jaipur the impact of the British was more 
indirect, but the ruler’s attempt to modernize the city from the 1860’s with a number of 
public works probably initiated a mercantile interest in secular philanthropy although 
there are no reports as such. In a city directory of 1935, from a list of 19 charitable 
institutions - and this list is probably incomplete - itemising libraries, schools, an 
orphanage, etc., eleven have a Jain provenance (Jaipur Album 1935 ch.ix:24-25).
Historically, Svetambar Jain gem merchants of Jaipur gave half of one anna or about 3% 
to religious organizations, although this was not exclusively for the erection and 
maintenance of purely religious structures, but also for Jain welfare trusts. Plus there 
were donations to, and the individual sponsorship of, specific religious events which may
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have been volunteered or requested by the sangha organization or an ascetic. My 
Kharataragaccha informants were unanimous in claiming that an ascetic would always 
direct lay acolytes to make their donations to a religious rather than a secular concern, 
and the benefits would be ultimately advantageous to both ascetics and laity - mainly the 
latter. As the wealth of the community increased, the donations to its religious institutions 
correspondingly increased both through the size of the donations and the larger number 
of potential donors. And since Independence, donations have probably involved large 
amounts of black money - as a form of tax avoidance - which was legitimized in the 
moral sphere as meritoriousness.
It was in this philanthropic context that the business/religious nexus was manifested, 
success in business was reflected less in pious religiosity but rather through charitable 
activity. And the public arena of the boli added an important competitive dimension, the 
public donations became important markers of wealth, status and creditworthiness. The 
most significant ritual bolis were the annual auction of the dreams of Mahavira’s mother; 
but if these were neither the most lucrative fund-raising events for the sangha nor 
produced the most extravagant donations from the devotees, they nevertheless were held 
during the most important and most public event of the Jain year. Although there were 
undoubtedly a number of donors who lead an abstemious lifestyle, philanthropic 
expenditure was mirrored in the conspicuous consumption displayed in the home, on 
consumer durables and notably at potlatch weddings. The result was that both modes of 
expenditure were perceived as the prerogative of the most affluent, and monopolized by 
a small number of competing families. Wealth has had such a thoroughgoing impact on 
religious practices that both secular and religious spending are conflated into a
mensuration of status ranking within the community.
Much of the heralded frugality and abstemiousness of the earlier Svetambar Jain Baniyas 
have vanished, and in Jaipur they now share the lifestyle of the urban upper caste middle 
classes. The individual gem merchant of Jaipur had a range of options open to him in 
regard to expenditure whether secular or religious, but religious gifting also conferred a 
moral status. The economic success of the Svetambar Jains has been of mutual benefit 
to both halves of community, lay and ascetic. The Svetambar Jain community of Jaipur 
was dependent on the entrepreneurial expertise of the gem traders centred on economic 
personalism. A tradition of business families reinforced by social and religious ties 
formed an embedded lapidary economy in Jaipur. Networks of durable personalized 
commercial relationships engendered information, credit, trust and minimised uncertainty; 
a system where economic self-interest was neither in terms of immediate short-term gains 
nor at the expense of long-term partnerships. The system has been successfully expanded 
to incorporate partners in other Indian cities and overseas, to both non-Jains and non- 
Indians. The personalized business style was entirely commensurate with commercial 
networks in other Indian centres, and compatible with a potentially capricious 
international market towards which much of the gem trader’s profit-making is now 
directed.
But these commercial strategies were rationalizing mechanisms of an entrepreneurial 
process that was ultimately speculative and unpredictable. Casson has observed that 
entrepreneurial judgements are based partly on information that is not only costly to 
obtain but not available by direct observation at all; thus decisions are also governed by
subjective beliefs which are grounded in an individual's culture and religion, in addition 
to their direct observation of life. And although the behaviour of individual entrepreneur’s 
cannot be predicted, 'the behaviour of entrepreneurs as a group is predictable' (Casson 
1987:152). In respect of my informants, we can combine Casson's observations to see 
how cultural and religious factors - the Jain sanskar - were an important enabling 
mechanism for entrepreneurship, and thus the mutuality of these beliefs and a set of 
shared commercial strategies did engender predictable economic behaviour. And Casson’s 
point that some cultures appear to give greater encouragement to entrepreneurship than 
others appears irrefutable.
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GLOSSARY
Abhavya: incapable of liberation.
Abhiseka: anointing.
Abru: honour, reputation.
Acarya: spiritual leader.
Adhiyatmik-/akti: spiritual power.
Agni: fire.
Ahimsa: non-violence, non-injury.
Akasana: a fast where only one meal a day is permitted. 
Aksata: uncooked rice.
Alartkar. ornament.
Alm&rT: cupboard 
Amanant: deposits.
Anaitik: immoral
Anekanta: ‘many-pointed’, principle of Jain relativism. 
Antyesti: funeral ritual.
Anupavasa: a fast where only water is permitted. 
Anuvrat: ‘lesser vows’ of a Jain layman.
Aparigraha: nonpossession.
Arham/Arhar. omniscient, kevalin (q.v.).
Arti: rotating a flame before a sacred image.
Aryika: female Digambar ascetic.
Asteya: not stealing.
Astprakari-puja: eightfold Jain worship.
Athai: 8 day fast.
Atithi-samvibtiaga: ‘sharing with [ascetic] guests*. 
Ayoga-kevalin: the activity of omniscience.
Bobir, clerk.
Baharana: gifts to Jain ascetics.
Bahi-khata: account books.
Baira: servant.
BakhsTs: ‘a tip*.
Bah strength.
BalTsi notra: ‘a full set*, ‘invitation to join marriage*. 
Band: closure
Bandobast: all arrangements.
Barat: groom’s wedding procession.
Betel: areca nut, ingredient of pan (q.v.).
Bhai: brother.
Bhajan: devotional song.
Bhakti: devotion.
Bhang: cannabis in d ia i. '
Bhat: rice.
Bhattarak: ‘teacher’, Digambar Jain quasi-mendicant. 
Bhava: mental, internal.
Bhent: gift.
Bhoga-bHumi: ‘place of enjoyment’, heaven.
Bhoj/Bhojan: feast.
Bhojansala: dining hall.
Bhomia: stone configuration in a temple usually covered with silver paper or coloured 
saffron.
Bima: insurance.
Biradari: ‘sub-caste’.
Bis: twenty.
Boli: bid.
Brahmacarya: celibacy.
Brahman: priestly caste.
Buddhi: intelligence.
Cabutra: low platform, rostrum.
Cakravartin: universal monarch.
Candana: sandalwood paste.
Caran: footprints of a religious virtuosi.
Caturmas: ‘four months’, monsoon season.
Dadagurudeva: Kharataragaccha saints.
Dadabarv. ‘grandfather’s garden’, shrine of the Dada.
Dadaguru ban puja: great ritual for the Dada.
Dahl: curd.
Dalai: broker.
Dalit: ‘downtrodden*, Schedule caste.
Dana: religious gift.
Darbar. royal court.
Darsana: view, beholding an image.
Das: ten.
Dasa: ‘black’, indigent, Schedule tribe.
Ded: rustic, indigenous, unsophisticated.
Deva: male deity.
Devadravya: ‘God’s money’, offerings to a deity.
Devapuja: ‘the lord’s ritual’, worship of a Tirthankara.
Dew. goddess.
Dewan/diwan: court minister.
Dharma: path, moral code, ‘religion*.
Dharmasala: religious rest house.
Dhoti: ‘loin cloth’, male covering for the lower half of the body. 
Dhupa: burning incense.
Diksa: initiation.
Dipa: a flame.
DTwalv. north Indian Hindu new year.
Dravyapuja: form of worship involving material substances. 
Dulharaj: groom-prince.
Dvija: twice-born castes.
Ek: one.
Faujdar. magistrate.
Firangr. foreigner.
Gaccha: Jain sect.
Gaddi: seat, mattress.
Galv. alley, lane.
Gana: ascetic ‘family*.
Ganin/ganini: senior ascetic.
Garbha: conception.
Garbha-grha: sanctum sanctorum of a Jain temple.
Gati: birth, destiny.
Ghadr. ‘24 minutes*.
Ghanta: ‘48 minutes’, period.
Ghi: clarified butter.
Ghofna: announce.
Gobar. cow dung
Gocari: ‘grazing’, ascetics alms round.
Gotra: clan.
Gram: chickpeas.
Gunasthanas: stages of purification.
Guru-upasti: listening to and veneration of one’s teacher. 
Guru-rekHa: jeweller apprenticeship lineage.
Harijan: ‘children of God*, Schedule castes.
Hartal: strike.
Hat: temporary street market.
Hathi: elephant.
Haveli: courtyard house.
Himsa: violence, injury.
Ho//: north Indian Hindu spring festival.
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Hundi: bill of exchange.
Ijara: leasehold land.
Iktisa: a panegyric of 31 verses.
Indratva: Indra-state.
JagFr. revenue landholding.
Jagirdar. revenue landholder.
Jajrriaru: patron/client relationship.
Jala: holy water.
Jamfta: birth.
Jati: species/genus, ‘caste*.
JauhiT: jeweller.
Jina: spiritual victor, Tirtharikara (q.v.). 
Jina-agama: Jain scriptures.
Jina-bhavana: Jain temple.
Jina-bimba: images of the Tirthankaras. 
Jinavaratva: Jina-state.
Jnan : knowledge.
Kamin: client.
Kanyadana: gift of a virgin.
Karkhana: factory.
Karma: action.
Katha: story, tale.
Kausal: proficiency in the scriptures. 
Kesacandar. saffron and sandalwood paste.
Kevalin: omniscient being.
Kevalinjnana: omniscient.
Khadi: homespun cloth.
Khafisa: crown lands.
Khandan: lineage.
Kharatara: ‘particularly sharp-witted*. 
Khuy. happy.
i
Kisi: any.
Kriyas: life-cycle rituals.
Ksama: forgiveness.
Ksatriya: warrior and aristocratic caste. 
Ksullika: junior ascetic.
Kul: lineage.
Labdhi: miraculous-powers.
Labha: profit
large sweets of Bengali origin. 
Lakhpati: ‘millionaire*, ‘nouveau riche*. 
Lekhpal: accountant.
Madrasa: Koranic school.
Mahajan: ‘lord’, Baniya, Gujarati guild. 
Mahapuja: complex ritual.
Mahavrat: ‘great vows’ of a Jain ascetic. 
Mahotsav: festival.
Mai: goods, commodities.
Mala: garland, necklace.
Malik: householder, proprietor.
Man: maund.
Mandap: canopy.
Mandir. temple.
Mandir-margi: temple-goer.
Mantra: sacred formula, litany.
Masa-khamana: 31 day fast.
Mauli: amulet.
Mayra: ‘gifts to the bride’s mother from her brothers’.
Mela: fair.
Milni: meeting.
Modi: ‘grocer’, Baniya.
Mojussil: provincial.
Mohalla: neighbourhood.
MohanBan: ‘beautiful garden’, shrine to a pravatini (q.v.).
Moksa: liberation, salvation.
Muh-patti: mouth covering of Sthanakvasi and Terapanthi ascetics. 
Muhurt: ghanta (q.v.), auspicious moment.
Mulagunas: dietary restrictions.
Muni: Jain ascetic.
Murti: temple image.
Murti-pujak: ‘image worshipper’.
Nagar. town, city.
Naivedya: sweets.
NamJan: ‘Bombay mix’.
Nigoda: ‘single-sense organism*.
Nirvana: ‘extinction*, liberation.
Padma-asana: lotus position.
Padvi: office.
Pagrr. turban.
Pakka/pucca: ripe, mature, complete.
Pan: chewable cocktail of areca nut, tobacco, lime. etc. 
Panca-katyarm: five auspicious events.
Panca-namaskara: five holy beings of Jainism.
Pandit: religious specialist.
Panigranaha: the joining of hands during a marriage ritual. 
Panth: path, religious sect.
Pap: sin.
Parampara: tradition.
Pargana: an administrative unit of several villages.
Parikramd: circumambulation, boundary.
Parivar. ascetic ‘family*.
Paryusana-parva: ‘abiding holy days*.
Parvan: Jain holy day.
Phala: dried fruit
Phera: marriage ritual, circumambulation around a sacred flame. 
Pinchi: peacock feather whiskbroom of Digambar ascetic.
Pinjarapole: animal sanctuary.
Pithi: pulses.
Posadha: sinlessness.
Potedar. revenue collector.
Prabhava: influence, proselytising the Jain faith.
Pradana: betrothal.
Prakritisah: nature, way of life.
Prasada: distribution of sanctified offerings.
Pratikramana: ritual confession.
Pratima: spiritual stage.
Pratistha: consecration.
Pravatini: senior female ascetic.
Pristibhoj: wedding meal.
Pujci: worship, ritual.
Pujari: temple priest.
Punya: merit.
Punya-ksetra: field of merit.
Puspa: flowers.
Raja: king, prince.
Rajoharana: woollen tufted whiskbroom of Svetambar ascetics.
Raksa-bandhan: annual festival where sisters tie a sacred thread to their brothers’ wrist, 
who in return guarantee their sisters’ life-long protection.
Rani: queen, princess.
Rasta: street, road.
m
Rath: chariot.
Riddhi: prosperity.
Ryots: cultivator.
Ryotwari: cultivating system.
Sabha: association.
Sadgrhastava: householder.
Sddhu: male ascetic.
Sadhutva: ascetic state.
Sddhvi: female ascetic.
Said: marriage, wedding.
clean 
Sagai: betrothal.
Sahab: lord, master. 
Sahu/sahukar/sowkar. banker, Baniya. 
Sajjatitva: ‘good society*.
Sallekhana: ritual fasting unto death. 
Samadhi: sepulchre.
Samaj: society.
Samavarsarana: assembly.
Samayika: ‘equanimity*, meditation. 
Samosarana: five tiered silver pedestal. 
Samsara: cycle of transmigration. 
Samskdras: life-cycle rituals.
Samuday: society.
Samyak-darsana: ‘true spiritual insight*.
Sarnyama: self-control
Sangha: religious community or organization.
Scmgha-pati: community leader.
Sanskar. cultural tradition.
Saptapadi: seven steps around the sacred fire during the phera (q.v.). 
Saraf '/shroff, bullion dealer, Baniya.
Sarfira: eccentric, mad.
Sasana-devita: guardian spirit, tutelary deities.
Satya: truth.
Seth: business magnate.
Sevarak: temple attendant.
Shamiana: marquee.
Siddha: kevalin (q.v.).
Sikar. hunting.
Snatra-puja: ritual bathing of an image.
/raddha: reverence. 
dravaka: layman.
Sravika: laywoman.
Stava: hymn of praise.
Sthairya: ‘steadfastness in the faith*
Sthanak: hall.
Sthavira: elder.
Stupa: Buddhist reliquary.
m .
tfubha: auspiciousness.
Suddh: pure.
/uddhta: purity.
/udra: artisan and servant castes.
Svadyaya: studying scriptures.
SyCadesl: self-made, ‘from one’s own land*.
S\~ayvar. a girls* choice of a potential groom. 
Syadvada: ‘the doctrine of may be*.
Tahsll: sub-district.
Tamasa: entertainment.
Tantrik: occult.
Tapa: ‘heat*, austerities.
Tapvasi: one who undertakes austerities.
Tehla: 3 day fast.
TtidlP. tray.
Tilak: auspicious mark on the forehead.
Tirthahkara: ‘ford maker*, one the 24 Jain luminaries. 
TTrtha-seva: serving the Jain divines.
Tola: 11.7 grams.
Topi: hat.
Toran-dwar. main-gate.
Upadhyaya: religious preceptor.
Upasraya: preaching hall.
Uphar. gift.
m
a
Upnayan: initiation rite into a twice-born caste. 
*
Upvasa: fasting.
Vagdana: betrothal.
Vaid: ayuvedic practitioner.
Vairagya: renunciation.
Vaisya: mercantile caste, Baniya.
Vanij: Vaisya (q.v.), Baniya 
Varana: kanyadana (q.v.).
Varna: fourfold caste schema.
Vasi: dweller.
Vihar. Jain ascetic wandering.
Viiaytv. ‘English’, imported, sophisticated. 
Vivah: marriage, wedding.
Vrat: vow.
Vratf: one who undertakes a vow.
Vydkhyan: sermon, lecture, religious discourse. 
Yaksa: tutelary demi-god.
Yati: Svetambar quasi-mendicant.
Yatra: travel, pilgrimage.
Yuga: age, eon.
Zamindar. landowner.
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